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Abstract
In recent years, formal methods have been developed to analyze and verify cryptographic
protocols. We will focus on protocols that rely on iteration or recursion. These protocols
typically use special security tokens – such as numbers used only once, called nonces, or
keys generated by a principal – to achieve their security assertions.
The recursion depth of the computations in such protocols and thus the number of fresh
tokens occurring in a run of a protocol is not explicitly bounded by the protocol’s descrip-
tion. Therefore, we need a mechanism to provide the protocol’s principals with the ability
to generate an unbounded number of fresh tokens.
In this report we will extend the model of selecting theories introduced by Truderung – in
this model recursive protocols can be analyzed in the presence of a Dolev-Yao intruder. We
will present an extended model that allows the principals to generate fresh tokens, and we
will show decidability with respect to a bounded number of sessions. In the proof, attacks
on such protocols will be represented by a special graph structure introduced by Truderung
called ADAG; we will prove our decidability result by bounding the size of ADAGs. In the
protocol model and in the ADAGs the modeling of fresh tokens will be based on an infinite
set of constants in the signature.
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1 Introduction and Fundamentals
The use of cryptographic protocols is widely spread – for example, e-commerce and online
banking are typically secured by protocols using cryptographic methods as encryption or
digital signatures, promising security properties as secrecy or authentication. The design of
such protocols is complex and error-prone, hence, an analysis of their security properties is
essential. But as the analysis itself is likewise complex and laborious, the overall analysis is
usually split up into several more manageable tasks.
One of these tasks is a high-level analysis of the protocol’s logic, abstracting from most
of the implementational and cryptographical details of the cryptographic methods used in
a protocol. The main question on this level of abstraction is if an adversary can attack a
protocol’s security assertions if he has control over the network and can manipulate mes-
sages, but has no means like cryptanalysis – this type of adversary is called Dolev Yao
intruder. A symbolic approach on this level has allowed models and tools to be develop,
which have become useful and practical for the (automatic) analysis of cryptographic pro-
tocols [DY83, FHG98, RT01].
While most models can only handle protocols of a simple structure, we will examine a
broader class of protocols including ones that can only be modeled by iteration or recursion.
These protocols often rely on special security tokens such as numbers used only once, called
nonces, or fresh keys generated by principals of the protocol [Mea01, SB05]. As the size of
the messages exchanged in such a protocol and thus the recursion depth of the principals’
computations is not explicitly bounded by the protocol’s description, we need a mechanism
to provide the principals with the possibility to generate an unbounded number of nonces
and fresh keys.
In this report we will extend a model introduced by Truderung [Tru05b], which uses spe-
cial Horn theories – called selecting theories – to model the principal’s computations. In
this model secrecy can be decided for recursive protocols in the presence of a Dolev-Yao
intruder; we will extend this model to handle the generation of fresh tokens and show de-
cidability of secrecy of a protocol (with respect to a bounded number of sessions). In the
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decidability proof, attacks on such protocols will be represented by a special graph struc-
ture called ADAG introduced in [Tru05a], and we will be able to present a decision algorithm
by bounding the size of ADAGs. In the protocol model and in our ADAGs the modeling of
fresh tokens will be based on an infinite set of constants along the lines of [KW04].
1.1 Cryptographic Protocols
1.1.1 Cryptographic Primitives
In this report we will use cryptographic algorithms such as encryption schemes, digital
signatures or hashing algorithms. As we will abstract from the cryptographical and imple-
mentational details of these algorithms, we refer the reader to introductory texts like [Sti95]
or [DK02], the latter also has a chapter about cryptographic protocols. We will call such
algorithms (cryptographic) primitives.
One important primitive we refer to are nonces, which is an abbreviation for number used
once. We assume that during computations each computing party can generate numbers
that were not generated by this party before. This allows us, for instance, to tag messages,
i. e., to distinguish between two messages which have the same content, by appending
nonces to the messages.
The Handbook of Applied Cryptography [MVO96] defines nonces as
[. . . ] a value used no more than once for the same purpose. It typically serves
to prevent (undetectable) replay.
The term nonce is most often used to refer to a »random« number in a challenge-
response protocol [. . . ]. Three main classes of time-variant parameters are [. . . ]
random numbers, sequence numbers, and time-stamps. Often, to ensure proto-
col security, the integrity of such parameters must be guaranteed.
In this report, the generation of nonces and the generation of fresh keys will both be referred
to as generation of fresh tokens, and we will abstract from the details of the implementation
as described in Section 1.2.5.
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1.1.2 Cryptographic Protocols
In computer science, a communication protocol is a convention for the communication be-
tween two or more computing parties called principals. The Handbook of Applied Cryp-
tography [MVO96] defines it as
[. . . ] a multi-party algorithm, defined by a sequence of steps precisely specify-
ing the actions required of two or more parties in order to achieve a specified
objective.
One has to distinguish between the service offered by a protocol (»a specified objective«),
i. e., the purpose and benefit when using this protocol, and the description of the internal
structure (»sequence of steps«), i. e., the way in which this protocol tries to accomplish
its purpose. The definition of a protocol may include several levels, from the syntax of
electronic signals to the semantics of applications.
Cryptographic protocols apply cryptographic methods such as encryption algorithms and
digital signatures to offer a specific security service. Their internal structure can often
be described on an abstract level, i. e., as a sequence of abstract messages under certain
conditions. Their service may, for example, include secrecy, authentication, key exchange
or agreement, secured data transport, anonymity, non-repudiation, or fairness. In this
report we will use the term »security of a protocol« – if not stated otherwise – for secrecy,
i. e., that an adversary is not able to derive information that is meant to be kept secret by a
protocol.
Today the use of cryptographic protocols on modern communication networks is widely
spread – for example, Transport Layer Security (TLS, formerly SSL, first presented in [HE95])
and Secure Shell (SSH, introduced in [Ylö96]) are common cryptographic protocol used
to secure connections over the internet. Although partly out-of-date, the Clark-Jacob li-
brary [CJ97] gives a good survey of cryptographic protocols.
Bellare and Goldwasser state [GB01]:
Classical cryptography is concerned with the problem of [secure] communica-
tion between users by providing privacy and authenticity. The need for an un-
derlying infrastructure for key management leads naturally into the topic of key
distribution. For many years this is all there was to cryptography.
One of the major contributions of modern cryptography has been the develop-
ment of advanced protocols. These protocols enable users to electronically solve
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many real world problems, play games, and accomplish all kinds of intriguing
and very general distributed tasks. Amongst these are zero-knowledge proofs,
secure distributed computing, and voting protocols.
1.1.3 Recursive Cryptographic Protocols
Most of the cryptographic protocols used in real world applications can be abstracted to
the mathematical level and then be described by simple means: The protocols consist of
a certain sequence of messages exchanged by the principals, where each principal that
receives a message replies with a single message that can be computed from the previous
messages without the need of complex methods as iteration or recursion.
This is often based on the fact that the cryptographic protocol is separated from the applica-
tion using it. For example, the standard situation for TLS is »only« to secure communication
between two principals by agreeing upon a set of cryptographic algorithms used and then
exchanging key material for these primitives. Any application may use this secured com-
munication channel and transmit arbitrary data over it, abstracting from the details of the
implementation of TLS.
But some protocols, called recursive protocols, contain complex actions or data structures:
On the one hand, there are, for instance, group protocols providing services not only for
two principals, but for a potentially unbounded number of principals. Such protocols often
contain data structures such as lists of the principals involved or rely on a server which
sends messages to each principal.
On the other hand, there are protocols that integrate application logic and cryptographic
methods: For example, there are protocols based on web services and WS-Security that
allow the modeling of business processes. During such a business process, a whole set of
data is exchanged between several parties, which have to encrypt or digitally sign parts of
the messages or data, or which may only be allowed to read or to add data etc.
One important example of a recursive protocol is the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) proto-
col [Kau05, Zho99], for more examples see [SB05]. We will use a simple recursive protocol
for illustration and as an example protocol, the Recursive Authentication Protocol [BO97,
Pau97].
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1.2 Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
1.2.1 Different Levels and Approaches
When cryptographic protocols are used in the real world, their security depends on factors
on different levels. One can distinguish between different types of weaknesses:
1. User level: When one uses software containing cryptographic primitives or crypto-
graphic protocols, there are several possible problems like weak or inscribed pass-
words, unconditional trust exploited by social engineering or phising, and running
security-critical applications on insecure systems.
2. Implementation level: Implementing cryptographic algorithms and protocols is ex-
tremely error-prone – there may be numerous ways to attack implementations on
hardware (e. g., power consumption) or software level (stack-overflow, deadlocks, tim-
ing attacks, weak pseudo-random number generators etc.).
3. Cryptographic Level: Some cryptographic protocols are designed by simply applying an
arbitrary encryption, signature, or hashing scheme. While some of these schemes are
simply outdated or weak (for example, DES), the security of other schemes depends
on their usage – e. g., the stream cipher RC4 should be used with a pseudo-random
key and the first output bytes should be discarded. Naturally, weak or misused cryp-
tographic primitives lead to serious flaws in protocols, the best-known example is the
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol which uses RC4 in an insecure way; for
further examples see [Boy90].
4. Logical level: Even if one abstracts from all other levels mentioned so far by assuming
that the cryptographic primitives used are perfectly secure, there are numerous pos-
sible weaknesses in the logic of a protocol itself. As described in the next section, one
major example is Lowe’s attack on the Needham-Schroeder protocol [NS78, Low95],
for more examples see, e. g., [CJ97].
Although the security of an actual protocol execution depends on all these levels, the com-
plexity of the analysis necessitates to split the analysis.
The user level (1) typically eludes any analysis. Applications using cryptographic methods
are, in practice, analyzed on the implementational level (2), but rarely systematically: These
examinations are very laborious, they have to be done manually and do always remain
partial. On the cryptographical level (3), many of the cryptographic primitives used in
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protocols have been thoroughly analyzed or are still analyzed; but naturally, the work on
this level will never be finished, either. Finally, as there are various potential problems
on the logical level (4) of protocol design, it is also necessary to analyze the logic level of
protocols.
There are two main approaches on the logical level: The first one links the security of a
protocol on the logical level to the security of the cryptographic primitives, i. e., linking level
three and four, while the latter one completely abstracts from the details of cryptographic
primitives, i. e., solely analyzing the logical level.
• In the computational model, messages are viewed as bit strings, and the cryptographic
operations applied on messages are considered as functions on bit strings. An ad-
versary is typically modeled by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine; and
security is proven by reducing the security of a protocol to security of the crypto-
graphic primitives. This usually yields security results which express the probability
or computational complexity of attacks like in [BR93]. In this model, the complex
proofs can often only be done manually, which is error-prone [CBH05].
• On the other hand, the symbolic approach abstracts from many of these details. Mes-
sages are modeled by a term algebra, and so the cryptographic primitives are only
modeled by a set of axioms, assuming perfect cryptography. The intruder is able
to modify terms in an idealized way. Thus, security properties can be described in
formal logics. This enables a (semi-)automatic analysis by model checking, theorem
proving or similar methods – if the problem is decidable at all, what is not necessarily
the case. We will give references in the next two sections.
• In addition to these two separate approaches, first results were achieved to link both
the symbolic and the computational approach, see, e. g., [AR00, BPW03, CW05].
In this report we will analyze protocols on the logical level, pursuing the symbolic ap-
proach, i. e., we will abstract from cryptographical details as described in the next sec-
tions.
1.2.2 History on the use of Formal Methods
From the beginning of computer networks, protocols were developed, implemented, and
tested by hand, i. e., by trial-and-error: A protocol was published (or some software using a
protocol), and if a bug or a flaw was found in a protocol or software, a revised version was
1 Introduction and Fundamentals 12
developed. But similar to the verification of algorithms, formal methods were developed
and began to be practical and useful to analyze the security of cryptographic protocols.
In 1978, Needham and Schroeder published an article entitled »Using Encryption for Au-
thentication in Large Networks of Computers« [NS78]. They described the scenario of a
network without a central authority that can ensure authentication etc., and they proposed
a threat model:
We assume that an intruder can interpose a computer in all communication
paths, and thus can alter or copy parts of messages, replay messages, or emit
false material. While this may seem an extreme view, it is the only safe one
when designing authentication protocols.
This description is the basis for today’s formal analysis on the logical level of protocols. In
1983, Dolev and Yao presented the first method which allowed protocols to be modeled on
this level, making it possible to formally analyze their secrecy properties with respect to the
Needham and Schroeder threat model [DY83].
Ironically, an authentication protocol proposed by Needham and Schroeder [NS78] is to-
day’s best-known example for a protocol that was analyzed with formal methods – and
failed: Although Denning and Sacco manually analyzed the protocols proposed by Need-
ham and Schroeder in 1981 and found flaws in it [DS81], an important attack on the asym-
metric Needham-Schroeder protocol was found by Lowe no earlier than 1995 [Low95].
Lowe then applied formal methods to analyze the flaw and to show that his extension of
the protocol is secure [Low96]. Today, a modified version of the protocols proposed by
Needham and Schroeder is widely used in the authentication protocol Kerberos [SNS88].
For a survey of the history of the symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols, for nu-
merous examples and for an outlook on open problems see [Mea95, Mea01, Mea03] and
[CS02].
1.2.3 The Dolev-Yao Model
The symbolic approach of protocol analysis is based on the so-called Dolev-Yao model, which
is a generic term for a set of assumptions and abstractions that has developed out of [DY83].
These assumptions mostly include the following ones, which will be used in our model,
too:
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1. A protocol run consists of messages exchanged by a set of principals. Each principal
is defined by a set of consecutive actions including receiving and sending messages;
such an action is called a protocol step.
2. The set of messages is created by a term algebra over a signature that contains con-
stants for atomic keys, the names of principals, nonces etc., as well as function symbols
for pairing and cryptographic primitives such as encryption or digital signatures.
3. The principals are connected via a network that is insecure, i. e., there is an intruder
which has complete control over the network: He can read, manipulate, or delete
each message sent by the principals, and he can create messages by combining (parts
of) messages he read. This is often illustrated and modeled as »The intruder is the
network«.
4. There can be several sessions of each principal, i. e., there may be multiple parallel runs
of the protocol. There typically is a basic knowledge shared between the sessions of
one principal, e. g., they all know the principal’s name, but further than that, the
different sessions are typically not connected nor coordinated except by the network,
i. e., by the intruder.
5. The cryptographic primitives work perfectly – for example, the only way to learn
the plaintext from an encrypted message is to use the appropriate key. No form of
cryptanalysis is possible.
Although these assumptions are not always realistic, they are necessary to analyze protocols
on this level of abstraction. Many decision problems and formal methods were developed
out of the Dolev-Yao model or inspired by it.
Previous Results and Restrictions
The general decision problem of secrecy of a protocol and many variants thereof are unde-
cidable as shown, e. g., in [DLMS99, EG83, AC02]. But there are important variants of the
problem that are decidable – also see Figure 1.1 for selected results: For a bounded total
number of sessions, the secrecy problem was shown to be NP-complete [RT01, RT03], for a
bounded message size and a bounded number of nonces it is DEXP-complete [DLMS04].
The decidability results for a bounded number of sessions have been extended to protocols
that incorporate, e. g., properties of operators like XOR [CKRT03a, CLS03] or Diffie Hellman
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exponentiation [CKRT03b]. In addition, while most work on the formal analysis of cryp-
tographic protocols has concentrated on protocols that offer secrecy, authentication or key
exchange, there are other security properties that can be analyzed and decided [KKW05].
For decidable classes of protocols, several techniques were developed and have been ap-
plied for the (semi-)automatic analysis of secrecy of such protocols, including model check-
ers [MMS97], theorem provers [BS97], logic programming [CDL+99], and tree automata [Küs03].
In [Mea03], Meadows identified several emerging areas of research: open-ended protocols,
new applications and threats (like anonymous communication or electronic commerce),
high fidelity (i. e., lowering the level of abstraction), composability of protocols, and »getting
it into the real world«. Our focus on recursive protocols falls in the first category.
1.2.4 Analyzing Recursive Cryptographic Protocols
So far, most research has concentrated on non-recursive protocols, i. e., protocols where the
protocol steps can be expressed by simple rewrite rules. However, as there exists many
recursive protocols, the relevance of their analysis is apparent – this has been pointed out
by, e. g., [Mea01, FS00, Zho99]. Recursive protocols have been analyzed manually [PQ01]
and (semi-)automatically [BS97, Mea00, SB05] – e. g., our running example, the Recursive
Authentication Protocol, has been analyzed using the theorem provers CSP/PVS [BS97] and
Isabelle/HOL [Pau97]. Furthermore, a general decision algorithm for an automatic analysis
of recursive protocols was presented in [KW04, Tru05b].
Modeling of Fresh Tokens
In the case of a finite number of sessions and non-recursive protocols, the modeling of
fresh tokens is quite easy – all nonces and keys used in a protocol run can simply be atomic
messages, i. e., constants of the signature used to model terms [RT01]. This is due to the
fact that in each session only a bounded number of nonces can be generated, so the total
number of nonces is bounded in terms of the size of the protocol.
In models that do not have these restrictions, one has to introduce other means to model
fresh tokens correctly. Some models allow an unbounded number of sessions – for exam-
ple, the approach of multiset rewriting [CDL+99, DLMS04] uses existential quantification to
model nonces, and the strand space model [FHG98] applies special restrictions on strands
and bundles to guarantee freshness.
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unbounded unbounded recursive fresh decidability
message size number of session protocols tokens and references
– yes – yes undecidable [DLMS04]
– yes – – decidable [DLMS04]
yes – – (yes) decidable [RT01]
yes – yes yes decidable [KW04]
yes – yes – decidable [Tru05b]
yes – yes yes decidable (this report)
Figure 1.1: Decidability of secrecy with respect to different restrictions
In [KW04] the number of sessions is bounded, but protocols can be recursive – therefore, an
infinite signature is used to allow an unbounded set of fresh tokens, and the tree automata
used to develop the decision algorithm are designed to cope with infinite signatures. We
will adopt this method and use an infinite signature of anonymous constants (the name also
originates from [KW04]), and we will modify the structures used in the proofs in [Tru05b]
to cope with infinite signatures or unbounded subsets thereof.
Comparison of Different Approaches
Figure 1.1 compares different approaches and some results. When aiming at recursive pro-
tocols, one naturally has to consider unbounded message sizes. Hence, to maintain decid-
ability it is necessary to limit the total number of sessions and thus the number of principals.
In [Küs03, KW04] transducers were used to model recursion. As stated in [KT07],
[. . . ] the expressivity of these transducer-based models is orthogonal to the Horn
theory model: While the transducer-based models allow [principals] to output
messages of complex structure, in the Horn theory model only lists (or sets) of
messages of a more simple structure can be produced. The main disadvantage of
the transducerbased model is that, unlike the Horn theory model, messages can-
not be tested for equality without losing decidability. This, as already observed
in [KW04], immediately implies that security is undecidable in the transducer-
based model with XOR (or Diffie Hellman exponentiation) since these operators
allow for (implicit) equality tests between arbitrary messages.
On the other hand, properties of the XOR operator can be added to the model based on
Horn theories, allowing decidability not for all protocols, but for a major class of proto-
cols [KT07].
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In this report we will examine recursive protocols with an unbounded message size and an
unbounded number of fresh tokens, but we will limit the number of sessions – in fact, we
will limit the number of principals and allow only one session per principal, but a bounded
number of sessions per principal can simply be simulated by copying each principal.
1.2.5 Generation of Fresh Tokens as a Cryptographic Primitive
As described above, we abstract from the mathematical and implementational details of the
cryptographic primitives used and make certain assumptions, e. g., for encryption schemes.
As we view the generation of fresh tokens as a cryptographic primitive, we have to formulate
assumptions for this primitive as well – similar assumptions are presented, e. g., in [CS02].
During this report we will abstract from the details of the generation of fresh tokens and
use the following assumptions:
• If a principal A generates a fresh token, no other principal is able to predict or derive
that token other than by receiving this information from A, directly or indirectly.
• Two different principals will never generate the same token.
• There is an unbounded set of values for fresh tokens.
Of course, these assumptions are not realistic: As [MVO96] states, nonces are typically im-
plemented by random numbers, sequence numbers, or timestamps; so there is, for example,
usually no guaranteed uniqueness. Nevertheless, the possibilities involved here, e. g., for
the incidental generation of equal random numbers on two different personal computers,
are usually negligibly small.
1.3 Horn Clauses and Selecting Theories
In [Tru05b] and in our model sets of Horn clauses are used to describe the principals of a
protocol. Horn clauses are named after Alfred Horn who analyzed special classes of clauses
in [Hor51]. They are the basis for many deduction methods in artificial intelligence [Rob65]
and furthermore, logic programming languages (e. g., PROLOG) are mostly based on Horn
clauses [Llo84].
Kowalski gives an introduction to Horn clause logic in [Kow79] and states:
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The majority of formalisms for computer programming bear greater resemblance
to Horn clauses than they do to »non-Horn« clauses. In addition, most of the
models of problem-solving which have been developed in artificial intelligence
can be regarded as models for problems expressed by means of Horn clauses.
Thus, Horn theories – i. e., sets of Horn clauses – have proven to be a good choice for
modeling the knowledge and the deduction capabilities of the principals and the intruder,
there are various approaches to the verification of cryptographic protocols using Horn
clauses [Bla01, VSS05, Tru05b].
Truderung introduces a special class of Horn theories called selecting theories [Tru05b], which
are used to model the handling of messages by the protocol’s principals and the intruder.
He uses three kinds of predicates in the Horn clauses: One is modeling the intruder’s
knowledge, a second kind is used to describe the recursive processing of terms by a prin-
cipal, and a third kind is modeling tree automata and provides a regular lookahead when
processing messages. Upon receiving a message a principal applies a rewrite rule. Then
he uses a selecting theory to process the result, deriving new messages that are added to
the intruder’s knowledge. The intruder is then able to process these messages by a special
Horn theory, composing and decomposing terms to construct new messages.
As we will extend Truderung’s model in this report, we refer the reader either to Chapter 2
for the details of the extended model or to [Tru05b] for the basic model.
1.4 Structure of this Report
In Chapter 2 we will first provide an example protocol. Then we will present our model,
and we will define a security notion for this kind of protocols. We will also show how
to model the example protocol, and we will state our main result. In the following two
chapters we will prove the decidability result: First, in Chapter 3 we will introduce a graph
structure called ADAG which represents an attack on a protocol, i. e., a protocol is insecure if
and only if an ADAG for this protocol exists. In Chapter 4 we show that we can always find
ADAGs of a bounded size in terms of the size of the protocol, which leads to the possibility
to decide security by checking all these bounded ADAGs in bounded time. In the last chapter
we will conclude and show possible extensions of our model.
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2 Protocol Model and Main Result
In this chapter we will extend the model of »Selecting Theories« developed in [Tru05b]
and briefly introduced in Section 1.3 to be able to generate an unbounded number of fresh
tokens and thus model nonces and generated keys more accurately. We will start with
a running example, the Recursive Authentication Protocol [BO97, Pau97]. Then we will
present preliminaries necessary for our model, the latter is then presented in Section 2.3.
Afterwards we will show how to model the running example in Section 2.5 and present our
main result in Section 2.6.
2.1 A Running Example
To illustrate the usage of our model, we will use the »Recursive Authentication Protocol«
which was presented by Bull and Otway [BO97]. After the description of the protocol in this
section we will give a formal model of the protocol in our extended model in Section 2.5.
The Recursive Authentication Protocol is an extended version of the authentication protocol
by Otway and Rees [OR87]: The latter can only cope with two principals, while the recursive
protocol allows an unbounded number of principals in one protocol run. Note that we
will use a modified version provided by Paulson [Pau97] – amongst minor differences the
original version uses exclusive or (XOR) instead of encryption, allowing a simple attack on
the protocol [RS98].
For this protocol we assume that there is a set of principals {P1, . . . , PN} who would like
to communicate pairwise, i. e., Pn wants to communicate in a secure way with Pn+1 for all
n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}.
In addition, there is a server PSrv (with Srv = N + 1) that, for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, shares
a long-term key Kn for a symmetric encryption scheme with the principal Pn. The server
shall now generate new symmetric session keys K(n,n+1) for the communication between Pn
and Pn+1 for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
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To start the protocol P1 sends the following message to P2, containing the names P1 and P2,
a nonce N̂1 generated by P1 and a constant marking ⊥ the start of the protocol – using the
symbol HK(x) for modeling x and a keyed hash of x as explained in Section 2.3.1:
P1 → P2 : m1 = HK1(P1, P2, N̂1,⊥) .
Principal P2 sends the following message to P3, again containing two names, a nonce N2
generated by P2 and the first request received from P1:
P2 → P3 : m2 = HK2(P2, P3, N̂2, m1) .
Accordingly, PN receives the message mN−1 and sends this message to the server PSrv:
PN → PSrv : mN = HKN(PN, PSrv, N̂N, mN−1) .
First the server processes mN without knowing the size of mN in advance, which depends
on the number of the protocol’s principals. The server generates keys K(n,n+1) for n ∈
{1, . . . , N} and composes the following messages:
m′N = 〈{K(N−1,N), PN−1, PN, N̂N}KN , {K(N,Srv), PN, PSrv, N̂N}KN〉 ,
...
m′n = 〈{K(n−1,n), Pn−1, Pn, N̂n}Kn , {K(n,n+1), Pn, Pn+1, N̂n}Kn〉 ,
...
m′2 = 〈{K(1,2), P1, P2, N̂2}K2 , {K(2,3), P2, P3, N̂2}K2〉 ,
m′1 = {K(1,2), P1, P2, N̂1}K1 .
Second the server sends all these messages to PN, who will decrypt the message m′N and
forward all other messages to his predecessor PN−1. They will act in the same way, resulting
2 Protocol Model and Main Result 20
in the following messages to be sent:
PSrv → PN : 〈m′1, . . . , m′N〉 ,
PN → PN−1 : 〈m′1, . . . , m′N−1〉 ,
...
P3 → P2 : 〈m′1, m′2〉 ,
P2 → P1 : m′1 .
At the end of the protocol run, principals Pn and Pn+1 share the key K(n,n+1) for all n ∈
{1, . . . , N}.
2.1.1 Fresh Tokens
The Recursive Authentication Protocol is an example of a recursive protocol: The server gets
a linked list of single requests, which is processed recursively. The size of the total message
received by the server and thus the number of elements in the list is neither known in
advance nor explicitly bounded by the protocol’s description, i. e., the server should be able
to process messages of arbitrary length (aside from real-world technical bounds as memory
or network capacity).
During this process, the server has to generate keys for each request, hence, the server may
have to generate an unbounded number of keys. In the previous section, we modeled this
by defining a key for each pair of principals. But this may lead to re-use of keys: If a groups
of principals (or the intruder) generate a message containing nested requests for symmetric
keys for two principals, the server creates duplicate certificates, i. e., he uses the same key
twice for both requests.
Consider the following request received by the server:
m = HKB(B, Srv, N
′
B, HKA(A, B, N
′
A, HKB(B, A, NB, HKA(A, B, NA,⊥)))) . (2.1)
The server will send the keys K(B,Srv) and K(B,A), but also keys for the communication
between A and B initiated by A, i. e., he will send a key K(A,B). When using a model which
has a bounded number of constants, we will usually only have one key K(A,B). The server
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has to send the following terms, sending the key K(A,B) twice to both A and B:
〈{K(A,B), A, B, N′B}KB , {K(B,Srv), B, Srv, N′B}KB〉 ,
〈{K(B,A), B, A, N′A}KA , {K(A,B), A, B, N′A}KA〉 ,
〈{K(A,B), A, B, NB}KB , {K(B,A), B, A, NB}KB〉 ,
{K(A,B), A, B, NA}KA .
(2.2)
But this is not what a real server would do. Upon receiving this kind of request, a real
server would generate a new key for each of the connections, ignoring the fact that some of
these connections are intended for the same pair of principals.
Thus, our goal is to allow the server to generate an unbounded number of fresh tokens so
that a verification of such a protocol does not have to rely on a finite set of constants defined
in the signature of that protocol.
2.2 Preliminaries
In this section we will introduce basic notations and preliminaries necessary for our model.
2.2.1 Signatures and Terms
The messages used in our model will be terms over a formal term algebra, and we will
extend the normal (finite) signature with an infinite set of constants, which will contain
constants called anonymous constants. In addition, we will use three different kinds of vari-
ables: regular variables, anonymous variables, and fresh variables. The main idea is that the
anonymous and fresh variables are typed variables, i. e., the only values that can be as-
signed to them are anonymous constants. Furthermore, we assume that the substitutions
we use cannot assign the same anonymous constant to two different fresh variables. Thus,
we can guarantee freshness of anonymous constants.
Definition 2.1. Let Σ be a finite signature, i. e., a set of function symbols with an arity. By
Σi we denote the subset of all function symbols of arity i in Σ. Symbols with arity zero
are called constants. Let Γ = {c1, c2, . . .} with Γ ∩ Σ = ∅ denote a countably infinite set of
constants which we call anonymous constants.
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Let X, Y, Y? be disjoint finite sets of variables: The elements x ∈ X will be called regular
variables, elements y ∈ Y will be called anonymous variables, and variables y? ∈ Y? are called
fresh variables. We use V = X ∪Y ∪Y?.
The set of terms over a signature Σ̄ and a set of variables V̄ will be denoted by T(Σ̄, V̄); we
will need the set TV = T(Σ ∪ Γ, X ∪Y ∪Y?). Terms are called ground if they do not contain
any variables, neither regular nor anonymous nor fresh ones. A term is called linear if each
variable occurs at most once in it. Flat terms are of the form f (t1, . . . , tm) with f ∈ Σm
and t1, . . . , tm are constants or variables. We will call terms simple if they are linear or flat,
possibly both.
For a term t ∈ TV , let sub(t) denote the set of subterms and depth(t) the depth of that term,
i. e., for all c ∈ Σ0 ∪ Γ ∪ V and for all f ∈ Σn (for some n ∈ N>0 and terms t1, . . . , tm ∈ TV)
we recursively define:




depth(c) = 0 , depth( f (t1, . . . , tm)) = 1 + max
{
depth(tj)
∣∣ j ∈ {1, . . . , m}} . (2.4)
Let var(t) denote the set of all variables occurring in t, i. e., var(t) = sub(t) ∩ V. For each
V′ ⊆ V we write varV′(t) for var(t)∩V′, e. g., the fresh variables of a term t are denoted by
varY?(t). /
2.2.2 Anonymous Substitutions
In order to cope with anonymous and fresh variables, anonymous substitutions are defined,
which map variables to terms, anonymous and fresh variables to anonymous constants,
and different fresh variables to different anonymous constants.
Definition 2.2. A (ground) substitution is a mapping σ : X → T(Σ ∪ Γ, X) from regular vari-
ables to (ground) terms. A substitution σ is extended to a substitution from terms to terms
σ̂ : T(Σ ∪ Γ, X) → T(Σ ∪ Γ, X) in the natural way:
σ̂(t) = σ(t) for t ∈ X , (2.5)
σ̂(t) = f (σ̂(t1), . . . , σ̂(tm)) for t = f (t1, . . . , tm) with f ∈ Σm . (2.6)
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A function σ : X ∪ Y ∪ Y? → TV is called anonymous substitution if the following two condi-
tions hold:
σ(y) ∈ Γ for all y ∈ Y ∪Y? and (2.7)
σ(y?1) 6= σ(y?2) for all y?1 , y?2 ∈ Y? with y?1 6= y?2 . (2.8)
An anonymous ground substitution is defined analogously, and both can be extended to a
mapping on terms as above. /
In the rest of this report, we will simply use σ and the denotation anonymous substitution for
both the substitution σ and the extended anonymous substitution σ̂.
Example 2.3. Let t = f (y?1 , y
?
2) for a function symbol f ∈ Σ2 and two distinct fresh variables
y?1 6= y?2 , an anonymous substitution σ cannot map t to f (c, c) with c ∈ Γ, instead we have
σ(t) = f (c1, c2) for some c1, c2 ∈ Γ and c1 6= c2. /
2.2.3 Registers and Register Sequences
When processing a message, our principals will have access to a special memory containing
a bounded number of anonymous constants, called register sequence. The principals can read
constants from that memory, move constants within the memory and generate anonymous
constants at each single position in the register sequence.
Definition 2.4. A tuple κ = (κ1, . . . , κZ) ∈ (Γ∪Y ∪Y?)Z for Z ∈N>0 will be called a register
sequence with Z registers. We will denote κi by κ[i]. We define varY(κ) = {κ1, . . . , κZ} ∩ Y
and varY?(κ) analogously, let var(κ) = varY ∪ varY? .
If we have κ ∈ (Y ∪ Y?)Z, we call it a register sequence of variables, if otherwise we have
κ ∈ ΓZ, it is called a ground register sequence. We will use a special term, called simple
register sequence, which is defined as κ? = (y1, . . . , yZ) ∈ YZ with fixed, pairwise distinct
anonymous variables y1, . . . , yZ. We will later use κ[i] to denote the ith element in a register
sequence.
Let Γ = {c1, c2, . . .}, then we define κ(n) = (rn·Z+1, . . . , rn·Z+Z) for each n ∈N. /
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2.2.4 Horn Theories and Proofs
As stated in Section 1.3, we will use Horn theories to model both the protocol’s principals
and the intruder, allowing recursive computations for the handling of messages.
Definition 2.5. Let P be a set of unary predicate symbols and R be a set of binary predicate
symbols. For p ∈ P and t ∈ TV we say p(t) is an atomic (ground) formula if t is a (ground)
term. For r ∈ R and a (ground) register sequence κ let r(t, κ) also be an atomic (ground)
formula. We will use the term (Horn) fact for atomic ground formulas.
A Horn theory Φ is a finite set of Horn clauses of the form [a1, . . . , am → a0] where a0, . . . , am
are atomic formulas. In addition we assume that fresh variables do only appear in a0. /
Definition 2.6. Let Φ be a Horn theory, and let A and B be sets of facts. Let Π = [b1, . . . , bm]
be a finite sequence of facts with B ⊆ {b1, . . . , bm}. We further assume that there is a set
{C1, . . . , Cm} of pairwise disjoint subsets of Γ, let C =
⋃m
j=1 Cj. We assume that the following
holds for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m}:
1. Either bj is an assumed fact (a-fact), i. e., bj ∈ A and Cj = ∅; or
2. bj is a constructed fact (c-fact), i. e., there is a clause ϕ = [t1, . . . , tn → t0] ∈ Φ and
an anonymous substitution σj such that there exists {t′1, . . . , t′n} ⊆ {b1, . . . , bj−1} with
σ(t0) = bj and σ(ti) = t′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; with Cj = σ(varY?(t0)). We call bj
constructed by ϕ or obtained by ϕ.
Such a sequence Π is called (Horn) proof of B with respect to Φ assuming A assigning C. /
If there is a Horn proof of B with respect to Φ assuming A which assigns C, we write
A `CΦ B, calling A the assumption and B the conclusion of the proof. For a single atomic
formula b we write A `CΦ b instead of A `CΦ {b}. If A `CΦ B holds for some C ⊂ Γ, we will
also omit C and write A `Φ B.
Note that we use squared brackets to denote sequences, e. g., Π = [b1, . . . , bm], and that we
will denote the ith element of a sequence Π by Π[i], e. g., we have Π[i] = bi.
Remark 2.7. In this report we will use algorithms to construct Horn proofs. This may
lead to duplicate facts in the same proof. While this is no problem for a-facts and c-facts
constructed by clauses without fresh variables, this may lead to two identical facts both
being constructed by the same clause containing a fresh variable: This would contradict the
assumption that the sets Ci are pairwise disjoint. Therefore, for the rest of the report we
assume that each fact is added to a proof only once. /
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We have now defined all the preliminaries we need to describe our protocol model.
2.3 The Formal Model
2.3.1 Messages
We will start with the term algebra defining the set of messages that can be used in our
protocols.
Definition 2.8. Let Σ be a finite signature containing following symbols:
• a subset K ⊆ Σ0 of constants modeling keys,
• a constant ¢ modeling the intruder’s initial knowledge,
• a constant $ modeling the secret,
• a binary function symbol 〈•, •〉 for pairing,
• a binary function symbol {•}• for symmetric encryption,
• a binary function symbol {|•|}• for asymmetric encryption,
• an unary function symbol h( •) where h(t) represents the hash of a term t,
• an unary function symbol H( •), where H(t) represents the hash of t plus the term t
itself,
• one unary function symbol hk( •) for each k ∈ K where hk(t) represents the keyed hash
of t under the key k,
• one unary function symbol Hk( •) for each k ∈ K, where Hk(t) represents the keyed hash
of t under the key k plus the term t itself,
• additional constants depending on the protocol, e. g., for names of principals etc.
Note that keys are constants, both for symmetric as for asymmetric encryption. We assume
that there exists a bijection •−1 on the set of keys which maps every public (private) key k
to its corresponding private (public) key k−1.
The elements of the set H = {h, H, } ∪ {hk, Hk | k ∈ K} ⊂ Σ are called hash symbols. A hash
term is a term of the form h(t) for some hash symbol h ∈ H.
Let Γ be an infinite set of constants. Ground terms over Σ ∪ Γ are called messages. /
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For the rest of this report, we will consider Σ, K, and Γ to be fixed sets. We will omit
the pairing symbols if possible – for instance, we will write I(x, y) instead of I(〈x, y〉), or
〈x1, . . . , x4〉 instead of 〈x1, 〈x2, 〈x3, x4〉〉〉.
2.3.2 Selecting Theories
Now the main ingredient of our model is defined – special Horn theories called selecting
theories. We will use them to process messages: When a message t is sent over the network,
there will be a predicate symbol r such that a principal’s processing of that message is
handled by a selecting theory applied on the fact r(t).
We will take three different kinds of predicate symbols and accordingly we define three
types of clauses, whose function can informally be described as follows:
1. Using push clauses we can process messages recursively, moving from a term in the
message to one of its subterms (or some of it subterms in parallel). There will be a
register sequence where we can store anonymous constants as explained above, and
we will be able to generate anonymous constants during each push step.
2. Send clauses allow principals to send messages to the network – and thus directly to
the intruder, as proposed by the Dolev-Yao model.
3. Pop clauses will provide a lookahead when processing messages as they can simulate
runs of a nondeterministic bottom-up tree automata when viewing the message terms
as trees: They assign pop symbols from a set of predicate symbols Q to subterms of
messages, allowing the use of these symbols in other clauses. Note that we will be
able to assign pop symbols to anonymous constants, and that our pop clauses are
even able to compare parts of messages.
For the resemblance between pop clauses and tree automata we refer the reader to [Tru05a].
Definition 2.9. Let Q and R be disjoint sets of predicate symbols. The elements of Q are
assumed to be unary predicate symbols and are called pop symbols, the elements of R are
binary predicate symbols called push symbols. Let I be an unary predicate symbols, it will
model the intruder’s knowledge.
Let κ, κ′ be register sequences of variables with var(κ) ⊆ Y and var(κ′) ⊆ var(κ) ∪ Y?.
Let m ∈ N, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, pop symbols q, q1, . . . , qm ∈ Q, push symbols r, r′ ∈ R, function
symbols f ∈ Σm ∪ Y and g ∈ Σm, variables x1, . . . , xm ∈ X. Let tr, tI ∈ T(Σ, X) be simple
terms with depth(tr) > 0, let xr ∈ var(tr), let sI ∈ T(Σ, var(tI) ∪ var(κ)).
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We define the following three types of Horn clauses:
pop clauses q1(x1), . . . , qm(xm) → q( f (x1, . . . , xm)) , (2.9 a)
push clauses q1(tr), . . . , qm(tr), r(tr, κ) → r′(xr, κ′) , (2.9 b)
send clauses q1(tI), . . . , qm(tI), r(tI, κ) → I(sI) . (2.9 c)
Pop, push, and send clauses are special Horn clauses. Hence, a finite set Φ of such clauses
is a special Horn theory called selecting theory using anonymous constants over (Q, R) with Y
registers. /
We remark that by using an anonymous variable f ∈ Y (and thus, m = 0) we are able to
assign pop symbols to anonymous constants.
Example 2.10. Consider the following selecting theory Φ containing three clauses over Q =
{q} and R = {r} with one register, regular variables x, x′, an anonymous variable y and a
fresh variable y?:
→ q(y) assign a pop symbol to all anonymous constants, (2.10)
r(〈x, x′〉, y) → r(x′, y?) descend in the right component, (2.11)
q(x), r(x, y) → I(〈x, y〉) send x and a fresh anonymous constant. (2.12)
Now consider a term t = 〈〈c1, c2〉, 〈d, c3〉〉 with anonymous constants c1, c2, c3 ∈ Γ and
d ∈ Σ0. Then we have r(t, c4) `
{c5,c6}
Φ I(〈c3, c6〉) as the following Horn proof shows:
r(〈〈c1, c2〉, 〈d, c3〉〉, c4) a-fact (2.13)
r(〈d, c3〉, c5) c-fact by applying (2.11) on (2.13) (2.14)
r(c3, c6) c-fact by applying (2.11) on (2.14) (2.15)
q(c3) c-fact by applying (2.10) (2.16)
I(〈c3, c6〉) c-fact by applying (2.12) on (2.15) and (2.16) (2.17)
But we will never be able to construct a fact I(〈d, c′〉) for any c′ because we cannot construct
the fact q(d). /
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Figure 2.1: The run of a protocol: The intruder derives a message m1, a principal applies a
protocol step t1 → r1(s1) and derives a message m2 sent to the intruder and so
on.
2.3.3 Principals and Protocols
Now we can define principals which mainly consists of rewrite rule which is then processed
by a selecting theory.
Definition 2.11. A protocol step τ over (Q, R) is of the form (t, r, s), where t, s ∈ T(Σ, X) are
terms and r ∈ R is a push symbol.
A principal ~τ over (Q, R) is a finite sequence [τ1, . . . , τN] of protocol steps such that, for





A protocol over (Q, R) with Z registers is a pair P = (P, Φ) consisting of a finite set of
principals P and a selecting theory Φ using anonymous constants over (Q, R) with Z regis-
ters. /
By abuse of notation we will write t → r(s) instead of (t, r, s) even if r(s) is no atomic
formula because of the arity of r.
We will now explain the behavior of principals in our model – see Figure 2.1 for illustration,
with the intruder theory ΦI as introduced in the next section.
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Let Φ be a selecting theory with anonymous constants over (Q, R). Assume that we have a
principal which has a protocol step t → r(s) with r ∈ R, and he is receiving a term σ(t) for a
ground substitution σ. Let κ be a register sequence containing fresh anonymous constants,
i. e., constants not used so far in the run of the protocol. The principal will now send each
term s′ to the network for which r(σ(s), κ) `CΦ I(s′) holds – for a set of fresh anonymous
constants C not used so far and not used to construct any other term s′′.
In fact, there could be an infinite number of messages s′ as there are infinitely many possi-
bilities to choose each anonymous constant – but we will show that for analyzing security
it is sufficient to check a bounded number of messages. Note that the number of messages
sent to the network in one protocol step is not bounded in terms of the size of the protocol,
even if we only consider messages that do not contain any anonymous constant.
Remark 2.12. It is also possible to model non-recursive protocol steps of the form t → I(s):
For each such step τ, we take an unused push symbol rτI ∈ R and add the following send
clause to the selection theory:
rτI(x, κ?) → I(x) . (2.19)
This allows us to express t → I(s) by r → rτI(s). /
Remark 2.13. For the rest of this report we will consider the sets of predicate symbols Q,
and R as well as the number of registers Z to be fixed, i. e., when referring to a protocol we
will omit »over (Q, R) with Z registers«. /
2.3.4 The Intruder
Our threat model is the same as presented in Section 1.2. Thus, we will describe an intruder
that is able to read, modify, delete, replay or create all messages sent over the network. But,
according to the level of abstraction of the Dolev-Yao model, he is not able to apply any
form of cryptanalysis or similar, e. g., he is only able to read and decompose messages that
are not encrypted at all or encrypted with keys he knows. These abilities of the intruder,
i. e., to decompose messages and generate new messages, are also modeled by a Horn
theory.
Definition 2.14. The intruder theory ΦI is defined as follows for x, x1, x2 ∈ X and each key
2 Protocol Model and Main Result 30
k ∈ K:
I(〈x1, x2〉) → I(x1) , I({x}k), I(k) → I(x) , (2.20 a)
I(〈x1, x2〉) → I(x2) , I({|x|}k), I(k−1) → I(x) , (2.20 b)
I(H(x)) → I(x) , I(Hk(x)) → I(x) , (2.20 c)
I(H(x)) → I(h(x)) , I(Hk(x)) → I(hk(x)) , (2.20 d)
I(x1), I(x2) → I(〈x1, x2〉) , I(x), I(k) → I({x}k) , (2.20 e)
I(x), I(k) → I({|x|}k) , (2.20 f)
I(x) → I(h(x)) , I(x), I(k) → I(hk(x)) , (2.20 g)
I(x) → I(H(x)) , I(x), I(k) → I(Hk(x)) . (2.20 h)
I(x), I(hk(x)) → I(Hk(x)) , (2.20 i)
For a set of messages A, let I(A) = {I(t) | t ∈ A}. We define that the intruder can derive a
message t from A if I(A) `ΦI I(t). /
As later stated in Lemma 3.1, this derivation can be divided into two phases: decomposition,
clauses (2.20 a) to (2.20 d), followed by composition, clauses (2.20 e) to (2.20 i).
Note that we have no special clauses for anonymous constants – for the intruder, these
constants are not distinguishable from regular constants. By the principal described in 2.4.1
we enable the intruder to use anonymous constants, but this is possible within the means
presented so far.
2.3.5 Attacks and Security
Definition 2.15. Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol with M principals ~τ1, . . . ,~τM, where for each
m ∈ {1, . . . , M} the principal ~τm has Nm protocol steps τm1 , τm2 , . . . , τmNm .
An execution scheme π for P is a sequence [π1, . . . , πN] of protocol steps if there is a function
f : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , M} that witnesses for each protocol step in which principal this
protocol step occurs, i. e., has the following property: f−1(m) = {p1, . . . , pN′m} with p1 <
p2 < · · · < pN′m and N
′
m ≤ Nm for all m ∈ {1, . . . , M}, and πpn = τmn for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N′m}.
/
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To complete our model we define the security of a protocol – keep in mind the illustration
in Figure 2.1.
Definition 2.16. Let (π, σ) be a pair with a ground substitution σ and an execution scheme
π = [tn → rn(sn)]Nn=1 for a protocol P , and set tN+1 = $.
We take the pairwise disjoint ground register sequences κ(1), . . . , κ(N) we defined earlier
and set C0 to contain all anonymous constants in these N register sequences. We further
assume that {C0, . . . , CN} is a set of pairwise disjoint subsets of Γ.
Let there be another set {T1, . . . , TN} of sets of messages sent to the intruder during that
step, i. e., Tn is a set of facts of the form I(t) for messages t, such that the following condi-
tions hold:
rn(σ(sn), κ(n)) `CnΦ Tn for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and (2.21 a)
{I(¢)} ∪ T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tn `ΦI I(σ(tn+1)) for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N} . (2.21 b)
Then (π, σ) is called an attack on P . A protocol is called insecure if there is an attack on it,
otherwise it is called secure. /
This concludes the definition of our model. In the next section we will single our some
features of our model, whereas in Section 2.5 we will show how to model the Recursive
Authentication Protocol.
2.4 Features of the Model
2.4.1 Fresh Tokens for the Intruder
In the real world, an intruder can obtain an arbitrary number of fresh tokens by simply
generating them randomly. Our intruder, on the other hand, is not yet able to generate
fresh anonymous constants.
We present one possible way to allow the intruder to generate constants: a principal whose
only purpose is to provide the intruder with fresh tokens. We leave it up to the user of our
protocol model to add such a principal if appropriate.
This affects the security of a protocol – i. e., a protocol without this principal may be secure
in our model, while adding the principal makes it insecure. But as stated above, this
2 Protocol Model and Main Result 32
change to the notion of »secure« is usually justified, as a real intruder is able to generate
fresh tokens.
This principal has the following protocol steps, with x? being a regular variable not used
elsewhere and r? being a new push symbol:
x? → r?(x?) . (2.22)
The following clauses are added to the selecting theory with y? being a fresh variable and
yz being an anonymous variable for each z ∈ {1, . . . , Z}:
r?(〈x0, x1〉, (y1, y2, . . . , yZ)) → r?(x1, (y?, y2, . . . , yZ)) , (2.23)
r?(〈¢, x1〉, (y1, y2, . . . , yZ)) → I(y1) . (2.24)
If the intruder wants to generate i anonymous constants, he constructs the following mes-
sage:
〈 ¢, . . . , ¢︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i+1) times
〉 . (2.25)
Upon receiving this message the new principal replies with i messages each containing a
fresh anonymous constant.
Note that our principals are not able to distinguish between different anonymous constants
because there is no possibility to check anonymous constants for inequality. Hence, it would
also be sufficient to allow the intruder to derive only one fresh anonymous constant.
2.4.2 Challenges to the Intruder
As later used in Section 2.5, we can add a principal which models security by using an
additional key KΛ and the following clause for the selecting theory with an unused regular
variable xΛ:
〈xΛ, {xΛ}KΛ〉 → I($) . (2.26)
Any principal can now claim a whole term t to remain secret by sending {t}KΛ to the
intruder: If the intruder is able to derive t, then he is able to send 〈t, {t}KΛ〉 to the additional
principal, which replies with $.
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On the other hand, the intruder is not able to extract t from {t}KΛ because of the assumption
that the key KΛ is not used anywhere else in the protocol.
2.5 Modeling the Example Protocol
To illustrate our extension in comparison with [Tru05b], we give a formal model of the
Recursive Authentication Protocol as described in Section 2.1. Our model presented here
is slightly imprecise as the server does originally send a list of messages, which cannot be
modeled by the means available – our server just sends each message on its own. Addi-
tionally, our principals do not forward the server’s messages to their predecessors. One can
show that both imprecisions are not relevant for the security of the protocol.
We will start by defining the protocol in the basic model presented in [Tru05b] and then
show how our extension of the model improves the analysis.
2.5.1 Basic Model of the Protocol
We assume that there are N + 1 principals {P1, . . . , PN, PSrv} using this protocol, with PSrv
being the server (again, Srv = N + 1). Besides the constants and function symbols from
Definition 2.8, the signature Σ contains the following constants:
• for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N, Srv} the principal’s name Pn, a nonce N̂n, and a key Kn which
is shared between the principal and the server,
• for each possible pair of principals (n, m) with Srv 6= n 6= m, a key K(n,m) which can
be sent to the principals by the server,
• the symbol ⊥ necessary for the initialization of the protocol, and
• a key KΛ which is used for formulating challenges.
Let xSrv, xΛ, x(a,b), x(a,b,c,d) be variables for a, b, c ∈ {1, . . . , N, Srv} and d ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. We will
now define the protocol steps and the selecting theory of the protocol:
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Security
For modeling security as explained in Section 2.4.2, we first add a principal which uses the
key KΛ, i. e., the principal has only one protocol step:
〈xΛ, {xΛ}KΛ〉 → I($) . (2.27)
The following principals can now state »The term t should remain secret« by sending {t}KΛ
to the intruder: As long as the key KΛ is, besides in this principal, only used for encryption,
the intruder can only obtain $ from this principal if he can derive a term t for which he
knows {t}KΛ .
Initiator
Protocol steps for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, m ∈ {1, . . . , N, Srv} (with x̄ = x(n,m)):
¢ → I(HKn(Pn, Pm, N̂n,⊥)) , (2.28)
{x̄, Pn, Pm, N̂n}Kn → I({x̄}KΛ) . (2.29)
The last step models that the term x̄ sent to the principal in step 2 should remain secret
during the run of the protocol – this is necessary because the initiator would use x̄ as the
key established by this protocol. Now if the intruder is able to derive x̄, he will also be able
to derive $ because of a the first principal, resulting in the protocol being called insecure.
Inner Principals
Protocol steps for each n, m1 ∈ {1, . . . , N} and m2 ∈ {1, . . . , N, Srv} (with x̄l = x(n,m1,m2,l)):
Hx̄1(Pm1 , Pn, x̄2, x̄3) → I(HKn(Pn, Pm2 , N̂n, Hx̄1(Pm1 , Pn, x̄2, x̄3))) , (2.30)
〈{x̄4, Pm1 , Pn, N̂n}Kn , {x̄5, Pn, Pm2 , N̂n}Ki〉 → I({x4}KΛ , {x5}KΛ) . (2.31)
Both x̄4 and x̄5 correspond to keys received from the server and thus should remain secret,
as again stated by the last send action.
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Server
The server is modeled with only one protocol step:
xSrv → rSrv(xSrv) . (2.32)
The following clauses are used as the selecting theory of the protocol for each n, m1 ∈
{1, . . . , N} and m2 ∈ {1, . . . , N, Srv}:
rSrv(HKn(Pn, Pm2 , x1, x2)) → rSrv(x2) , (2.33)
rSrv(HKn(Pn, Pm2 , x1, HKm1 (Pm1 , Pn, x2, x3))) → I({K(m1,n), Pm1 , Pn, x1}Kn) ,
I({K(n,m2), Pn, Pm2 , x2}Kn) ,
I({K(m1,n)}KΛ) , I({K(n,m2)}KΛ) ,
(2.34)




An additional principal is necessary to allow the intruder to gain knowledge of the com-
monly used constants, i. e., the names of the principals and ⊥:
¢ → I(⊥, P1, . . . , PN, PSrv) . (2.36)
2.5.2 Extending the Model of the Protocol
We will now modify the selecting theory presented in the previous section to use our
extended model. We use Z = 2 as the number of registers. We still need most of the
constants defined above, but not the keys K(n,m).
The protocol’s principals are modeled in exactly the same way, we only have to change the
clauses of the selecting theory. Hence, in our model we use the following selecting theory,
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replacing the clauses (2.33) to (2.35):
rSrv(HKi(Pi, Pj2 , x1, x2), (y1, y2)) →rSrv(x2, (y2, y?)) ,
I({y1}KΛ) ,
(2.37)
rSrv(HKi(Pi, Pj2 , x1, HKj1 (Pj1 , Pi, x2, x3)), (y1, y2)) →I({y2, Pj1 , Pi, x1}Ki) ,
I({y1, Pi, Pj2 , x2}Ki) ,
(2.38)
rSrv(HKi(Pi, Pj, x1,⊥), (y1, y2)) →I({y1, Pi, Pj, x1}Ki) . (2.39)
We also add a principal that is generating anonymous constants for the intruder as de-
scribed in Section 2.4.1.
This model of the protocol is slightly more accurate than the one presented first. Indeed,
we did not model the nonces used by the principals by anonymous constants. But this is
not necessary because the total number of nonces used by the principals in the protocol is
bounded by the number of principals.
But the key generation of the server is modeled using anonymous constants – thus, we
eliminated the problem described in Section 2.1.1, i. e., the server will no longer »generate«
the same key twice.
Note that in this protocol such a situation can only occur if there are multiple principals
with the same name, which would be the case if we had Pi = Pj in our model for i 6= j,
or if the intruder would be able to modify or generate a message to the server such that it
contains multiple requests for a single connection as shown in Section 2.1.1.
2.6 Main Result
Theorem 2.17 (Main Theorem). Let P be a protocol using anonymous constants. For a bounded
number of principals, there is an algorithm that decides in nondeterministic double exponential time
if P is secure.
To prove this theorem, we will later describe the algorithm which nondeterministically
guesses a possible attack and checks if the guess is an attack. To do so, we present a
structure called directed acyclic graph of the attack (ADAG) introduced in [Tru05a] and extended
in [Tru05b], which represents an attack on a protocol.
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The proof has two main steps: First we will show that a protocol is insecure if and only
if there is an ADAG for that protocol. Second we will prove that for each ADAG we find
one of at most double exponentially bounded size, resulting in the possibility to guess and
examine each ADAG in nondeterministic double exponential time.
More precisely, in Chapter 3 we will begin with transforming the definition of an attack
presented above to a characterization more suitable for defining an ADAG. This transforma-
tion consists of two steps: First, we will merge the selecting theory of a protocol with the
intruder theory, resulting in a Horn theory called the theory of a protocol (see 3.2) which can
directly obtain the additions to the intruder’s knowledge from a protocol step t → r(s).
Then we will extend this Horn theory to a selecting theory called stage theory (see 3.3),
which is not modeling one protocol step at a time, but the whole run of the protocol in one
application of the theory. The characterization of an attack by a stage theory is then related
to an ADAG, which is a graph structure with special labeling functions, altogether restricted
by a set of local properties defined in 3.5.
Subsequently, in Chapter 4 we will show how to scale down ADAGs. In 4.2 an ADAG will
be transformed to simple ADAGs, i. e., we further restrict the structure of an ADAG. In 4.3 we
scale down the number of a certain kind of nodes called goals, and finally in 4.4 we will
show how to scale down the number of all nodes in an ADAG by merging nodes until the
whole ADAG has a bounded size. Finally in 4.5 we can present an algorithm which decides
security by nondeterministically guessing and checking ADAGs.
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3 The Graph of an Attack
3.1 The Intruder Theory
We will begin with the proof of the following lemma mentioned in the definition of the
intruder in Section 2.3, which is based on [CJM98]:
Lemma 3.1 (Intruder Theory). Let A and B be sets of messages. It holds A `ΦI B if and only if
there exists a Horn proof b1, . . . , bn of B with respect to ΦI assuming A such that there are numbers
l1 ≤ l2 ≤ n with the following properties:
• b1, . . . , bl1 ∈ A are a-facts,
• bl1+1, . . . , bl2 are c-facts obtained by clauses (2.20 a) to (2.20 d), and
• bl2+1, . . . , bn are c-facts obtained by clauses (2.20 e) to (2.20 i).
Proof. Let A and B be sets of messages. Clauses (2.20 a) to (2.20 d) will be called decomposi-
tion clauses, clauses (2.20 e) to (2.20 i) composition clauses.
One implication of the lemma directly holds: If there exists a Horn proof with the restric-
tions mentioned in the lemma, then we have A `ΦI B.
We show the other implication: We assume that A `ΦI B. This means there is a Horn
proof b1, . . . , bn of B with respect to ΦI assuming A, we now show that there is a sequence
[b′1, . . . , b
′
n′ ] ⊆ {b1, . . . , bn} which still is a Horn proof of B, but with l1 ≤ l2 ≤ m as men-
tioned above.
By definition of a Horn proof, all the a-facts bi ∈ A occurring in the proof do not depend on
other facts in the proof, hence, we can assume that we find an index l1 with b1, . . . , bl1 ∈ A
and bl1+1, . . . , bn /∈ A.
As long as we do not find an l2 satisfying the condition in the lemma for bl1+1, . . . , bn, we
repeat the following steps:
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• First we find an index i > l1 with bi being obtained by a composition clause, but
bi+1 being obtained by a decomposition clause – we call such a situation an inversion.
Such an index exists because we have moved all facts from A to the beginning of the
Horn proof and we cannot find an index l2.
• Let the fact bi be produced by a composition clause c1 → c0 or c1, c2 → c0; and bi+1 be
produced by a decomposition clause d1 → d0 or d1, d2 → d0.
Consider three cases:
a) If c0 6= d1, then bi+1 does not rely on bi: We find an anonymous substitution σ
and sets with σ(d0) = bi+1, and with σ(d1), σ(d2) ∈ {b1, . . . , bi−1} (analogously if
there is no d2).
Then we can swap both steps: We set n′ = n, b′i = bi+1, and b
′
i+1 = bi, as well as
b′j = bj for all j 6= i, i + 1.
b) If c0 = d1 with c0 = I(H(x)) or c0 = I(Hk(x)) and d0 = I(h(x)) or d0 = I(hk(x)),
one can directly obtain d0 from the c1 (and possibly c2).
As above, we swap both steps: We set n′ = n, b′i = bi+1, and b
′
i+1 = bi, as well as
b′j = bj for all j 6= i, i + 1.
c) If c0 = d1, but case b) did not apply, then bi+1 is a fact which is already known
before bi is composed, i. e., we have d0 ∈ {c1, c2} and we can delete step i + 1 of
the Horn proof: We set n′ = n− 1, b′j = bj for all j ≤ i, and b′j = bj+1 for all j > i.
We now repeat these steps as long as there is an index i as above, using b′1, . . . , b
′
m as the
new Horn proof in the next iteration.
In every iteration we shorten the proof by one fact or eliminate an inversion, hence, we can
have no more than n2 iterations. As soon as there is no index i left, the proof meets the
requirements mentioned in the lemma.
3.2 The Theory of a Protocol
In our model each of the intruder’s steps consists of composing a term and sending it to a
principal, after which the principal applies a protocol step and uses the selecting theory to
determine which terms are sent to the intruder.
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Figure 3.1: Merging the selecting theory Φ and the intruder theory ΦI into the theory of a
protocol ΦP
As shown in Figure 3.1 we now merge two steps: After a principal applies the selecting
theory Φ of the protocol, the intruder uses his theory ΦI to derive new messages. Because
both Φ and ΦI are Horn theories, we can merge them into one Horn theory, the theory of a
protocol.
In order to bound the ADAG in later steps of our proof, we introduce an optimization: If the
selecting theory contains a send clause constructing a term t, the intruder may be able to
decompose this term – possibly because he already learned some keys used in the protocol
– and derive a subterm s ∈ sub(t). Therefore, we add an additional send clause to the
theory of the protocol which directly sends the term s if the intruder knows the necessary
keys.
First we define a relation on the set of keys expressing accessibility: For a send clause ϕ
and a set of keys K we need to know which subterms of the send term can be derived by
the intruder after the clause ϕ has been applied, assuming the intruder already knew the
keys in K.
Definition 3.2. Let K be a set of keys. We will inductively define the relation ⇒K⊆ TV × TV .
Let t, s be terms and let k ∈ K be a key. Then we set:
t ⇒∅ t , (3.1 a)
〈t, s〉 ⇒∅ t , {t}k ⇒{k} t , (3.1 b)
〈t, s〉 ⇒∅ s , {|t|}k ⇒{k−1} t , (3.1 c)
H(t) ⇒∅ t , Hk(t) ⇒∅ t , (3.1 d)
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If t1 ⇒K1 t2 and t2 ⇒K2 t3 for terms t1, t2, t3, we define t1 ⇒K1∪K2 t3, if not already t1 ⇒K3 t3
for a set K3 ( K1 ∪ K2. /
For example, we have a ⇒∅ a, {a}k ⇒{k} a, and 〈k1, {|{a}k1 |}k2〉 ⇒{k−12 } a.
In addition, we need to generalize the notion of push and send clauses:
Definition 3.3. A generalized push clause is a push clause where facts of the form I(k) for
keys k ∈ K are allowed on the left-hand-side. Generalized send clauses also allow facts of the
form I(k) on the left-hand-side, but in addition they allow facts of the form q(sI) on the
left-hand-side for a pop symbol q with I(sI) being the fact on the right-hand-side of the
send clause.
Let κ, κ′ be register sequences of variables with var(κ) ⊆ Y and var(κ′) ⊆ var(κ) ∪ Y?. Let
m ∈ N, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, pop symbols q1, . . . , qm, q′1, . . . , q′m ∈ Q, push symbols r, r′ ∈ R, and
keys k1, . . . , kn ∈ K. Let tr, tI ∈ T(Σ, X) be simple terms with depth(tr) > 0, let xr ∈ var(tr),
let sI ∈ T(Σ, var(tI) ∪ var(κ)). Then we define
I(k1), . . . , I(kn), q1(tr), . . . , qm(tr), r(tr, κ) → r′(xr, κ′) ,
generalized push clauses, (3.2 b)
q′1(sI), . . . , q
′
m(sI), I(k1), . . . , I(kn), q1(tI), . . . , qm(tI), r(tI, κ) → I(sI) ,
generalized send clauses. (3.2 c)
/
Now we can define the theory of a protocol.
Definition 3.4. Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol. Let RI = {rI, rIH} ∪
{
rIHk
∣∣∣ k ∈ K} be a set
of new binary push symbols, let qI↓ be a new pop symbol. Let cI ∈ Γ be an anonymous
constant, leading to the unique register sequence κ(I) = (cI, . . . , cI) ∈ {cI}Z. The theory ΦP
of the protocol P consists of the clauses (3.3 i a) to (3.3 vi b):
• (generalized) intruder pop clauses for each key k
I(x1), I(x2) → I(〈x1, x2〉) , I(x), I(k) → I({x}k) , (3.3 i a)
I(x), I(k) → I({|x|}k) , (3.3 i b)
I(x) → I(h(x)) , I(x), I(k) → I(hk(x)) , (3.3 i c)
I(x) → I(H(x)) , I(x), I(k) → I(Hk(x)) , (3.3 i d)
I(x) → qI↓(Hk(x)) , (3.3 i e)
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• the generalized intruder push clauses for each key k
rI(〈x1, x2〉, κ?) → rI(x1, κ(I)) , I(k), rI({x}k, κ?) → rI(x, κ(I)) , (3.3 ii a)
rI(〈x1, x2〉, κ?) → rI(x2, κ(I)) , I(k), rI({|x|}k−1 , κ?) → rI(x, κ(I)) , (3.3 ii b)
rI(H(x), κ?) → rI(x, κ(I)) , rI(Hk(x), κ?) → rI(x, κ(I)) , (3.3 ii c)
rI(h(x), κ?) → rIH (x, κ(I)) , rI(hk(x), κ?) → rIHk (x, κ
(I)) , (3.3 ii d)
rI(H(x), κ?) → rIH (x, κ(I)) , rI(Hk(x), κ?) → rIHk (x, κ
(I)) , (3.3 ii e)
• the intruder send clauses for each key k
rI(x, κ?) → I(x) , (3.3 iii a)
rIH (x, κ?) → I(h(x)) , rIHk (x, κ?) → I(hk(x)) , (3.3 iii b)
I(x), rIH (x, κ?) → I(H(x)) , I(x), rIHk (x, κ?) → I(Hk(x)) , (3.3 iii c)
• each pop clause in Φ
q1(x1), . . . , qn(xn) → q( f (x1, . . . , xn)) , (3.3 iv)
• each push clause in Φ
q1(t), . . . , qn(t), r(t, κ) → r′(x, κ′) , (3.3 v)
• for each send clause [q1(t), . . . , qn(t), r(t, κ) → I(s)] ∈ Φ, each s′ ∈ sub(s) each K =
{k1, . . . , kl} with s ⇒K s′, and each key k, add the following generalized push clause
(case a) or generalized send clause(s) (case b to e) to ΦP :
I(k1), ..., I(kl), q1(t), ..., qn(t), r(t, κ) → rI(s′, κ(I)) if s′ ∈ X , (3.3 vi a)
I(k1), ..., I(kl), q1(t), ..., qn(t), r(t, κ) → I(s′) if s′ /∈ X , (3.3 vi b)
I(k1), ..., I(kl), q1(t), ..., qn(t), r(t, κ) → I(h(s′′)) if s′ = H(s′′) , (3.3 vi c)
I(k1), ..., I(kl), q1(t), ..., qn(t), r(t, κ) → I(hk(s′′)) if s′ = Hk(s′′) , (3.3 vi d)
qI↓(Hk(s′′)), I(k1), ..., I(kl), q1(t), ..., qn(t), r(t, κ) → I(Hk(s′′)) if s′ = hk(s′′) . (3.3 vi e)
/
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As we need to clarify in which steps of a protocol execution fresh tokens are generated, we
define two subsets of the theory of a protocol: The only clauses that contain fresh variables
are the clauses of the form (3.3 v); the only prerequisites for applying these clauses may be
pop clauses. Therefore, we write Fresh(ΦP ) for the set of all clauses in ΦP which are of
the form (3.3 iv) or (3.3 v). In addition, we write Basic(ΦP ) for the set ΦP without the push
clauses of the form (3.3 v).
We now formulate the following lemma, which characterizes attacks on protocols using the
theory of a protocol:
Lemma 3.5 (Theory of a Protocol). Let P be a protocol, let π = [tn → rn(sn)]Nn=1 be an execution
scheme, and use tN+1 = $. Let σ be a ground substitution.
We take the pairwise disjoint ground register sequences κ(1), . . . , κ(N) defined in Section 2.2.3 and
set C0 to contain all anonymous constants in these N register sequences. We further assume that
there is a set {C0, . . . , CN} of pairwise disjoint subsets of Γ.
Then (π, σ) is an attack if and only if there are sets of facts Rn for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N} with
rn(σ(sn), κ(n)) `CnFresh(ΦP ) Rn for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and (3.4 a)
{I(¢)} ∪ R1 ∪ · · · ∪ Rn `Basic(ΦP ) I(σ(tn+1)) for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N} . (3.4 b)
3.2.1 Proof of Lemma 3.5, Part 1
Proof. Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol, let π = [tn → rn(sn)]Nn=1 be an execution scheme, set
tN+1 = $. Let σ be a ground substitution.
First, we assume (π, σ) to be an attack. Then let {C1, . . . , CN} be the set of subsets of Γ from
the definition of an attack (2.21 a). We show that conditions (3.4 a) and (3.4 b) hold for every
n ∈ {0, . . . , N} for a set Rn we will define and for the Cn as defined above.
First consider n = 0. We have nothing to show for condition (3.4 a). By (2.21 b) we know
that I(¢) `ΦI I(σ(t1)), let ΠB0 be a Horn proof of that. Using Lemma 3.1 and the fact that
¢ is a constant, we know that there is no decomposition in ΠB0 , hence, all clauses used in
the proof are composition clauses, which are of the form (2.20 e) and (2.20 f). Note that in
this step, each fact derived by Clause (2.20 i) can be derived by a clause from (2.20 h), as the
intruder has to know the key k to derive hk(x) which is a prerequisite for applying (2.20 i).
As the composition clauses are elements of Basic(ΦP ), called intruder pop clauses, we also
have I(¢) `Basic(ΦP ) I(σ(t1)) and Π
B
0 is a Horn proof of that, which is our claim for n = 0.
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Now let T1, . . . , TN be sets of facts such that for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N} the sequence ΠAn is a
proof of (2.21 a) and ΠBn is a proof of (2.21 b) with the restriction mentioned in Lemma 3.1.
We define Π̂An as the Horn proof ΠAn without all the c-facts constructed by send clauses;
then let Rn be the set of facts in Π̂An for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
We now take an n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Let ΠAn \ Π̂An = [a1, . . . , ai1 ] be the sequence of all c-facts
constructed by send clauses, i. e., all terms sent to the intruder; and let ΠBn = [ai1+1, . . . , ai2 ].
We will construct a Horn proof Π̂Bn = [b1, . . . , bj3 ] of (3.4 b) for that n by the following
algorithm, which uses variables i and j to iterate over ai and bj:
1. Let [b1, . . . , bj1 ] be the concatenation of R1, . . . , Rn. We set j = j1, and i = 1.
2. Now ai is a c-fact, i. e., ai = I(t) for a term t, and we look at the send clause producing
ai:
a) If it is of the form [. . . , r(t′, κ) → I(x)] with x ∈ X, we increment j by two and
set bj−1 = rI(t, κ(I)) as well as bj = ai = I(t).
b) If the send clause has the form [. . . → I(s)] for s /∈ X, but with s = h(s′) for
h ∈ {H, Hk}, we increment j by two and choose
• bj−1 = I(H(s′)) and bj−1 = I(h(s′)), if h = H, or
• bj−1 = I(Hk(s′)) and bj−1 = I(hk(s′)), if h = Hk.
c) Otherwise, we increment j by one and choose bj = ai.
3. Now increment i and repeat from step 2 on as long as the new i is less than i1 or
equal, otherwise set j2 = j and continue.
4. a) If ai is produced by (2.20 i), i. e., ai = I(Hk(t)) we increment j by two and set
bj−1 = qI↓(Hk(t)) as well as bj = ai.
b) If ai is produced by another composition clause, we increment j by one and set
bj = ai.
c) If ai = I(t) is a c-fact produced by a decomposition clause ϕ ∈ ΦI from (2.20 a)
to (2.20 c) with an anonymous ground substitution σ, formally we have to dif-
ferentiate for the different types of decomposition clauses. As example we will
consider ϕ = [I(〈x1, x2〉) → I(x1)], with t = σ(x1).
i. If we find a fact of the form rI(〈t, t′〉, κ(I)) in {b1, . . . , bj}, we increment j by
two and set bj−1 = rI(t, κ(I)) and bj = ai.
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ii. If we do not find such a fact, there is a clause ψ in ΦP of the form
ψ =
[




and a substitution σ′ with t = σ′(t2). In the case rI, we increment j by two
and set bj−1 = rI(t, κ(I)) and bj = ai. Otherwise for I, we increment j by
one and set bj = ai.
We proceed analogously for the decomposition clauses (2.20 a) to (2.20 c).
d) If ai is produced by (2.20 d), we simply increment j by one and set bj = ai.
5. Now increment i and repeat from step 4 on as long as the new i is less than i2 or
equal, otherwise set j3 = j.
This algorithm produces a Horn proof of (3.4 b): For each ai with ai = I(t) we have a fact
bj with bj = ai. We will show that the facts bj are justified, i. e., the definition of a Horn
proof holds for the sequence [b1, . . . , bj3 ].
Together with the fact that the algorithm terminates because he is iterating over a finite
sequence this proves our claim.
Let j < j3, and assume as an inductive hypothesis that the facts b1, . . . , bj conform to the
definition of a Horn proof. For j ≤ j1, the fact bj is an a-fact, hence, we have nothing
to show. For j > j1 we will show that the next steps of the algorithm are correct: As j
is incremented within this step, we have to show that the fact bj (and possibly also bj−1)
conform to the definition of a Horn proof.
2. In this case, we have ai ∈ ΠAn \ Π̂An .
a) The fact bj−1 is justified as by construction of the theory of the protocol (3.3 vi a)
we have [q1(t′), . . . , r(t′′, κ) → rI(x, κ(I))] ∈ Basic(ΦP ). The fact bj is derived by
the clause [rI(x, κ?) → I(x)] (3.3 iii a).
b) This step is also justified because for s /∈ X, the original send clause in Φ is copied
to the theory of the protocol Fresh(ΦP ), see (3.3 vi b), and there are additional
clauses (3.3 vi c) and (3.3 vi d).
c) Again, this step is justified because for s /∈ X, the original send clause in Φ is
copied (3.3 vi b).
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4. In this case, we have ai ∈ ΠBn .
a) We know that ai = I(Hk(t)). As clause (2.20 i) was applied to derive that fact, we
already have the fact I(x) and thus can derive bj−1 = qI↓(Hk(t)) by (3.3 i e). Then
bj can be derived by a clause ϕ2 depending on the clause ϕ1 which was used to
derive the fact I(hk(t)) (which is used as a prerequisite to apply (2.20 i)):
original clause ϕ1 corresponding clause ϕ2
(3.3 i c) (3.3 i d)
(3.3 iii b) (3.3 iii c)
(3.3 vi b) (3.3 vi e)
(3.3 vi d) (3.3 vi b)
Each of the clauses ϕ2 has the same or fewer prerequisites that the corresponding
clause ϕ1, except for bj−1 which we derive as above.
b) We know that ai is either an a-fact from Tn or ai is a c-fact constructed by a
composition clause. The case ai ∈ Tn implies bj = ai ∈ {b1, . . . , bj2}, and hence,
bj is justified. If on the other hand ai is produced by a composition clause, bj is
justified by the same composition clause, as the composition clauses are elements
of Basic(ΦP ), see (3.3 i a) and (3.3 i b), and for every fact I(t) ∈ {a1, . . . , ai−1} we
have I(t) ∈ {b1, . . . , bj−1}.
c) i. The justification for bj−1 is the corresponding (generalized) intruder push
clause, see (3.3 ii b) and (3.3 ii c); the fact bj is again derived by the clause
[rI(x, κ?) → I(x)] (3.3 iii a).
ii. This step is the most difficult one. We know that in the assumed Horn proof
ΠBn the fact ai = I(t) was produced by a decomposition clause ϕ, we again
assume that ϕ = [I(〈x, y〉) → I(x)]. We know ai′ = I(〈t, t′〉) for an index
i′ < i. But as we are in case ii., there is no fact rI(〈t, t′〉, κ(I)) ∈ {b1, . . . , bj−2}.
By algorithm, there has to be a fact bj′ = I(〈t, t′〉) with j′ < j− 1.
Now we take the justification for the fact bj′ . As in ΠBn the restrictions of
Lemma 3.1 hold, ai′ is not produced by a composition clause. By inductive
hypothesis bj′ has to be generated by a (generalized) send clause
ψ̂ =
[
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The case rI is not possible, hence, we have a clause with I(t2) on the right
hand side, and a substitution σ with σ(t2) = 〈t, t′〉. By (3.3 vi a) we know that
t2 /∈ X, and because t2 /∈ Y (in that case t2 could not be mapped to a term
containing a pairing symbol) we know that t2 = 〈t2a, t2b〉 for terms t2a, t2b.
Now by definition of the theory of the protocol, there is a clause
ψ =
[
I(k1), . . . , I(kl), q1(t1), . . . , qm(t1), r(t1, κ) →
 or I(t2a)rI(t2a, κ(I))
]
. (3.7)
For the decryption clauses amongst the decomposition clauses, we may have
to add another key on the left hand side (i. e., I(kl+1)), but this key has
already been used in ΠAn to construct ai.
The clause ψ can now be used in step 4. b) ii. of the algorithm.
d) For (2.20 d), we have ai ∈ {I(h(t)), I(hk(t))} for some term t. As clause (2.20 d)
was applied in the original proof, we already have a fact b′ = I(H(t)) or b′ =
I(Hk(t)) in Π̂Bn . Now take a look at the clause ϕ1 justifying b—in each case, there
is a corresponding clause ϕ2 which justifies ai and which has the same or fewer
prerequisites:
original clause ϕ1 corresponding clause ϕ2
(3.3 i d) (3.3 i c)
(3.3 iii c) (3.3 iii b)
(3.3 vi b) (3.3 vi c) or (3.3 vi d)
(3.3 vi e) (3.3 vi a)
We have proven that for every attack (π, σ), the characterization in Lemma 3.5 holds.
3.2.2 Proof of Lemma 3.5, Part 2
We will now show the other direction of the lemma. Assume that for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N} the
two conditions (3.4 a) and (3.4 b) hold. We now have to show that (π, σ) is an attack, i. e.,
we find sets Tn of facts of the form I(t) such that the following conditions hold:
rn(σ(sn), κ(n)) `CnΦ Tn for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and (3.8 a)
{I(¢)} ∪ T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tn `ΦI I(σ(tn+1)) for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N} . (3.8 b)
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For n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, let ΠAn be a Horn proof of (3.4 a), and let ΠBn be a proof of (3.4 b)
for n ∈ {0, . . . , N}. We will construct Horn proofs Π̂An and Π̂Bn for (3.8 a) and (3.8 b) by
transforming ΠAn and ΠBn by a method that preserves the semantics of each fact in these
proofs.
Let Πpushn , Πsendn , Πintrudern be empty sequences for each n ∈ {0, . . . , N}, and let Πpop also be
an empty sequence. We will now iterate over the facts in ΠAn and ΠBn ; in every iteration we
will append facts to the sets we just defined, e. g., Πpop.
For every n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and each c-fact a in the concatenation ΠAn · ΠBn , we consider the
following cases:
i. a) If a was produced by an intruder pop clause from (3.3 i a) to (3.3 i d), we append a
to Πintrudern .
b) If a was produced by the intruder pop clause (3.3 i e), we do nothing.
ii. a) If a was produced by a (generalized) intruder push clause (3.3 ii a) to (3.3 ii c), we
know a = rI(t, κ(I)) for a ground term t, and we append I(t) to Πintrudern .
b) If a was produced by an intruder push clause (3.3 ii d) or (3.3 ii e), we do nothing.
iii. a) If a was produced by the intruder send clause (3.3 iii a), we have nothing to do.
b) If a was produced by an intruder send clause from (3.3 iii b) or (3.3 iii c), we append
a to Πintrudern .
iv. If a was produced by a pop clause (3.3 iv), we append a to Πpop.
v. If a was produced by a push clause from Φ (3.3 v), we append a to Πpushn .
vi. a) If a was produced by a (generalized) send or push clause from (3.3 vi a) or (3.3 vi b),
we have a = I(t̂) or a = rI(t̂, κ(I)) for a term t̂. We now take that clause ψ ∈ ΦP
and the corresponding substitution σ with σ(t) = t̂, and know by definition of the
theory of the protocol that there is a clause ϕ ∈ Φ, such that we have:
ψ =
[






ϕ = [q1(t′), . . . , qn′(t′), r(t′, κ) → I(s)] (3.10)
with s ⇒{k1,...,kl} t . (3.11)
We append I(σ(s)) to Πsendn .
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By s ⇒{k1,...,kl} t we know there is a sequence [s1, . . . , sm] with s = s1, sm = t in
which sj+1 ∈ sub(sj) and depth(sj+1) = depth(sj)− 1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m− 1}. Let
σ(sj) = tj, we then append each I(tj) to Πintrudern .
b) If a was produced by a (generalized) send clause from (3.3 vi c) to (3.3 vi e), we have
a = I(h(s′′)) for some hash symbol h. Now we first look at the corresponding
clause (3.3 vi b) which produces a fact a′ = I(s′) where s′ = h′(s′′) for a hash symbol
h′ that corresponds to h.
First, we apply case vi. a), i. e., append one fact to Πsendn and possibly a sequence of
facts including a′ to Πintrudern . Then we append a to Πintrudern .
This method terminates as we are iterating over finite sequences. Now we set Tn = Πsendn
and define the following Horn proofs for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N}:
Π̂An = Π
pop ·Πpushn ·Πsendn and (3.12)
Π̂Bn = Π
pop ·Πsend1 · · · · ·Πsendn ·Πintrudern . (3.13)
Now we know that Π̂An is a Horn proof of (3.8 a) and Π̂Bn is one of (3.8 b). First take a look
at the facts in Π̂An :
• The elements in Πpop are independent of all other facts, they are justified by the same
pop clauses in Φ as in ΦP .
• All facts derived by a push clauses (3.3 v), i. e., a clause copied from Φ to ΦP , can be
derived by exactly this clause in Φ because we keep the order among the push facts,
and because we put all facts derived by pop clauses in Πpop.
• The applications of send clauses in Φ only depend on facts obtained by pop and push
clauses of Φ, and so the facts in Πsendi are justified.
Finally, as Tn = Πsendn ⊆ Π̂An , this is a Horn proof for Tn.
Now take a look at the facts in Π̂Bn . All facts in Πpop are justified as above; whereas all the
facts in Πsendi for an index i ≤ n are a-facts. But we have to look at the facts in Πintrudern .
i. The facts added in step i. can be derived by the composition clauses in the intruder
theory.
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ii. The facts appended in step ii. are justified as we transform all facts of the form rI(t, κ(I))
to I(t), such that for every application of an intruder push clause on push facts there
is an equivalent application of decomposition clauses.
More precisely, the prerequisites for an application of a clause ϕ from (3.3 ii a) to (3.3 ii c)
are transformed from rI(t, κ(I)) to I(t) and appear in Πsendn = Tn or earlier in Πintrudern ,
hence, in Π̂Bn we can apply a decomposition clause corresponding to ϕ from the intruder
theory.
iii. In step iii., each fact a that we add depends on a push fact a′ with symbol rIH or rIHk ,
i. e., a′ can only have been derived by (3.3 ii d) or (3.3 ii e) in the original Horn proof ΠBn .
• If a′ was derived by (3.3 ii d) and a was derived by (3.3 iii b), the fact a is simply
an a-fact. The same applies for a′ being derived by (3.3 ii e) and a being derived
by (3.3 iii c).
• If a′ was derived by (3.3 ii e) and a was derived by (3.3 iii b), the fact a can be
derived by the decomposition clause (2.20 d).
• If a′ was derived by (3.3 ii d) and a was derived by (3.3 iii c), the fact a can be
derived by the composition clause (2.20 i).
vi. a) In step vi. we first have to take a look at the facts I(k) for keys k. In the original Horn
proof ΠBn , each fact I(k) has to be known prior to the application of this generalized
push or send clause ψ. The algorithm puts this fact I(k) in either Πsendn or Πintrudern ,
in the latter case I(k) prior to the application of the clause ψ. Therefore, we can just
assume that the necessary keys are known.
The facts added in step vi. are justified as we added the result of a send clause to
Πsendn , hence, we have a copy in Tn and can decompose this fact using the decompo-
sition clauses of the intruder theory and the relevant keys.
b) The application of the clauses from (3.3 vi c) to (3.3 vi e) in the original Horn proof
ΠBn can be reduced to applying case a) plus applying either the decomposition
clause (2.20 d) or the composition clause (2.20 i). In the latter case, the fact qI↓(Hk(s′′))
guarantees I(s′′).
We now have Horn proofs Π̂An and Π̂Bn for (3.8 a) and (3.8 b), which concludes our proof.
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Figure 3.2: Example for the stages of a protocol with protocol steps 1 to 4
3.3 Stage Theory
The characterization of an attack presented in Lemma 3.5 will be transformed anew in this
section. We start with an execution scheme of a protocol. First, each of the protocol steps
resembles a major stage in the execution of the protocol. For each of these major stages
it is now possible to state which keys are added to the intruder’s knowledge during this
protocol step, allowing us to divide the major stage into multiple stages. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.2.
As a consequence we can merge the (2 · N + 1) Horn proofs necessary to show that the
definition of an attack or the characterization in Lemma 3.5 holds, resulting in only one
Horn proof. To do so annotate the predicate symbols with the stage they are used in – see
Figure 3.3.
Formally we will annotate the predicate symbols in the Horn clauses with special indices:
These indices contain the current protocol step. But during each step, the intruder may be
able to gain knowledge of several keys – therefore, we will use indices of the form (n, m)
where n is the current protocol step and m is the number of keys obtained so far during
that step. This gives us a partitioning of the protocol run into several stages as shown in
the following example.
Example 3.6. A possible run of a protocol as illustrated in Figure 3.2 could be as follows:
(0, 0) The intruder composes and sends his initial message m1 to start the protocol.
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(1, 0) The principal of the first protocol step receives m1, processes it and sends a message
m2. The intruder decomposes m2 but does not learn any keys from it. He composes a
message m3 and sends it.
(2, 0) Another principal receives m3 and sends m4, containing a key k1 and the subterm
{k3}k2 . The intruder extracts k1.
(2, 1) The intruder cannot extract k3 as he does not know k2 yet, but he composes and sends
a message m5.
(3, 0) After receiving m5, one principal sends m6 which contains the key k2. The intruder is
able to decompose m6 and gain knowledge of k2.
(3, 1) With the help of k2 the intruder is able to decompose m4 so that he can extract k3.
(3, 2) Now the intruder composes a message m7 that may, for example, contain terms en-
crypted by k1 or k2.
(4, 0) The next protocol step is executed – and so on. /
Note that in the example and in the figure each of our principals is only sending one
message – as stated earlier, each principal could just as well send a whole set of messages.
Remark 3.7. We must remark that up to this point, it does not seem necessary to divide a
protocol step into multiple stages. But the second component of the indices is necessary to
prevent cycles in Horn proofs. Even though this cannot happen in the Horn proofs we used
so far because they are just sequences of facts, we will later see that in the ADAG there may
be cyclic situations if we do not prevent this:
For example, consider a protocol step in which the intruder learns two keys k1, k2. We
assume that there is a message m = 〈{k2}k1 , {k1}k2〉. Now in a Horn proof as defined in
Definition 2.6 it is clear that the intruder can only learn k1 and k2 if he knew one of these
keys before receiving m.
But in the ADAG we loose that linearity and may get cycles, i. e., the intruder would be able
to derive k1 from the message m by using k2, which he derived from that same message m
by using k1. By introducing stages we ensure that if k1 is derived in stage e1, this key can
only be used in stages e2 > e1, avoiding the occurrence of cycles. /
Now we are ready to give the formal definition of stages and stage mappings.
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Definition 3.8. Let P be a protocol with an execution scheme π with N protocol steps, and
let K be the set of keys in Σ. Let E = {0, . . . , N} × {0, . . . , |K|} be the set of stages of P , let
< be the lexicographical ordering on the set of stages E, and let  be the ordering on the
first component (and define ≤, ≥, >, and  in the natural way):
(n, m) < (n′, m′) if n < n′ or (n = n′ and m < m′) , (3.14)
(n, m)  (n′, m′) if n < n′ , (3.15)
n  (n′, m′) if n < n′ . (3.16)
We will denote { e′ ∈ E | e′ ≤ e} by E≤e. For a set of predicate symbols R, let R(E) be the
following set of predicate symbols (maintaining their arity):
R(E) = {re | r ∈ R, e ∈ E} . (3.17)
A partial function f : K 99K E is called stage mapping for P if
f (k) ∈ { (n, m) ∈ E | n 6= 0, m 6= 0} (3.18)
for all k. We will write K f for the set of keys for which f is defined. Additionally, for each
e ∈ E we will use K(e) = {k ∈ K | f (k) ≤ e}. /
The intended semantic of a stage mapping f is that for a key k with f (k) = e, this key
is derived in a stage ek < e and thus can be used from stage e onwards to derive other
messages or keys. This will be used during the definition of the stage theory.
From now on we will use Q̃ as pop symbols and R̃ as push symbols:
Ĩ = {I}(E) , (3.19 a)
Ĩ+ = {I, qI↓}(E) . (3.19 b)
Q̃ = Q ∪ Ĩ+ , (3.19 c)
R̃ =
(
R ∪ {rI, rIH} ∪
{
rIHk
∣∣∣ k ∈ K})(E) , (3.19 d)
Thus, we have unary predicate symbols like I(n,m) and binary predicate symbols like r(n,m).
By abuse of notation we will write I(n) if we have I(n,m) for some m.
Definition 3.9. Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol. Let E be the set of stages of P , f : K 99K E
be a stage mapping for P . The stage theory Φf of the protocol P and the stage mapping f is a
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selecting theory over (Q̃, R̃) consisting of the following clauses:





(x2) → Ie(〈x1, x2〉) , Ie
′
(x) → Ie({x}k) , (3.20 i a)
Ie
′
(x) → Ie({|x|}k) , (3.20 i b)
Ie
′
(x) → Ie(h(x)) , Ie′(x) → Ie(hk(x)) , (3.20 i c)
Ie
′
(x) → Ie(H(x)) , Ie′(x) → Ie(Hk(x)) , (3.20 i d)
Ie
′
(x) → qeI↓(Hk(x)) , (3.20 i e)
• intruder push clauses for each e ∈ E, each key k ∈ K(e), and each e′ ∈ E≤e
re
′
I (〈x1, x2〉, κ?) → reI(x1, κ(I)) , re
′
I ({x}k, κ?) → reI(x, κ(I)) , (3.20 ii a)
re
′
I (〈x1, x2〉, κ?) → reI(x2, κ(I)) , re
′
I ({|x|}k−1 , κ?) → reI(x, κ(I)) , (3.20 ii b)
re
′
I (H(x), κ?) → reI(x, κ(I)) , re
′
I (Hk(x), κ?) → reI(x, κ(I)) , (3.20 ii c)
re
′
I (h(x), κ?) → reIH (x, κ
(I)) , re
′
I (hk(x), κ?) → reIHk (x, κ
(I)) , (3.20 ii d)
re
′
I (H(x), κ?) → reIH (x, κ
(I)) , re
′
I (Hk(x), κ?) → reIHk (x, κ
(I)) , (3.20 ii e)
• intruder send clauses for each e ∈ E, each key k, and each e′, e′′ ∈ E≤e
re
′




(x, κ?) → Ie(h(x)) , re
′
IHk











(x, κ?) → Ie(Hk(x)) , (3.20 iii c)
• each pop clause in Φ, which is, by definition, also in ΦP
q1(x1), . . . , qn(xn) → q( f (x1, . . . , xn)) , (3.20 iv)
• for each push clause [q1(t), . . . , r(t, κ) → r′(x, κ′)] ∈ Φ, which, by definition, is also in
ΦP , and for each e = (i, 0) ∈ E
q1(t), . . . , re(t, κ) → r′ e(x, κ′) , (3.20 v)
• for each (generalized) push clause [I(k1), . . . , I(kl), q1(t), . . . , r(t, κ) → r(x, κ(I))] ∈ ΦP ,
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and accordingly, for each (generalized) send clause [. . . → I(s)] ∈ ΦP , for each e ∈ E,






q1(t), . . . , qn(t), re
′
(t, κ) →
re(x, κ(I)) orIe(s) . (3.20 vi)
/
As we later need a unique stage et for each fact Iet(t) for a term t, we introduce the notion
of normal Horn proofs. Afterwards we can formulate the lemma that links the description
of an attack to the stage theory.
Definition 3.10. A Horn proof Π is called normal if for each term t there is at most one stage
e ∈ E with Ie(t) ∈ Π. /
Lemma 3.11 (Stage Theory). Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol. Let π = [tn → rn(sn)]Nn=1 be an
execution scheme, set tN+1 = $. Take the pairwise disjoint ground register sequences κ(1), . . . , κ(N)
and again set C0 to contain all anonymous constants in these N register sequences. Let σ be a ground
substitution, C ⊂ Γ a set of anonymous constants disjoint with C0.
Then (π, σ) is an attack if and only if there exists a stage mapping f (which can be efficiently
constructed) such that there is a normal Horn proof of the following statement for stages en  n + 1






∣∣∣ n ∈ {1, . . . , N}} `CΦf{
Ien(σ(tn+1))
∣∣∣ n ∈ {0, . . . , N}} ∪ {Iek(k) ∣∣∣ k ∈ dom( f )} (3.21)
3.3.1 Proof of Lemma 3.11, Part 1
Proof. In the first part of the proof, we assume that there is an attack (π, σ) on the protocol,
and we construct a stage mapping f . To show that the condition holds we construct a
Horn proof of statement (3.21), consisting of the concatenation of modified facts taken from
Horn proofs used in Lemma 3.5, i. e., we annotate most of the facts with stages. Figure 3.3
illustrates this transformation.
Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol. Let π = [tn → rn(sn)]Nn=1 be an execution scheme, set
tN+1 = $. Take the pairwise disjoint ground register sequences κ(1), . . . , κ(N) and again set
C0 to contain all anonymous constants in these N register sequences. Let σ be a ground
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Figure 3.3: Transformation of multiple proofs with respect to the theory of a protocol ΦP
into a single proof with respect to a stage theory Φf
substitution such that (π, σ) is an attack on P . By Lemma 3.5 we know there is a set
{C0, . . . , CN} of pairwise disjoint subsets of Γ such that:
rn(σ(sn), κ(n)) `CnFresh(ΦP ) Rn for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and (3.22 a)
{I(¢)} ∪ R1 ∪ · · · ∪ Rn `Basic(ΦP ) I(σ(tn+1)) for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N} . (3.22 b)
Let ΠAn be a Horn proof of (3.22 a) for n ∈ {1, . . . , N} (and the empty sequence for n = 0,
respectively). Let ΠBn be a proof of (3.22 b) for n ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
Let Kn be the sequence of keys added to the intruder’s knowledge during step n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
i. e., not known before. This means Kn is a sequence such that for each m ≤ |Kn| we have
I(Kn[m]) ∈ ΠBn , but also I(Kn[m]) /∈ ΠBi for all i < n, with the same ordering of the keys in
Kn as in ΠBn . We define M = max { |Kn| | n ∈ {1, . . . , N}}. Now we can construct a stage
mapping f as
f : K 99K {0, . . . , N} × {0, . . . , M} with f (k) =
(n, m) if k = Kn[m] ,⊥ if k /∈ ⋃Ni=n Kn . (3.23)
We have efficiently constructed f from (π, σ), now we have to show that (3.21) holds by
constructing a Horn proof Π thereof.
We take n ∈ {0, . . . , N}. Let ΠAn = [a1, . . . , aj] and a ∈ ΠAn . We derive a′ from a by replacing
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r ∈ R ∪ {rI, I} with r(n,0) (which also means we know a′ = a if we have a = q(t) for a pop
symbol q ∈ Q).
Assume that |Kn| = M′, and let ΠBn = [b1, . . . , bjM′+1 ]. We choose jm such that bjm = I(km)
for every m ∈ {1, . . . , M′}, and we choose j0 = 0. Now let m ∈ {0, . . . , M′} and b ∈
[bjm+1, . . . , bjm+1 ].
If b is an a-fact, we derive b′ by replacing any r ∈ R with r(n,0) and I with I(0,0). If b is a
c-fact, we derive b′ from b by replacing r ∈ R ∪ {rI, I} with r(n,m). Hence, if b = q(t) for a
pop symbol q ∈ Q, we again have b′ = b.




1, . . . , b
′
jM′+1−1
]. Now the concatenation Π̂ = Π̂0 · · · · · Π̂N is a
Horn proof of (3.21).
First we check the conclusion of the Horn proof, i. e., if all facts in the conclusion occur in the
proof: As I(σ(tn+1)) is an element of ΠBn for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N}, we have I(n,m)(σ(tn+1)) ∈ Π̂n
for some m (and therefore, we have I(n)(σ(tn+1))). For each k ∈ K with f (k) = (n, m), we
have I(k) = bjm ∈ Π
B
n by construction of f and so we have I(n,m−1)(k) ∈ Π̂n. We can now
choose ek = (n, m− 1) < f (k).
Now we check if each fact is justified: The facts of the form a′ for some a ∈ ΠAn are justified
because the pushed facts are all indexed with stage (n, 0), and we have r(n,0)(σ(sn), κ(n)) in
the assumption. The facts constructed by pop clauses are not modified.
Of the facts b′ for some b ∈ ΠBn , the a-facts are clearly justified. For the facts constructed in
ΠBn by a clause ϕ, we know that ϕ is a (generalized) push or send clause, an intruder pop
or push clause, or a pop clause. In the latter case, we have b′ = b. In the other cases, we
have a copy of ϕ in Φf which has the appropriate stages as indices, as we use all possible
combinations of e′, e′′ ≤ e in the rules.
This shows that for each attack (π, σ), we can efficiently construct a stage mapping f , such
that (π, σ, f ) fulfills statement (3.21). But it remains to prove that we can also construct a
normal Horn proof of that statement.
For each term t define et = min { e ∈ E | Ie(t) ∈ Π} (and similar for other s ∈ S). We now
obtain Π̂ from Π by replacing each Ie(t) for some e ∈ E with Iet(t) (and again, similar for
other s ∈ S). Now Π̂ is a Horn proof of (3.21), and all facts in it are justified: We have
Iet(t) ∈ Π, and for each Ie(t) used as a prerequisite for the application of a clause ϕ ∈ Φf ,
we find a clause ϕ′ ∈ Φf which allows I
et(t) to be used instead.
This completes the proof of the first part of our claim.
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3.3.2 Proof of Lemma 3.11, Part 2
We now assume that (3.21) holds. Hence, we take an appropriate ground substitution σ, a
stage mapping f and an execution scheme π as above such that (3.21) holds for (π, σ, f );
let Π be a normal Horn proof of that.
Due to Lemma 3.5 we now only need to define appropriate sets Rn and Cn such that the
following holds:
rn(σ(sn), κ(n)) `CnFresh(ΦP ) Rn for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and (3.24 a)
{I(¢)} ∪ R1 ∪ · · · ∪ Rn `Basic(ΦP ) I(σ(tn+1)) for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N} . (3.24 b)
We divide Π in several parts and modify them to get the Horn proofs for theses statements.
We first define a subsequence Πpop ⊆ Π of all the facts of the form q(t) for a pop symbol
q ∈ Q and a term t, preserving the relative ordering amongst the elements of Πpop.
For all n ∈ {0, . . . , N}, let ΠAn ⊆ Π be the subsequence of all facts of the form r(n,0)(t, κ) for
a push symbol r ∈ R (note that rI /∈ R). Accordingly, let ΠBn ⊆ Π \ ΠAn be the set of facts
with a predicate symbol p(n,m), ordered by their stage, but preserving the ordering amongst
facts of the same stage.
Now ΠAn is nearly a Horn proof of (3.24 a) for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we only need to remove
the stage annotation. Let ξ be a substitution on terms (extended to sequences of terms)
which replaces each predicate symbol of the form re with the according symbol r. We now
use this substitutions to derive Π̂pop = ξ(Πpop) and Π̂An , Π̂Bn in the same manner.
Now with Rn = Π̂An , the sequence Π̂pop · Π̂An is a Horn proof of (3.24 a) for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
This sequence contains only facts which can be derived by clauses in Fresh(ΦP ), as the
sequence Πpop only contains facts obtained by pop clauses, and ΠAn only uses push clauses
of the form (3.20 v). For each fact we can use the same justification as in the Horn proof
Π. In addition, we can set Cn to the set of anonymous constants assigned to anonymous
variables by the substitutions of the c-facts in ΠAn .
Similarly, Π̂pop · Π̂A1 · · · · · Π̂An · Π̂B0 · · · · · Π̂Bn is a Horn proof of (3.24 b) for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
The facts in Π̂pop are clearly justified, and the choice for R1, . . . , Rn makes the facts in
Π̂A1 · · · · · Π̂An a-facts. Thus, we know that no fresh anonymous constants need to be assigned
at all: In the Horn proofs ΠBn no clause of the form (3.20 v) has been applied because no
c-fact in ΠBn is of the form r(n,0)(t, κ) (for any r, n, t, κ).
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The c-facts in Π̂Bn are derived by a clause ϕ ∈ Φf which corresponds to a clause ϕ
′
∈
Basic(ΦP ), and so we can use this clause as justification. The only clauses weakened during
the construction of the stage theory are the (generalized) push and send clauses of the
form (3.20 vi), but we know by assumption that each key k occurring in ϕ′ has to be known
at the time ϕ is applied, so for the construction of a fact in stage e, the fact Iek(k) for a stage
ek < e has to occur in Π. But then we know that I(k) is an element of Π̂B1 · · · · ·ΠBn−1, or an
element of ΠBn occurring prior to the c-fact constructed by ϕ′.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
3.4 Flattening Push Clauses
For our proof we need to flatten all push clauses, i. e., only allow clauses of the following
form with a predicate symbol f ∈ Σn and normal variables x1, . . . , xn (and pop predicate
symbols and register sequences like in (2.9 b)):
q1(t), . . . , qm(t), r(t, κ) → r′(xj, κ′) with t = f (x1, . . . , xm), j ∈ {1, . . . , n} . (3.25)
We will show how to transform push clauses to a sequence of flat push clauses.
Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol, and let ϕ be a non-flat push clause, i. e., for a simple term t
we have ϕ = [q1(t), . . . , qm(t), r(t, κ) → r′(x, κ′)].
First, we take a set of pop clauses that recognize the structure of t, i. e., we add a set of pop
symbols Qt to Q and add a set of pop clauses Φt to Φ such that we have ∅ `Φt q′(t̂) for
some q′ ∈ Qt if and only if t̂ is an instance of t.
As x ∈ sub(t), there is a sequence [t1, . . . , tm] of terms with t = t1, tm = x with tj+1 ∈ sub(tj)
and depth(tj+1) = depth(tj)− 1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m− 1}. We now choose terms s1, . . . , sm−1
such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} we can construct tj from sj by substituting x ∈ var(sj)
with tj+1.
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If, for instance, t = 〈x′, 〈{x}k, x′′〉〉, we would have m = 4 and the following terms:
t1 = 〈x′, 〈{x}k, x′′〉〉 , s1 = 〈x′, x〉 ,
t2 = 〈{x}k, x′′〉 , s2 = 〈x, x′′〉 ,
t3 = {x}k , s3 = {x}k ,
t4 = x .
Then we take m − 2 push symbols r2, . . . , rm−1 ∈ R not used before and replace ϕ ∈ Φ by
the following m− 1 clauses:
q′(t), q1(t), . . . , qm(t), r(s1, κ) → r2(x, κ′) , (3.26)
r2(s2, κ?) → r3(x, κ?) , (3.27)
... (3.28)
rm−2(sm−2, κ?) → rm−1(x, κ?) , (3.29)
rm−1(sm−1, κ?) → r′(x, κ?) . (3.30)
In these clauses we use κ? from Definition 2.4 to just copy an unmodified version of the
register sequence from one fact to the next one.
Note that this transformation is only possible because we have simple terms on the left-
hand-side of push clauses, i. e., each variable occurring more than once in a push clause
will lead to a new push clause that is non-linear, but flat.
Remark 3.12. From now on we will assume that there are only flat push clauses, so each
(generalized) push clause that has a non-flat term on its left-hand-side is transformed ac-
cording to the method described above. /
3.5 The Graph of an Attack
We will now present a structure called directed acyclic graph of the attack (ADAG) introduced
in [Tru05a, Tru05b], which represents an attack on a protocol: We show that such an ADAG
for a protocol exists if and only if there is an attack on this protocol. As we later show
a double exponential bound for ADAGs, this structure allows us to present the algorithm
which decides security of recursive protocols. Again, we begin with preliminaries.
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Definition 3.13. Let Φ and Ψ be stage theories. The theory Ψ is an instance of Φ, if each
clause in Ψ is an instance of a clause in Φ, more precisely if for each clause ψ ∈ Ψ there is
a substitution σ : X → T(Σ, X ∪ Y) and a clause ϕ ∈ Φ such that σ̂(ϕ) = ψ where σ̂ is the
extension of σ on clauses. /
Term DAGs
Definition 3.14. Let Σ̄ be a signature. Then D = (V, F, µ) consisting of a finite set of nodes
V, a set of edges F ⊂ V ×V ×N with an order in last component, and a labeling function
µ : V → Σ̄ is a term DAG over Σ̄ if the following holds: For a node v ∈ V with µ(v) = f for
a function symbol f ∈ Σ̄m, the node v has m ordered successors v1, . . . , vm in the DAG, i. e.,
(v, vj, j) ∈ F for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
In the above situation, we will write v ~=D f (v1, . . . , vm), and we will omit D if the DAG is
clear from the context. In addition, we recursively define the notation
D(v) = c if v ~=D c , (3.31 a)
D(v) = f (D(v1), . . . , D(vm)) if v ~=D f (v1, . . . , vm) . (3.31 b)
A term DAG D is minimized if for all nodes v1, v2 in D, we have D(v1) 6= D(v2). /
Embeddings
Definition 3.15. Let T ⊆ T(Σ ∪ Γ, X ∪ Y) be a set of terms. Let D = (V, F, µ) be a term
DAG over Σ ∪ Γ. A function α : sub(T) → V is a D-embedding for T if for all v ∈ V and all
y ∈ Y ∩ sub(T) we have
v ~= c ∈ Γ if v = α(y) , (3.32 a)
v ~= f (v1, . . . , vm) and α(tj) = vj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m} if v = α( f (t1, . . . , tm)) . (3.32 b)
Two embeddings α1 and α2 are compatible if we have α1(x) = α2(x) for each regular and
anonymous variable x ∈ dom(α1) ∩ dom(α2) ∩ (X ∪Y).
For v ∈ V and t ∈ T we further write t 7→ v if there exists a unique embedding α for {t}
which is determined by α(t) = v. We write (t, t′) 7→ (v, v′) if both t 7→ v and t′ 7→ v′ hold
true and both embeddings are compatible. /
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Register Sequences
Definition 3.16. Let κ be a variable register sequence and κ′ be a ground register sequence.
We denote the substitution which maps each variable y ∈ κ to the corresponding anony-
mous constant c ∈ κ′ by subst(κ, κ′) if such a substitution is well-defined; i. e., if for each




∣∣ there exists z ∈ {1, . . . , Z} such that
κ[z] = y ∈ Y and κ′[z] = c ∈ Γ
}
. (3.33)
Again, we will write (κ1, κ2) 7→ (κ′1, κ′2) if both substitutions σ1 = subst(κ1, κ′1) and σ2 =
subst(κ2, κ′2) exists and are compatible, i. e., if for each y ∈ dom(σ1) ∩ dom(σ2) we have
σ1(y) = σ2(y). /
For example, the application of a push clause [. . . r1(t1, κ1) → r2(t2, κ2)] to a fact r1(t′1, κ′1)
will result in a fact r2(t′2, κ
′
2) where we have (κ1, κ2) 7→ (κ′1, κ′2).
We will now define ADAGs and after the formal definition we will give some intuition of
how ADAGs resemble terms, predicate symbols and so on.
ADAGs
Definition 3.17. Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol, let π = [tn → rn(sn)]Nn=1 be an execution
scheme and f be a stage mapping for π for the set E of stages.
Let Q f be the set of all predicate symbols occurring in Φf and let KP be the keys used in
the protocol. By TP we denote the set of static terms occurring in P , more precisely:
TP = {¢, $} ∪ { tn, sn | n ∈ {1, . . . , N}} ∪ KP . (3.34)
Let D be the tuple (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) with
• a finite term DAG D = (V, F, µ) over Σ ∪ Γ̂,
• a stage theory Ψ which is an instance of the stage theory Φf ,
• a finite set of anonymous constants Γ̂,
• an embedding function α : sub(TP ) → V, which embeds TP in D,
• a witness function β : V ×Q f ×N 99K V ×N×Ψ,
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of a graph of an attack D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ)
• a register sequence function γ : V ×Q f ×N 99K Γ̂Z,
• a predicate symbol labeling function δ : V 99K 2Q f , and
• a freshness function λ : Γ̂ 99K V ×Q f ×N× {1, . . . , Z}.
Then D is called DAG of the attack (ADAG) for P and (π, f ) if the following three conditions
hold (see the explanation below for additional notation we use):
(i) For all n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and all k ∈ dom( f ) we have
Ie ∈ δ(α(tn)) for a stage e  n , (ADAG i a)
Ie ∈ δ(α(k)) for a stage e < f (k) , and (ADAG i b)
Ie ∈ δ(α($)) for a stage e . (ADAG i c)
(ii) For each node v and each s ∈ S we have
se ∈ δ(v) for at most one e ∈ E . (ADAG ii)
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(iii) For each node v and each predicate symbol p ∈ δ(v) at least one of the following
conditions holds, i. e., p is justified because of
(iii a) the application of a protocol step (or the intruder’s initial knowledge)
v = α(¢) with p = I(0,0) (ADAG iii a)
or v = α(sn) with p = r
(n,0)
n for some n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
γ?(v, p) = {0},
γ(v, p, 0, z) 6= γ(v, p, 0, z′) for z 6= z′, and
λ(γ(v, p, 0, z)) = (v, p, 0, z) for all z ∈ {1, . . . , Z} ;
(iii b) the application of an (intruder) pop clause with p ∈ Q̃
v ~= f (v1, . . . , vm) and (ADAG iii b)
there is a clause ψ =
[
p1(x1), . . . , pm(xm) → p( f (x1, . . . , xm))
]
∈ Ψ
with pj ∈ δ(vj) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m} and
vj1 = vj2 for all j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , m} with xj1 = xj2 ;
(iii c) the application of an (intruder) push clause with p ∈ R̃ witnessed by β
γ?(v, p) 6= ∅, and for all i ∈ γ?(v, p) (ADAG iii c)
we have v′ ~= f (v1, . . . , vm)
with v = vj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , m}
such that β(v, p, i) = (v′, pm, i′, ψ),
with ψ =
[
p1(t′), . . . , pm(t′, κ′) → p(xj, κ)
]
∈ Ψ,
t′ = f (x1, . . . , xm),
pj ∈ δ(v′) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m},
vj1 = vj2 for all j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , m} with xj1 = xj2 , and
(κ, κ′) 7→ (γ(v, p, i), γ(v′, pm, i′)), as well as
λ(γ(v, p, i, z)) = (v, p, i, z′) for some z′ with κ[z] = κ[z′]
for all z with κ[z] ∈ Y? ;
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(iii d) or the application of a send clause with p ∈ Ĩ witnessed by β
we have β(v, p, 0) = (v′, pm, i′, ψ) (ADAG iii d)
with ψ =
[
p0(t), p1(t′), . . . , pm(t′, κ′) → p(t)
]
∈ Ψ,
p0 ∈ δ(v), and
pj ∈ δ(v′) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, as well as
(σκ(t), t′) 7→ (v, v′) for σκ = subst(κ′, γ(v′, pm, i′)) .
/
Remark 3.18. For a node v and p ∈ δ(v) ∩ R̃ we define γ?(v, p) to contain what we call the
indices of the register sequences, i. e.,
γ?(v, p) = { i ∈N | γ(v, p, i) is defined} . (3.35)
By abuse of notation, we will use β as a function β : V × Q f × N 99K V × Q f × N × Ψ,
i. e., mapping a node v, a symbol p and a register sequence i not only to (v′, i′, ϕ), but to
(v′, p′, i′, ϕ) if p′ is in ϕ, i. e., if we have ϕ = [. . . , p′(t′, κ′) → p(t)] or ϕ = [. . . , p′(t′, κ′) →
p(t, κ)].
Similarly, we will write γ(v, p, i, z) instead of γ(v, p, i)[z], so we are using γ as a function
γ : V ×Q f ×N× {1, . . . , Z} → Γ̂. /
We will now give some intuition what was defined here; keep in mind that we will later
show that an ADAG for a protocol represents an attack on that protocol, so we will explain
how an ADAG represents a Horn proof of (3.21).
First of all, take a look at Figure 3.4: An ADAG consist mainly of a term DAG D representing
all terms that occur in the run of a protocol. The nodes of the DAG are labeled with function
symbols and constants, so for each node v there is a unique term t defined by the labeling
of v and its descendants, we will say v corresponds to t. The function α embeds the static
terms of the protocol to D.
In addition the nodes are labeled with predicate symbols by δ: A node v corresponding
to a term t is labeled with all predicate symbols p for which there is p(t) or p(t, κ) in the
Horn proof. For each node and each symbol there may be an unbounded set of register
3 The Graph of an Attack 66
 ···     ···    ···     	 〉  







Figure 3.5: Illustration of the ADAG conditions (ADAG iii a) to (ADAG iii d)
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sequences κ, in the ADAG they are represented by γ. Moreover, the freshness of a gener-
ated anonymous constant in a register sequence of a node is witnessed by λ through the
definition in (ADAG iii c).
The set of conditions guarantee the resemblance between ADAGs and Horn proofs of (3.21):
Condition (ADAG i) ensures that the conclusion of the Horn proof is fulfilled by the ADAG,
while condition (ADAG ii) corresponds to the normality of the Horn proof.
Furthermore, each fact in a Horn proof is either an a-fact or constructed by a clause. Ac-
cordingly, each predicate symbol in the ADAG needs a justification. This is ensured by
condition (ADAG iii) as illustrated in Figure 3.5: The fact is either an assumed fact (ADAG iii a),
or there is a pop clause (ADAG iii b), a push clause (ADAG iii c), or a send clause (ADAG iii d)
that justifies the fact. For the last two cases this justification is witnessed by β.
We can now express the following theorem, linking the existence of an ADAG to the insecu-
rity of a protocol:
Theorem 3.19 (Characterization of Attacks by ADAGs). Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol.
1. If (π, σ) is an attack on the protocol then there exists a stage mapping f and an ADAG
(D, Φ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) for P and (π, f ).
2. If there is an ADAG for P for an execution scheme and a stage mapping (π, f ) then there exists
an attack (π, σ) on the protocol for a substitution σ.
3.5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.19, Part 1
Proof. Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol, and let (π, σ) be an attack on that protocol. By
Lemma 3.11 we know that there exists a stage mapping f and sets C0, C such that state-
ment (3.21) holds; let Π be a Horn proof of that. We will now construct a corresponding
ADAG.
• Let T = {σ(t) | t ∈ TP} be a set of ground terms. We define a minimized term DAG
D = (V, F, µ) over Σ ∪ Γ̂ (with Γ̂ as defined below) and the function α̂ to be a D-
embedding for T. We also define α, which shall be a D-embedding for TP compatible
with α̂, i. e., α(t) = α̂(σ(t)) for each t ∈ TP .
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• Let Γ̂ be the set of all anonymous constants occurring in the Horn proof and the
assumption, i. e., including C and C0.
For all c ∈ C0 there is a register sequence κ(n) and some z ∈ {1, . . . , Z} with c =
κ(n)[z] such that r(n,0)n (sn, κ(n)) appears in the assumption of the Horn proof. Now set
γ(α(sn), r
(n,0)
n , 0) = κ(n) and λ(c) = (α(sn), r
(n,0)
n , 0, z).
• Start with δ(v) = ∅ for all v ∈ D. For each fact p(t) ∈ Π with α̂(t) = v we put p ∈ δ(v).
For each push symbol p and each term t for which there is a fact p(t, κ) in Π, let
{κ1, κ2, . . . , κI} be the set of register sequences with p(t, κi) ∈ Π for each i ∈ {1, . . . , I}.
Assume that α̂(t) = v. Then we put p ∈ δ(v), and in addition we set γ(v, p, i) = κi for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , I}.
• If p(t̂) is a c-fact in Π constructed by a send clause ϕ = [. . . , p′(t′, κ′) → p(t)] ∈ Φf
and a substitution σ̄, let v = α̂(t̂) and v′ = α̂(σ̄(t′)). Let i′ be the index such that
γ(v′, p′, i′) = σ̄(κ′). We then set β(v, p, 0) = (v′, i′, ϕ).
If p(t̂, κ̂) is a c-fact in Π constructed by a push clause ϕ = [. . . , p′(t′, κ′) → p(t, κ)] ∈ Φf
and a substitution σ̄, let v = α̂(t̂) and v′ = α̂(σ̄(t′)). Then for let i be the index
such that γ(v, p, i) = κ̂, and let i′ be the index with γ(v′, p′, i′) = κ̂′. We then set
β(v, p, i) = (v′, i′, ϕ), and we also set λ(σ̄(y?)) = (v, p, i, z) for each y? ∈ varY?(κ) and
for one z ∈ {1, . . . , Z} with y? = κ[z].
Now D = (D, Φ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) is an ADAG for P and (π, f ):
First we need to check if D is well-defined, i. e., if all elements of D are of the right type.
Most of this directly holds by definition, the interesting thing is to check that λ actually is
a functions, meaning there for each c ∈ Γ̂ there is at most one (v, p, i, z). This is ensured by
the definition of Horn proofs: In Π each c ∈ C ⊆ Γ̂ is assigned only once by one substitution
to a fresh variable y? ∈ Y?, possibly multiple times in one register sequence. In addition,
the anonymous constants c ∈ C0 ⊆ Γ̂ are used in the assumption of the Horn proof Π, but
they are not assigned anywhere else in the protocol.
We can now check the properties (ADAG i a) to (ADAG iii d): Condition (ADAG i) is ensured by
the Horn proof Π, condition (ADAG ii) holds because of the normality of the proof, for both
conditions we refer to Lemma 3.11.
For the third condition we look at the reason for each node’s creation: For a node v ∈ D
with a predicate symbol p ∈ δ(v) we have a term t̂ ∈ T with v = α̂(t̂). We now take the
fact a ∈ Π which contains t̂, i. e., which has the form p(t̂) or p(t̂, κ̂). If this is an a-fact, we
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know that (ADAG iii a) holds. If this is a c-fact, we have a clause ϕ constructing a. If ϕ is an
(intruder) pop clause, case (ADAG iii b) holds.
If a was constructed by a push clause ϕ = [p1(t′), . . . , pm(t′, κ′) → p(t, κ)] ∈ Φf with the
substitution σ̄ (this means σ̄(t) = t̂), we know (ADAG iii c) holds: We have an index i with
γ(v, p, i) = σ̄(κ). There is a fact pm(t̂′, κ̂′) ∈ Π with t̂′ = σ̄(t′), which leads to a correspond-
ing node v′ = α̂(t̂′). As the definition of a Horn proof holds for Π, we put the predicate
symbols p1, . . . , pm in δ(v′). As our term DAG is minimized, the condition about equal
nodes for equal variables holds. Because of the application of ϕ we have (κ, κ′) 7→ (κ̂, κ̂′),
where we know by definition of γ that we have (κ̂, κ̂′) = (γ(v, p, i), γ(v′, pm, i′)). Finally, for
each y? ∈ varY?(κ) we defined λ to point to (v, p, i, z) for some z with κ[z] = y?.
If a was constructed by a send clause ϕ = [p0(t), p1(t′), . . . , pm(t′, κ′) → p(t)] ∈ Φf with the
substitution σ̄ (this again means σ̄(t) = t̂), we know that (ADAG iii d) holds with a similar
argumentation: There is a fact pm(t̂′, κ̂′) ∈ Π with t̂′ = σ̄(t′), which again leads to the
node v′ = α̂(t̂′). The predicate symbol p0 is an element of δ(v), the symbols p1, . . . , pm are
elements of δ(v′). The interesting part here is the compatibility of the embeddings:
As t′ and t are elements of TP , we know by the definition of the embedding α̂ that (t, t′) 7→
(v, v′), as for each variable in x ∈ var(t) ∩ var(t′) we know that α̂(σ̄(x)) points to exactly
one node. However, that is not enough – we have to show that each node corresponding to
an anonymous variable y ∈ sub(t) is labeled with the correct anonymous constant.
In ϕ, each anonymous variable y ∈ sub(t) has to occur in the register sequence κ′, so in
the Horn proof Π the anonymous constant c = σ̄(y) has to occur in κ̂′. By construction
of the DAG this gives us c ∈ γ(v′, pn, i′) for an index i′; so we know v ~= σκ′(t) for σκ′ =
subst(κ′, γ(v′, pn, i′)).
As there are no anonymous variables in t′, we can substitute each anonymous variable
y ∈ sub(t) with the corresponding anonymous constant occurring in κ̂′, without affecting
the compatibility of the embeddings. Thus, we know (σκ′(t), t′) 7→ (v, v′).
This proves that D is an ADAG for P and (π, f ). We can now address the other direction of
the proof.
3.5.2 Proof of Theorem 3.19, Part 2
We now assume that there is an ADAG D = (D, Φ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) for a protocol P and a pair
(π, f ) of an execution scheme π = [tn → rn(sn)]Nn=1 and a stage mapping f .
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We have to construct a substitution σ such that (π, σ) is an attack. We use Lemma 3.11 and
can thus construct a Horn proof Π of statement (3.21). For each x ∈ TP ∩X we set σ′(x) = t
for the unique term t with α(x) ~= t.
1. Now start with Π′ being the empty sequence.
2. Put all the facts of the form q(t) in Π′ where we have q ∈ Q in the set δ(v) for a node
v ~= t; putting q(t1) before q(t2) if t1 ∈ sub(t2).
3. For each stage e occurring in D, beginning with the smallest stage and ascending, we
add the following facts:
a) We put all the facts of the form p(t, κ) in Π′ where we have p ∈ R̃ in the set δ(v)
for a node v ~= t, and where κ = γ(v, r, i) for an index i. We put pe(t1, κ1) before
pe(t2, κ2) if we have t2 ∈ sub(t1).
b) We then put all the facts of the form Ie(t) and qeI↓(t) in Π
′ where we have Ie or
qeI↓ ∈ δ(v) for a stage e ∈ E and a node v ~= t; putting I
e(t1) before Ie(t2) if we
have t1 ∈ sub(t2).
Now Π is a Horn proof for statement (3.21), more precisely: Π is a normal Horn proof of
the following statement with tN+1 = $ for stages en  n + 1 and ek < f (k), and for a set of







∣∣∣ n ∈ {1, . . . , N}} `CΦf{
Ien(σ(tn+1))
∣∣∣ n ∈ {0, . . . , N}} ∪ {Iek(k) ∣∣∣ k ∈ dom( f )} (3.36)
Let A be the assumption and B be the conclusion of this statement. We know that Π is
a normal Horn proof because of (ADAG ii). The assumption A corresponds to (ADAG iii a).
By (ADAG i a), (ADAG i b), and (ADAG i c), we also know B ⊆ Π for stages en  i + 1 and
ek < f (k).
Hence, we only have to show that the Horn proof Π is conclusive, i. e., that each fact in Π
is a valid a- or c-fact.
Let a = p(t̂) or a = p(t̂, κ̂) be a fact in Π. We know by construction that there is a node
v with v ~= t and p ∈ δ(v). We can now use condition (ADAG iii) from the definition of an
ADAG to distinct the following cases as one of them has to apply for p, v:
(iii a) In this case a is an a-fact, i. e., a ∈ A.
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(iii b) Now a is a c-fact constructed by an (intruder) pop clause. By construction we put
pj(t̂j) ∈ Π before a for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m} and for vj ~= t̂j, because t̂j ∈ sub(t̂) holds.
By (ADAG iii b) we have a matching clause ψ ∈ Ψ, which is an instance of a clause
ϕ ∈ Φf . Hence, p(t̂) can be derived in Π by that ϕ.
(iii c) In this case a = p(t̂, κ̂) is a c-fact constructed by a push clause ϕ of which ψ is an
instance (with β(v, p, i) = (v′, i′, ψ) for indices i, i′); let σψ be the substitution with
σψ(ϕ) = ψ. We put the prerequisites for that construction pj(t̂′) and pm(t̂′, κ̂′) in Π
before a, because we put the pop facts to the beginning and because t̂ ∈ sub(t̂′) holds.
In addition, we find a substitution σ̄1 with σ̄1(t′) = t̂′, and σ̄1(t) = t̂, and another
substitution, σ̄2, which embeds (κ, κ′) to (κ̂, κ̂′) = (γ(v, p, i), γ(v′, pm, i′)).
These two substitutions can be chosen disjoint as var(t′) ∩ Y = ∅, so we unify them
to σ̄3 = σ̄1 ∪ σ̄2 and set σ̄ = σ̄3 ◦ σψ.
Now a is constructed from pj(t̂′) and pm(t̂′, κ̂′) with the clause ϕ and the substitution
σ̄.
(iii d) In the last case, a is a c-fact constructed by a send clause, and the same argumentation
as in case (ADAG iii c) applies, with σ̄2 being subst(κ′, γ(v′, pn, i′)).
This concludes our proof; we have shown that ADAGs and attacks on protocols are equiva-
lent notions.
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4 Scaling Down ADAGs
Theorem 3.19 characterizes the existence of an attack by a special structure with a set of
local properties. The ADAG for an attack can now be guessed and checked by an algorithm
if we find a bound for the size of the ADAG.
4.1 Preliminaries
To do so we will first define some notation and show certain properties of ADAGs that are
important to keep in mind.
Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol over (Q, R), and let D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) be an ADAG for
P and a (π, f ), with V being the set of nodes in D and π = [tn → rn(sn)]Nn=1.
Let E be a set of stages for P. We again use Q̃ as pop symbols and R̃ as push symbols,
using
Ĩ = {I}(E) , (4.1 a)
Ĩ+ = {I, qI↓}(E) . (4.1 b)
Q̃ = Q ∪ Ĩ+ , (4.1 c)
R̃ =
(
R ∪ {rI, rIH} ∪
{
rIHk
∣∣∣ k ∈ K})(E) , (4.1 d)
4.1.1 Notation
Definition 4.1. We define the following relations, sets and notations:
• For two nodes v, v′ ∈ V we will use the relation v →D v′ if there is an edge (v, v′, j) in
D for a j ∈N. Let →∗D be the reflexive transitive closure of →D.
For a set of nodes W we will also write W →D v if w →D v holds for a node w ∈W.
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• For two nodes v, v′ ∈ V we define a second kind of edges, β-edges, in the following
way: (v, p, i) ;D (v′, p′, i) if conditions (ADAG iii c) or (ADAG iii d) hold for v′ and p′
such that β(v′, p′, i) = (v, p, i, ϕ). Let ;∗D be the reflexive transitive closure of ;D.
A matching sequence of β-edges (v1, p1, i1) ; (v2, p2, i2) ; · · · ; (vm+1, pm+1, im+1)
is called a β-path for some m ∈N called the length of the path. We will omit the third
component or both the second and third component and just write v ;D v′ if we have
(v, p, i) ;D (v′, p′, i′) for some p, p′, i, i′.
In addition, we will further simplify the β-notation: As condition (ADAG ii) guarantees
that for each node u there is at most one stage e with Ie ∈ δ(u), we will use β(u, I)
instead of β(u, Ie, 0) if such a stage e exists, and (v, p, i) ; (u, I), respectively.
• A node v of D is static if it belongs to the static terms of the protocol like tn and sn,
i. e., if v = α(t) for a term t ∈ sub(TP ). We also need the nodes reachable from static
nodes in a bounded number of steps:
StaticD = {v ∈ V | α(t) = v for a term t ∈ sub(TP )} , (4.2)
Static+D =
{
w ∈ V | v →mD w for a term v ∈ StaticD with m ≤ |P|2
}
. (4.3)
• A node v belongs to step n if we have α(tn) →∗D v or α(sn) →∗D v.
StepsD(≤n) = {v ∈ V | α(t) →
∗
D v for a term t ∈ {¢, t1, s1, . . . , tn, sn}} . (4.4)
A node v can belong to multiple steps if, for example, α(tn) →∗D α(sn′) →∗D v holds.
• A node u ∈ V is a goal if u is the top node of the resulting term of a send action, i. e.,




∣∣ there is an m such that I(n,m) ∈ δ(u) and








GoalsD(v) = {u ∈ GoalsD | v ;∗ (u, Ie, 0)} . (4.7)
In that case (n, m) is the stage of the goal, and n is the protocol step of the goal; we will
also call u an n-goal.
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• For a goal u with Ie ∈ δ(u) and β(u, Ie, 0) = (v, p, i, ϕ) with ψ = [. . . , p(t′, κ) → Ie(t)],
we find an embedding αu which embeds (σκ(t), t′) to (u, v) for the substitution σκ =
subst(κ, γ(v, p, i)).
We then define the set of fixed nodes, i. e., nodes belonging to t and t′, and the set of
nodes of variables, i. e., nodes representing the regular variables in t:
FixD(u) =
{





w ∈ V | αu(x) = w for a normal variable x ∈ var(t) ⊆ var(t′)
}
. (4.9)
The send clause ψ ∈ Ψ may either be a send clause occurring in the stage theory of
the protocol, i. e., ψ = ϕ for a clause ϕ ∈ Φf , or it may be an instance of such a send
clause ϕ ∈ Φf with ψ 6= ϕ. In both cases, let ϕ = [. . . , p(t̂′, κ) → Ie(t̂)]. Let α′u and α′′u
be two embeddings with α′u(u) = t̂ and α′′u(v) = t̂′. We define
Var?D(u) =
{
w ∈ V | α′u(x) = w or α′′u(x) = w for x ∈ varX(t̂) ⊆ var(t̂′)
}
. (4.10)
Note that we may have two nodes α′u(x) 6= α′′u(x) for a normal variable x ∈ varX(t̂),
while there is only one node αu(x) for each x ∈ varX(t). Also note that we have
Var?D(u) = VarD(u) if ψ = ϕ is not an instance.
For all sets and relations defined here with an index D, we will omit the index if it is clear
from the context which ADAG we refer to. /
4.1.2 Properties of ADAGs
To understand the proofs in the following sections it is important to point out some gen-
eral properties of the structure of an ADAG D. Therefore, we will present and prove the
following four lemmas.
Lemma 4.2 (Structure of β-Paths). Let v ∈ V be a node, let p ∈ δ(V) ∩ (R̃ ∪ Ĩ) be a predicate
symbol and i ∈ γ?(v, p) be the index of a register sequence of v and p. Let
~v = (v1, p1, i1) ; (v2, p2, i2) ; · · · ; (vm, pm, im) (4.11)
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be a β-path of maximal length through (v, p, i), i. e., a path with (v, p, i) = (vj, pj, ij) for a j ∈
{1, . . . , m}, and such that there is no (v′, p′, i′) with (v′, p′, i′) ; (v1, p1, i1) or (vm, pm, im) ;
(v′, p′, i′).
Then we can assume the following:
1. The subpath (v1, p1, i1) ;∗ (vj, pj, ij) is uniquely determined.
2. (v1, p1, i1) = (α(sn), r
(n,0)
n , 0) for an n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
3. p1, . . . , pm−1 ∈ R̃, i. e., besides the last step, the path consists of push clause applications,
4. v1 → v2 → · · · → vm−1, i. e., besides the last step, the β-path moves along the normal edges
of the ADAG, and
5. (vm, pm, im) = (u, Ie, 0) for a goal u and a stage e, and
6. if we have GoalsD(v) = ∅ for a node v, we also know δ(v) ∩ R̃ = ∅.
In other words, each β-path of maximal length begins at a push symbol rn in a node corre-
sponding to a term sn, then it follows the normal edges of the DAG and the push symbols,
moving from a node to one of its children, and finally it »jumps« to a goal by applying a
send clause.
In terms of Horn proofs this only reflects the fact that each fact containing a push symbol
was justified either by assumption (and the only assumption was rn(sn, κ(n))) or through
construction by a flat push clause, and the fact is only necessary if it is a prerequisite for a
send symbol.
Proof. Let vj, pj, ij and ~v be as described in the lemma. We will prove each assumption made
in the lemma.
1. The subpath (v1, p1, i1) ;∗ (vj, pj, ij) is uniquely determined because we can construct
it directly: We distinguish between two cases, depending on which condition v and p
fulfill in D: If (ADAG iii a) holds for vj and pj, we know j = 1 by definition of the relation
;. Otherwise, either condition (ADAG iii c) or condition (ADAG iii d) holds for v and p, so
because β is a function there is a unique triple (vj−1, pj−1, ij−1) with (vj−1, pj−1, ij−1) ;
(vj, pj, ij). Then, by applying this construction recursively on (vj−1, pj−1, ij−1), we get
a path as assumed. This recursion terminates as we have a finite DAG.
2. The proof of the first condition also shows that condition (ADAG iii a) holds for v1 and
p1, so we know v1 = α(sn), p1 = r
(n,0)
n and in = 0 for an n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
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3. If we have (v, p, i) ; (v′, p′, i′) ; (v′′, p′′, i′′), we know that condition (ADAG iii d)
cannot hold for v′ and p′ because p′ ∈ Ĩ cannot be used as justification for any p′′,
i. e., we cannot have β(v′′, p′′, i′′) = (v′, p′, i′, ϕ) for any ϕ. By definition of ;, condi-
tion (ADAG iii c) holds for v′ and p′, and so we have p′ ∈ R̃. Applying this argumenta-
tion on all nodes v ∈ {v1, . . . , vm−2} and v′′ ∈ {v3, . . . , vm} proves the third condition.
4. Here we can use the same argumentation as for the previous condition – knowing
that (ADAG iii c) holds for v′ and p′ leads to v → v′.
5. The proof for this condition is the most technical one: There may be ADAGs where
this condition does not hold, but then we can construct a very similar ADAG which
only has less register sequences and perhaps a smaller predicate symbol labeling, but
for which this condition holds.
Take a look at v = vj, and assume that there is no goal u with (v, p, i) ;∗ (u, I). We
either have j 6= m, then condition 3 we have just proven leads to pj ∈ R̃, or we have
j = m, in which case we also have pj ∈ R̃ because otherwise vj would be a goal and
we could select u = vj.
We will now remove the register sequence which is indexed by ij and all of its descen-
dants on all β-paths by restricting γ, β, and λ in the following way:
For all nodes v′ ∈ V, predicate symbols p′ ∈ δ(v′) and all indices i′ ∈ γ?(v′, p′) such
that we do not have (v, p, i) ;∗ (v′, p′, i′), we set
γ1(v′, p′, i′) = γ(v′, p′, i′) , (4.12)
β1(v′, p′, i′) = β(v′, p′, i′) , (4.13)
λ1(c) = λ(c) if λ(c) = (v′, p′, i′, z) for a z ∈ {1, . . . , Z} . (4.14)
Otherwise γ1, β1, and λ1 shall be undefined, i. e., i′ /∈ γ?1(v
′, p′).
We may have created a structure where a predicate symbol p̄ for a node v̄ does not
have any register sequences left, γ?1(v̄, p̄) = ∅, which would contradict the definition
of an ADAG in condition (ADAG iii c). But then, this predicate symbol p̄ can clearly not
lead to any goals, so we can also remove it.
As p̄ may lead to other push symbols, we do not only remove p̄, but also all of its




∣∣ (v̄, p̄) 6;∗ (v′, p′)} . (4.15)
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Now for all nodes v′ ∈ V, predicate symbols p′ ∈ δ2(v′) and all indices i′ ∈ γ?1(v
′, p′)
we set
γ2(v′, p′, i′) = γ1(v′, p′, i′) , (4.16)
β2(v′, p′, i′) = β1(v′, p′, i′) , (4.17)
λ2(c) = λ1(c) if λ1(c) = (v′, p′, i′, z) for a z ∈ {1, . . . , Z} . (4.18)
We will show that the result D′ = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β2, γ2, δ2, λ2) is an ADAG. Then, by
repeating this process for all indices i and all predicate symbols p we get an ADAG D′′
which fulfills the fifth condition of the lemma.
We will show that we actually constructed an ADAG: As we only restricted the domain
of the functions, all the components of the ADAG are still well-defined. The ADAG
conditions (ADAG i a) to (ADAG ii) do clearly still hold, as we modified no I-symbols.
For each node v and each symbol p ∈ δ′(v), we know that one of the four condi-
tions (ADAG iii a) to (ADAG iii d) holds in D. Then this condition will still hold in D′:
The cases (ADAG iii a) and (ADAG iii b) were not modified.
In case (ADAG iii c) we know because of p ∈ δ(v) that (v, p, i) ;∗ (u, I) for an index i
and a goal u; otherwise, we would have removed p from δ(v). But then, we also know
that (v̂, p̂, î) ;∗ (u, I) for β(v, p, i) = (v̂, p̂, î, ϕ), i. e., we did not remove p̂ or î from v̂.
Hence, case (ADAG iii c) still holds.
The last case, (ADAG iii d), holds analogously – if v is a goal with β(v, I) = (v̂, p̂, î, ϕ),
we know that (v̂, p̂, î) ; (u, I), so we did not remove p̂ from δ′(v̂) or î from γ?(v̂, p̂).
This proves that by this transformation we get an ADAG.
6. This is a direct consequence of the fifth condition easily seen by contraposition: If
p ∈ γ(v) ∩ R̃, then we have at least one index i ∈ γ?(v, p) and can apply the lemma’s
fifth condition on (v, p, i), showing GoalsD(v) 6= ∅.
This concludes the proof of our lemma, which will be used in the following proofs.
Lemma 4.3 (Restriction of Nodes). For a protocol P we can assume that an ADAG for P contains
only nodes w for which α(t) →∗ w holds for a term t ∈ TP .
Proof. Let W be the set of nodes of an ADAG D such that w ∈W is no descendant of α(t) for
any t ∈ TP . Furthermore, let w ∈W be a node without a parent – we can select such a node
as any parent of w would also be in W.
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We can remove this node without damaging the ADAG: First, w is not necessary to fulfill
the ADAG conditions (ADAG i a) to (ADAG i c). For (ADAG ii) and (ADAG iii a) we have nothing to
show. Then, it cannot be any vj in condition (ADAG iii b) as w has no parents. Furthermore,
by the previous lemma we know that δ(v) cannot contain any push symbols, as it would
have to be descendant of a node α(tn) by the previous lemma. Thus, it cannot be used as a
justification in the witness function of (ADAG iii c) and (ADAG iii d).
Hence, if we define D′ to be the same as D just with removing w from the set of nodes (and
possibly from the functions), all ADAG conditions do still hold for D′. We can repeat this
procedure until we reach an ADAG D′′ for which we have W = ∅.
Lemma 4.4 (Nodes of Variables). Let u be an n-goal of an ADAG D. Then we have VarD(u) ⊆
StepsD(≤n).
From the protocol point of view, this is plausible as it only states that the terms sent in a
step n have to be known to the principals in that step or an earlier step than n.
This lemma also states that if d is the maximal depth of a term occurring in a send clause
in the stage theory Ψ of D, than each path of length greater than d from u or some of its
descendants in the DAG will lead to a node in StepsD(≤n).
Proof. Let u be an n-goal of an ADAG D, and let v ∈ VarD(u). Then by the embedding
condition in (ADAG iii d) we know that v is not only a descendant of u, but also of a node w
with β(u, I) = (w, re, i, ϕ). We also know re ∈ δ(w) for a push symbol re ∈ R̃. By looking at
all possible send clauses we know e ≤ n. Then Lemma 4.2 states there is a node ŵ = α(sm)
for some m with ŵ →∗ w. Again, we know m ≤ e. But then, we have m ≤ n, leading to
v ∈ StepsD(≤m) ⊆ StepsD(≤n).
Lemma 4.5. Let v be a node of an ADAG D with v ∈ StepsD(≤n), but v /∈ Static
+
D. Then there is
an index i ≤ n with α(ti) →∗ v.
Proof. Let v be a node of an ADAG D. Then because of v ∈ StepsD(≤ n) there is a term
t ∈ {¢, t1, s1, . . . , tn, sn} with α(t) →∗ v. If t = ¢, we would have α(¢) →0 v, so v ∈ Static+D,
this case is not possible. If t = ti for an i ≤ n, there is nothing to show.
The only case left to consider is t = si for an i ≤ n. Then there is a path in the DAG of the
form α(si) → w1 → · · · → wm → v. As v /∈ Static+D, this path is longer than the depth of si,
which means there is a node wj on the path with wj = α(x) for a variable x ∈ sub(si). But
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then by definition of a protocol step we know that x ∈ sub(ti′) for an i′ ≤ i, and thus, there
is a path α(ti′) → u1 → · · · → um′ → wj. Now we have a path
α(ti′) → u1 → · · · → um′ → wj → wj+1 → · · · → wm → v . (4.19)
This shows α(ti′) →∗ v.
4.2 Constructing Simple ADAGs
We now define simple ADAGs. Simple means that a goal with predicate symbol Ie
′
has no
descendants in Static+D with a predicate symbol I
e for any e  e′. The main idea is that
these predicates are not necessary:
If a goal u with stage e is descendent of a goal u′ with stage e′  e, then we cannot use the
predicate symbol Ie to show that Ie
′
holds, as the intruder’s knowledge in stage e cannot
be used to show his knowledge in stage e′  e.
But there may be another ancestor of u in the DAG which needs the predicate symbol Ie.
Therefore, we just copy the node u to the node û, leaving the original node as a descendent
of v, but deleting it’s symbol Ie, and making the new copy û (which is annotated with the
symbol Ie) a descendent of all ancestors of u that need the symbol Ie.
Definition 4.6. The ADAG D is called simple if for every v /∈ Static+D that is a descendent of
u ∈ GoalsD(n), the node v is not in GoalsD(m) for any m > n. /
As we copy some nodes, there may be a situation where the definition of an ADAG no longer
holds: Assume that we duplicate a node v which is in the set VarD(u) of a goal u (with
β(u, I) = (u′, i′, ϕ)). Further assume that the copy, call it v̂, will only be a descendant of u
(not u′), while v is only a descendant of u′ (and not of u). Now the embedding condition
in (ADAG iii d) is violated, i. e., a variable in t and t′ is no longer mapped to the same node
v. We will repair this by using instances of send clauses, as later shown in the definition of
βn. For this we use the following definition:
Definition 4.7. Let Φf be a stage theory for a protocol with N steps. Then Φ̂f is the same
stage theory unified with all instances ϕ′ of send clauses ϕ ∈ Φf , where the depth of ϕ
′ is
not greater than |Φ| · (N + 1). /
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It is easy to see that for a protocol P = (P, Φ) the size of such an instantiated stage theory
Φ̂f is exponential in terms of the size of P , as the maximal depth equals |Φ| · (N + 1) < |P|2,
i. e., is polynomial in terms of the protocol size.
Theorem 4.8 (Simple ADAGs). Let P be a protocol. If D = (D, Φf , Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) is an ADAG
for a protocol P = (P, Φ) and (π, f ), then there exists a simple ADAG D′ for P and (π, f ) with
D′ = (D′, Φ̂f , Γ̂, α′, β′, γ′, δ′, λ′).
4.2.1 Proof of Theorem 4.8
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we will construct a simple ADAG DN from an ADAG
D0 step-by-step: We will construct a sequence [D0, . . . ,DN] of ADAGs where the following
condition will hold for each ADAGs Dn in the sequence: For every v /∈ Static+Dn that is a
descendent of u ∈ GoalsDn(m) for an m ≤ n, the node v is not in GoalsDn(m′) for any
m′ > m. In short:
For all v /∈ Static+Dn
with GoalsDn(m) →
∗ v for an m ≤ n
we have v /∈ GoalsDn(>m) .
(4.20 a)
We will later show that this condition holds for n = N, so we know that DN is simple. We
add another two conditions that will ease the argumentation:
Let u ∈ GoalsDn(m) for an m > n. For all v ∈ VarDn(u) we either have v ∈ Var
?
Dn(u), i. e., the
variable that v corresponds to was not instantiated, or we have v ∈ StepsDn(≤n). In short:
For all u ∈ GoalsDn(>n)
for all v ∈ VarDn(u) \Var
?
Dn(u),
we have v ∈ StepsDn(≤n) .
(4.20 b)
And finally we need to state that the depth of send clauses used in the witness function βn
is bounded:
For all ϕ = [. . . , p′(t′, κ) → p(t)] ∈ Φ̂f
with βn(v, p, i) = (v′, i′, ϕ) for some v, v′, p, i, i′
we have depth(t), depth(t′) ≤ |P| · (n + 1) .
(4.20 c)
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For D0 all three conditions hold; the first one because there is no m-goal for m ≤ 0; the
second one because D0 uses no instances, so VarDn(u) = Var?Dn(u) for all goals u; and the
last one, too, because D0 uses no instances, so the depth of terms in send clauses is smaller
than |P|.
Now let n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. Let Dn−1 = (Dn−1, Φ̂f , Γ̂, α, βn−1, γn−1, δn−1, λn−1) be an ADAG
for P and (π, f ), with Vn−1 being the set of nodes in Dn−1. Assume that the inductive
hypothesis – i. e., conditions (4.20 a) to (4.20 c) – holds for Dn−1. We will now define Dn =
(Dn, Φ̂f , Γ̂, α, βn, γn, δn, λn), with Vn being the set of nodes in Dn. We will then show that all
three conditions also hold for Dn.
As explained above, the main step in this construction is to duplicate some nodes in Vn−1.
We define the following set W ⊆ Vn−1 of nodes that will be duplicated. These are all nodes
that are only belonging to protocol steps greater than n, and that are a descendant of an
n-goal, but are no n-goal itself:
W = {w ∈ Vn−1 | GoalsDn−1(n) →∗ w,
w /∈ GoalsDn−1(n),
w /∈ StepsDn−1(≤n)} .
(4.21)
There may be some static nodes belonging to W, and we do not want to manipulate them,
hence, we define the set WS ⊆ W of static nodes and their descendants. Formally, let WS be
the smallest set for which the following fixed point equation holds:
WS =
{
w ∈W | w ∈ StaticDn−1 or WS → w
}
. (4.22)
We know WS ⊆ Static+Dn−1 : Each node w ∈ WS is either in StaticDn−1 , or it is a descendent
of a node ŵ ∈ StaticDn−1 . By WS ⊆ W we know that in the latter case, ŵ and w are the
descendants of an n-goal u. But on the other hand both ŵ and w are not in StepsDn−1(≤n)
(as they are in W). By Lemma 4.4 we know that the length of the path ŵ →∗ w is bounded
by |P|2 as that is the maximal depth of a send clause in Φ̂f . Hence, we know that w is in
Static+Dn−1 . In fact, the bound |P|
2 in the definition of Static+Dn−1 originates in this step.
Now we are able to construct the ADAG Dn = (Dn, Φ̂f , Γ̂, α, βn, γn, δn, λn), i. e., we will define
the components of Dn.
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The Term DAG Dn
We assume that we have Dn−1 = (Vn−1, Fn−1, µn−1), and we will construct the term DAG
Dn = (Vn, Fn, µn).
Let WB be a set of new nodes, i. e., WB ∩ Vn−1 = ∅ with a bijection f : W → WB; then set
Vn = Vn−1 ∪WB. Now each node w ∈ W ⊆ Vn−1 is split into two nodes w and f (w) ∈ Vn.
As we need the corresponding nodes, we define two functions:
B : Vn−1 → Vn vB =
 f (v), if v ∈W ,v, if v /∈ W , (4.23)
C : Vn → Vn−1 vC =
 f−1(v), if v ∈WB ,v, if v /∈ WB . (4.24)
Now we define the set of edges Fn by the following conditions for each (v, w, l) ∈ Fn−1:
(vB, wB, l) ∈ Fn if v ∈W , (4.25 a)
and either (v, wB, l) ∈ Fn if v /∈ W, w ∈W, v /∈ GoalsDn−1(≤n) (4.25 b)
or (v, w, l) ∈ Fn otherwise. (4.25 c)
The labeling function µn is defined by µn(v) = µn−1(vC). Note that we did not modify the
nodes, edges or labeling in StepsDn−1(≤n), so we have StepsDn−1(≤n) = StepsDn(≤n).
The Register Sequence Function γn and the Freshness Function λn
The register sequences assigned to a node and a push symbol will just follow the paths
on which they were constructed. Hence, take a node v ∈ Vn−1 and a push symbol r ∈
δn−1(v) ∩ R̃. Now for each i ∈ γ?n−1(v, r) we set define the node (v, r, i)B ∈ Vn to be either v
or vB:
We will set (v, r, i)B = vB if there are nodes v̂, w ∈ Vn−1 with v̂ ;Dn−1 w ;
∗
Dn−1 (v, r, i)
and with v̂ /∈ W, but w ∈ W such that (4.25 b) holds for v̂ and w, i. e., we have v̂ →Dn wB.
Otherwise we set (v, r, i)B = v.
Now for each v ∈ Vn−1, each r ∈ δn−1(v) ∩ R̃ and each i ∈ γ?n−1(v, r) we define:
γn((v, r, i)B, r, i) = γn−1(v, r, i) . (4.26)
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Accordingly, for each c ∈ Γ̂ we set:
λn(c) = ((v, r, i)B, r, i, z) for λn−1(c) = (v, r, i, z) . (4.27)
The Predicate Symbol Labeling Function δn
Let v ∈ Vn−1 be a node. Let δQ = δn−1(v) ∩ Q, as well as δR = δn−1(v) ∩ R̃, and δI =
δn−1(v) ∩ Ĩ+. Then we have δn−1(v) = δQ ·∪ δR ·∪ δI. Now we have to assign these symbols
to v and vB if the latter exists; so we will have δn−1(v) = δn(v) ∪ δn(vB).
Hence, for now assume that v ∈ W. The pop symbols (except for qI↓) can just be copied
to both v and vB. The I-symbols we want to remove from v are all the symbols Ie with a
stage that is greater than n, so we define δI =
{
Ie or qeI↓ ∈ δI
∣∣∣ e  n}. Finally we define
the sets δR(v), δR(vB) ⊆ δR in the following way:
δR(v) =
{





r ∈ δR | (v, r, i)B = vB for an index i ∈ γ?n−1(v, r)
}
. (4.29)
Now we can define δn, so for each v ∈ Vn−1 we set:
δn(v) = δn−1(v) if v /∈ W , (4.30 a)
δn(v) = δQ ∪ δR(v) ∪
δI \ δI , if v /∈ WSδI, if v ∈WS if v ∈W , (4.30 b)
δn(vB) = δQ ∪ δR(vB) ∪ δI if v ∈W . (4.30 c)
TheWitness Function βn
This is the most technical part of the construction. In most cases, we will use a definition
similar to βn((v, p, i)B, p, i) = βn−1(v, p, i). But in some cases we have to modify the witness
for the application of a send clause.
Hence, we distinguish between the following cases for v ∈ Vn and p ∈ δn(v) if nei-
ther (ADAG iii a) nor (ADAG iii b) applies for vC and p in Dn−1:
1. For p ∈ δn(v) ∩ R̃ we define
βn(v, p, i) = ((v′, p′, i′)B, p′, i′, ϕ) for βn−1(vC, p, i) = (v′, p′, i′, ϕ) . (4.31 a)
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of case 2. c) of the definition of βn in the proof of Theorem 4.8
2. For p ∈ δn(v) ∩ Ĩ we have the following cases:
a) If we have FixDn−1(v
C) ∩W = ∅, or
b) if we have VarDn−1(v
C) ⊆ StepsDn(≤n), we do nearly the same as in (4.31 a):
βn(v, p, 0) = ((v′, p′, i′)B, p′, i′, ϕ) for βn−1(vC, p, 0) = (v′, p′, i′, ϕ) . (4.31 b)
c) Otherwise, we have VarDn−1(v
C) * StepsDn(≤ n), but we know that v
C is a goal
(let e be the stage with Ie ∈ δn−1(vC)), so by Lemma 4.4 we have e  n. But
then by (4.20 b) we know βn−1(vC, I) = (v′, p′, i′, ϕ) for a clause ϕ ∈ Φf with
ϕ = [. . . , p′(t′, κ) → Ie(t)].
As case a) did not apply, we know FixDn−1(v
C) ∩ W 6= ∅, so we know that a
node w ∈ FixDn−1(v
C) is in W, i. e., a descendant of an n-goal u. We will define
a substitution σ which maps each regular variable x to a term if and only if x is
corresponding to such a node w ∈W.
Hence, we need the embedding θv which embeds (σκ(t), t′) to (v, v′) as defined
in (ADAG iii d) for Dn−1. Now we define σ to be a substitution, the domain of σ
will be the set Xσ = {x ∈ varX(t) | θv(x) ∈W}. Hence, for each x ∈ Xσ we do
the following steps, as illustrated in Figure 4.1:
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Let u be an n-goal such that w = θv(x) is a descendant of u in Dn−1. Now let
ψ be a send clause such that βn−1(u, I) = (u′, r′, i′, ψ). We assume that ψ =
[. . . r′(s′, κ′) → Ie′(s)], so let θu be the embedding which embeds (σκ′(s), s′) to
(u, u′) as defined in (ADAG iii d) for Dn−1.
Because of Lemma 4.4 there is a term sx ∈ sub(s) with θu(sx) = w: We know
that u is an n-goal, w is a descendant of u, and w /∈ StepsDn−1(≤ i) because of the
definition of W.
Hence, we now set σ(x) = sx. We assume that var(sx) ∩ (var(t) ∪ var(κ)) = ∅,
else we have to rename the variables in the intersection.
After repeating this for each x ∈ Xσ, we set
βn(v, p, 0) = ((v′, p′, i′)B, p′, i′, σ(ϕ)) for βn−1(vC, p, 0) = (v′, p′, i′, ϕ) . (4.31 c)
Note that we may have an anonymous variable in the term sx, i. e., we took sx from
sub(s) and not, for example, from sub(σκ′(s)), but – as shown later – this does
not raise any problems.
This completes our ADAG Dn = (Dn, Φ̂f , Γ̂, α, βn, γn, δn, λn), we now have to show that this
actually is an ADAG and that the three conditions (4.20 a), (4.20 b), and (4.20 c) hold.
Proof of the ADAG Conditions
We will show that Dn actually is an ADAG. To do so, we first have to check the type of each
component.
The graph Dn is acyclic: If there is a cycle v1, . . . , vm in Dn, we have a cycle vC1, . . . , v
C
m
in Dn−1. The type of the other components is easy to check from the definition of each
component; and when later proving condition (4.20 c) we will show that in the definition of
βn we used instances of send clauses that actually are in Φ̂f .
Now we show that (ADAG i a) to (ADAG iii d) do still hold.
(i) For (ADAG i a) to (ADAG i c) note that we did not alter α. Hence, for each node v = α(t)
for a term t ∈ { tn | n ∈ {1, . . . , N}} ∪ {k | k ∈ dom( f )} ∪ {$}, we know Iet ∈ δn−1(v)
for an appropriate stage et. We show that Iet ∈ δn(v), i. e., that I was not removed:
We know that if v ∈ W, then v is also in WS. Thus, in the definition of δn we did not
remove Iet , as only (4.30 a) or the second case of (4.30 b) are possible.
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(ii) For (ADAG ii) just assume that Ie1 , Ie2 ∈ δn(v) for e1 6= e2, then we would have Ie1 , Ie2 ∈
δn−1(vC), which contradicts the inductive hypothesis that (ADAG ii) holds for Dn−1.
(iii) Let v ∈ Vn be a node, p ∈ δn(v) be a predicate symbol. By construction and inductive
hypothesis, one of the for cases (ADAG iii a) to (ADAG iii d) holds for vC and p ∈ δn−1(vC).
Hence, we can distinguish between this four cases:
(iii a) We know (ADAG iii a) holds for vC and p in Dn−1. First assume that vC = α(¢).
As α(¢) ∈ StepsD(≤ 1) for each ADAG D (the first message of the intruder can
only contain terms constructed from ¢), we know vC /∈ W, so vC = v. This
means v = α(¢) and p = I(0,0) ∈ δn(v), so (ADAG iii a) holds for v and p.
Now assume that vC = α(sm) for an m ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then we have p = r(m,0)m ∈
δn−1(vC). We defined (vC, r
(m,0)
m , 0)B = vC, so we did neither change γ(v, p, 0)
nor λ(v, p, 0, z) for any z, so (ADAG iii a) holds for v and p.
(iii b) If (ADAG iii b) holds for vC and p in Dn−1, the same pop clause ψ will also be
sufficient as a justification for v and p in Dn. We will show this for multiple
cases:
For the case p ∈ Q̃, we know that the necessary pop symbols p1, . . . , pm in the
labeling of the descendants of vC were copied from δn−1(w) to both δn(w) and
δn(wB) for each descendant w of vC.
Take a look at p ∈
{
Ie, qeI↓
∣∣∣ e  n}. Let v ∈ Vn, w ∈ Vn−1 be nodes with
p ∈ δn−1(vC) and p′ ∈ δn−1(w), such that p was produced by an intruder pop
clause using p′. We know vC →Dn−1 w, and to show that (ADAG iii b) still holds,
we have to show that v →Dn w′ for a node w′ ∈ {w, wB} with p′ ∈ δn(w′).
• If we have v ∈WB, we constructed an edge v →Dn w′ by (4.25 a), distinguish
between two cases:
– For w ∈W we have w′ = wB and p′ ∈ δn(wB) by (4.30 c).
– For w /∈ W we have w′ = w and p′ ∈ δn(w) because of (4.30 a).
• Otherwise we have v /∈ WB, i. e., v ∈ Vn−1. We constructed an edge v →Dn
w′ as we applied either condition (4.25 b) or condition (4.25 c).
– If we used (4.25 b), we know w ∈ W, then again we set w′ = wB and
have p′ ∈ δn(wB) by (4.30 c).
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– If (4.25 c) was applied, we have v ∈W, w ∈W or v ∈ GoalsDn−1 n.
If the latter one applies, we have nothing to show, as we will handle the
case (ADAG iii d) later.
For w /∈ W we again set w′ = w and know p′ ∈ δn(w) because of (4.30 a).
Assume that w ∈W.
For v ∈W we know v ∈WS, else, we would have removed p as defined
in (4.30 b). But then by (4.22) we would also have w ∈ WS because
w ∈ W and v →Dn−1 w. Then for w′ = w we know v →Dn w as well as
p′ ∈ δn(w) because of (4.30 b).
Furthermore, we still have vj1 = vj2 for all j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , m} with xj1 = xj2 , as
conditions (4.25 a) to (4.25 c) modify all edges between two nodes in exactly the
same way.
(iii c) In this case, too, we will show that (ADAG iii c) still holds. Hence, let i ∈
γ?n(v, p), and let βn(v, p, i) = (v′, p′, i′, ϕ). We know by construction that we
have βn−1(vC, p, i) = (v′C, p′, i′), so we have to show that v′ is a father of v, that
p′ ∈ δn(v′) and that i′ ∈ γ?n(v′, p′). Then we know that the register sequences
are still compatible and the freshness function still points to the right register
sequences because we did modify these functions accordingly.
Distinguish between two cases:
• First, assume that v = vC, i. e., (v, p, i)B = v. Then by the definition
of (v, p, i)B we know that there are no nodes v̂, w ∈ Vn−1 with v̂ ;Dn−1
w ;∗Dn−1 (v, r, i), with v̂ /∈ W, and w ∈ W such that (4.25 b) holds for v̂ and
w. But then the same applies for (v′, p′, i′), leading to (v′, p′, i′)B = v′. This
means p′ ∈ δn(v′) and i′ ∈ γ?n(v′, p′), and this also means v′ →Dn v because
of condition (4.25 c) (remember that (4.25 b) did not apply).
• Now assume that v 6= vC, this means v ∈ WB. We again use the definition
of (vC, p, i)B, but this time we know that there are nodes v̂, w ∈ Vn−1 with
v̂ ;Dn−1 w ;
∗
Dn−1 (v, p, i) and with v̂ /∈ W, but w ∈ W such that (4.25 b)
holds for v̂ and w.
We then can either have w = vC, then we know v̂ = v′ and we have v′ →Dn
v because of (4.25 b). Then v′ = v̂ /∈ W also implies p′ ∈ δn(v′) and i′ ∈
γ?n(v′, p′).
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Or we have w 6= vC, but then we know v′ 6= vC: There are nodes v̂, w ∈
Vn−1 with v̂ ;Dn−1 w ;
∗
Dn−1 (v
′C, p′, i′) ;Dn−1 (v
C, p, i) with v̂ /∈ W, but
w ∈ W such that (4.25 b) holds for v̂ and w. Then we know v′ →Dn v by
condition (4.25 a), and we also know p′ ∈ δn(v′) and i′ ∈ γ?n(v′, p′) because
(v′C, p′, i′)B = v′.
(iii d) In this case we know vC was a goal, and we will show that v is also a goal with
p = Ie. Let βn(v, I) = (v′, p′, i′, ϕ) with ϕ = [. . . , p′(t′, κ′) → p(t)]. Then we
know by definition of βn that p′ ∈ δn(v′), and that i′ ∈ γ?n(v′, i′). We only have
to show that the embeddings are compatible, i. e., that (σκ(t), t′) 7→ (v, v′) for
the substitution σκ = subst(κ′, γn(v′, p′, i′)). As we did neither modify κ′ nor
γn(v′, p′, i′), we will still use the same substitution σκ.
We can now distinguish between the cases we had when defining βn(v, I) by
conditions (4.31 b) and (4.31 c).
In the first case, we have FixDn−1(v
C) ∩W = ∅. Then we know that there are
no nodes in FixDn−1(v
C) that are duplicated, and as we know VarDn−1(v
C) ⊆
FixDn−1(v
C), all nodes of variables of v are left unchanged.
The same argumentations applies for the case VarDn−1(v
C) ⊆ StepsDn(≤ n),
because this also leads to VarDn−1(v
C) ∩W = ∅, so the nodes of variables of v
were left unchanged.
But in the last case, we may have copied some nodes of variables of v because
we cannot ensure that VarDn−1(v
C) ∩ W is empty. Again, see Figure 4.1 for
illustration. Take a node w ∈ VarDn−1(v
C) ∩W corresponding to the variable x.
Then there is a node wB 6= w, which could contradict the embedding condition:
We may have
v → wB , v 6→ w , but (4.32 a)
v′ 6→ wB , v′ → w . (4.32 b)
But we replaced x by a term sx, where the term sx was taken from the set of
subterms of a term s which embeds to an n-goal u. Thus, let x′ be a variable in
sub(sx). Then there is a node w′ corresponding to x′ in the embedding of s to
u, and by applying Lemma 4.4 to Dn−1 we know that w′ is in StepsDn−1(< n),
so we know w′ ∈ StepsDn(≤ n). But then w
′ was not split, and there are two
paths w →∗ w′ and wB →∗ w′. This leads to v →∗ w′ and v′ →∗ w′; thus for
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this w′ we have repaired the embedding such that x′ ∈ var(t) and x′ ∈ var(t′)
both embed to w′.
Proof of Condition (4.20 a)
Take a node v ∈ Vn that is a descendant of an m-goal u ∈ GoalsDn(m) with m ≤ n. Let
v /∈ Static+Dn (and thus, v
C /∈ Static+Dn−1). We have to show that v /∈ GoalsDn(> m), so
we assume that v ∈ GoalsDn(> m) and show that each of the following cases leads to a
contradiction:
1. If m is smaller than n, we get a contradiction with the inductive hypothesis (4.20 a)
because of vC ∈ GoalsDn−1(>m) and u
C
∈ GoalsDn−1(m).
2. If m equals n, we have three cases:
a) First assume that v ∈ WB: In this case there would have to be an n-goal û ∈
GoalsDn(n) = GoalsDn−1(n) and a path of the following kind with w1, . . . , wl ∈W
(and thus, wi 6= wBi ):
û →Dn w
B
1 →Dn · · · →Dn w
B
l →Dn v . (4.33)
But by (4.25 b) there is no edge û →Dn wB, there is only an edge û →Dn w.
b) Now assume that v ∈ W. As v = vC /∈ Static+Dn−1 , we have v /∈ WS. Then by the
definition of δn (4.30 b) there is no Ie ∈ δn(v) for any e  n.
c) Finally, consider v /∈ W ∪WB, i. e., vC /∈ W. Take look at the definition of W
in (4.21) and distinguish between the different possibilities why we have v /∈ W:
We know that vC cannot be an n-goal (then we would have nothing to show,
see (ADAG ii)), and by assumption about u we have uC ∈ GoalsDn−1(n) and u
C →∗
vC, so by definition of W we know v = vC ∈ StepsDn−1(≤n) = StepsDn(≤n).
Lemma 4.5 states there is an m ≤ n with α(tm) →∗Dn v. Let [v1, . . . , vl] be a path
in the DAG Dn from v1 = α(tm) to a leaf vl with v = vk for a k ≤ l, as shown in
Figure 4.2.
By the definition of an ADAG (ADAG i a) there is a stage e1  m with Ie1 ∈
δn(α(tm)). And there is a minimal index i such that vi is a goal for a stage
ei ≤ e1. Now assume that v is a goal for a stage ev  n. Then we know:
ev  n ≥ m  e1 ≥ ei . (4.34)
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of case 2. c) of the proof of condition (4.20 a) for Theorem 4.8
Finally, we again consider three cases:
i. In the case k < i note that by choice of i we have Iej ∈ δn(vj) for a stage ej
with e1 ≥ ej ≥ ei for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i}. But then we would have ek ∈ δn(v) with
ek ≤ e1  ev, which contradicts (ADAG ii) for v.
ii. The case k = i directly contradicts (ADAG ii), as this would give Ie0 ∈ δn(vk)
and Iei ∈ δn(vk).
iii. The case k > i contradicts the inductive hypothesis (4.20 a): v would be
descendant of a goal vi with stage ei  n  e0.
Proof of Conditions (4.20 b) and (4.20 c)
Now we have to show that for every u ∈ GoalsDn(m) for an m > n and for every v ∈
VarDn(u) \ Var?Dn(u) we have v ∈ StepsDn(≤ n). Therefore, let u be an m-goal, and let
v ∈ VarDn(u) \Var?Dn(u).
We know that v is a node that corresponds to a variable that was introduced by an instan-
tiation during the definition of βn′ for an n′. We have to show that v ∈ StepsDn(≤n).
If n′ < n, by inductive hypothesis (4.20 b) we already have v ∈ StepsDn(< n). Now assume
that n′ = n, i. e., during the definition of Dn we replaced a variable x corresponding to a
node w with a subterm sx, such that there is a variable x′ ∈ varX(sx) which v corresponds
to. The term sx was taken from the set of subterms of a term s which embeds to an n-goal
u′. But then by Lemma 4.4 we know that the node corresponding to x′ is in StepsDn(< n),
so we know v ∈ StepsDn(<n) ⊆ StepsDn(≤n).
As mentioned earlier, we still have to show that when defining βn, we actually used in-
stances that are in Φ̂f , i. e., that are not too deep; this is also necessary to show the third
condition.
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Note that we do only instantiate each variable once, so if we replaced x by sx, we know




2, . . .
corresponding to the variables in sx will then be in StepsDn(< n). Thus, for Dn+1, . . . ,DN,
the nodes w′i will not be in W, and hence, the variables occurring in sx will not be substituted
again.
Also note that each such x corresponding to a node w ∈ Var?Dn(u) is reachable from u with
a path that is shorter than |P|. We extend the length of that path by the depth of sx, so to
prove both conditions we only have to know that the depth of sx is bounded by |P| · n, but
this is the third condition (4.20 c) of the inductive hypothesis.
Now we have shown that our construction creates an ADAG Dn for which all three of our
conditions hold. Thus, after constructing DN from DN−1 in this way we get an ADAG which
is simple.
4.3 Bounding the Number of Goals
Now every ADAG can be transformed into a simple one. The next theorem states that a
simple ADAG can be transformed into an ADAG with an exponentially bounded number of
goals.
This transformation uses the observation that one part of the relevant information of a node
v is the predicate symbols its labeled with, i. e., the value of δ(v). Hence, from the set of all
goals u which have the same labeling δ(u), we can pick a specific one as a representative.
During this process we will not delete any nodes, but we will delete the predicate symbol
Ie from some nodes, transforming them from goals to non-goals. The other components of
the ADAG like the witness and the labeling function are adjusted accordingly.
In fact there are a goals we do not want to alter at all, for example, the goals in the static part
of the protocol. Nevertheless, after this transformation we have an exponentially bounded
number of goals without deleting any nodes.
Theorem 4.9 (Bounded Number of Goals). Let P be a protocol. If D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ)
is a simple ADAG for P and (π, f ) where each term occurring in Ψ has at most polynomial depth in
terms of the size of the protocol, then there exists an ADAG D′ = (D′, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β′, γ′, δ′, λ) for P and
(π, f ), where GoalsD′ is exponentially bounded in terms of the size of P .
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4.3.1 Proof of Theorem 4.9
Proof. This proof, too, will be done by constructing a sequence [DN+1, . . . ,D1] of ADAGs,
this time starting with D = DN+1 and ending with an ADAG D1 with a bounded number
of goals. The inductive hypothesis is straightforward: For each n ∈ {1, . . . , N} we will
construct Dn from Dn+1 such that the following condition holds for Dn:
GoalsDn(≥n) is exponentially bounded . (4.35)
Again, this condition holds for any ADAG DN+1 we start with; and after we constructed an
ADAG D1 for which this condition holds, we have proven the theorem.
Let n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Let Dn+1 = (Dn+1, Ψ, Γ̂, α, βn+1, γn+1, δn+1, λ) be a simple ADAG with
Dn+1 = (V, Fn+1, µ) being the DAG. Assume as inductive hypothesis that the condition
holds for Dn+1. We will construct Dn = (Dn, Ψ, Γ̂, α, βn, γn, δn, λ) with Dn = (V, Fn, µ), i. e.,
use the same stage theory, the same set of anonymous variables, the same embedding and
freshness functions and even the same set of nodes. Hence, we will only define the new set
of edges Fn and the new predicate labeling, register sequence and witness functions δn, γn,
and βn.
Selecting the Protected Goals
Let G = GoalsDn+1(n) be the set of n-goals, we will define a subset G
B ⊆ G of protected
goals, i. e., nodes we keep as goals, whereas for all nodes v in GC = G \ GB we will later
remove Ie from δn(v).
First, we will define an equivalence relation on G according to the predicate labeling of the
goals: For u1, u2 ∈ G let u1 ≡ u2 if δn+1(u1) = δn+1(u2). We will need a representative from
each equivalence class of ≡, so for each class Gu for a goal u, let u≡ denote a unique node
such that no goal w ∈ Gu is a descendant of u≡.
We will put u≡ in GB, but some other goals need to be protected, too; so we define GB to
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be the least subset of G such that
{u≡ | u ∈ G} ⊆ GB , (4.36 a)
FixDn+1(v) ∩ G ⊆ G
B for all v ∈ GoalsDn+1(>n) , (4.36 b)
Static+Dn+1 ∩ G ⊆ G
B , (4.36 c){
u ∈ G | u ;∗Dn+1 v
}
⊆ GB for all v ∈ GoalsDn+1(>n) , (4.36 d){
u ∈ G | GB →∗Dn+1 u
}
⊆ GB . (4.36 e)
The reasons why we need to protect all these goals are hidden in the details of the proof.
The first line states that for each occurring value of δ, we need to keep one representa-
tive. We need the second line to protect all the fixed parts of m-goals for m > n so the
embeddings in (ADAG iii d) are still compatible – we will later show that this protection is
also guaranteed for m = n. The third line protects nodes in the static part of the DAG,
which eases our argumentation in the following steps because, e. g., the property of »sim-
ple« only holds for non-static goals. Condition (4.36 d) is necessary to prevent damage to
β-paths from a node to a goal: The β-paths move along the normal edges of the DAG, and
we will change some edges, so by this condition we guarantee that no β-path is damaged.
Finally, (4.36 e) and the definition of u≡, or more precisely the fact that u≡ has no descen-
dants in its equivalence class, are necessary to guarantee that we will get an DAG. All this
parts will be referred to in the proof later.
We will now start with defining our ADAG Dn, i. e., the functions δn, βn, γn and the term
DAG Dn.
The Predicate Symbol Labeling Function δn
Let v ∈ V be a node. Again, let δQ = δn+1(v) ∩Q, as well as δI = δn+1(v) ∩ Ĩ+. We will set
δR = δn+1(v) ∩ R̃, but also define δ′R ⊆ δR to only contain the necessary push symbols, i. e.,
let δ′R be the set of all r ∈ δR with (v, r, i) ;
∗
Dn+1 u for an index i and a goal u /∈ G
C.
Now we can define δn for each v ∈ V:
δn(v) = δQ ∪ δ′R if v ∈ GC , (4.37 a)
δn(v) = δQ ∪ δ′R ∪ δI if v /∈ GC . (4.37 b)
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TheWitness Function βn and the Register Sequence Function γn
For each node v ∈ V and p ∈ δn(v) ∩ (R̃ ∪ Ĩ) we will reduce βn and γn to the necessary
parts.
Let i ∈ γ?n+1(v, p). If (v, p, i) ;
∗
Dn+1 u for a goal u /∈ G
C, we will set βn(v, p, i) = βn+1(v, p, i)
and γn(v, p, i) = γn+1(v, p, i); otherwise let βn(v, p, i) and γn(v, p, i) be undefined.
The Term DAG Dn
As stated above, we do neither remove nor add any nodes. But we will modify some edges:
All I-symbols that are created by intruder pop clauses which are based on a goal u ∈ GC
will now be based on u≡. But as the pop clauses follow the edges of the DAG, we have to
modify the DAG:
Let W be the set of all nodes w with Ie or qeI↓ ∈ δn+1(w), but w /∈ GoalsDn+1 , i. e., we know
that (ADAG iii a) or (ADAG iii b) holds for w and Ie or qeI↓ in Dn+1, so the predicate symbol was
derived by an intruder pop clause (or w = α(¢)). Now define the set of edges Fn such that
for all (v, u, l) ∈ Fn+1 we have
(v, u≡, l) ∈ Fn if v ∈W and u ∈ GC , (4.38 a)
(v, u, l) ∈ Fn if v /∈ W or u /∈ GC . (4.38 b)
This completes our ADAG Dn = (Dn, Ψ, Γ̂, α, βn, γn, δn, λ), we now show that we constructed
a simple ADAG and condition (4.35) holds.
Proof of the ADAG Conditions
We will show that Dn actually is an ADAG. As we kept most of the components, there is not
much to show for the types – the only interesting part here is to see that Dn is acyclic. To
do so, assume that there is a cycle v1, . . . , vl in Dn.
As Dn+1 is acyclic, there must be an edge vj →Dn vj+1, that is modified, i. e., in Fn but not
in Fn+1. By (4.36 e) we know that GB is closed under →∗, so no descendant of vj+1 is in GC,
which means that (4.38 a) cannot be applied for any descendant of vj+1.
Hence, vj →Dn vj+1 is the only edge in the cycle that was modified, i. e., vj+1 →∗Dn+1 vj.
By (4.38 a) there is a node u with u≡ = vj+1 and (vj, u, l) ∈ Fn+1. But then we have
u≡ = vj+1 →∗Dn+1 vj →Dn+1 u . (4.39)
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But u≡ →∗ u contradicts the selection of the representative u≡; so our assumption that
there is a cycle must be wrong.
Now we have to check if (ADAG i a) to (ADAG iii d) do still hold.
(i) Because of (4.36 c) all nodes in the range of α are elements of GB, so we did not modify
their predicates.
(ii) We did at most remove predicates Ie, so condition (ADAG ii) still holds.
(iii) Let v ∈ V and p ∈ δn(v). As Dn+1 is an ADAG and δn(v) ⊆ δn+1(v), we know one of the
four conditions (ADAG iii a) to (ADAG iii d) holds in Dn+1. We will distinguish between
these four cases and show that each case still holds for v and p in Dn:
(iii a) For this case there is nothing to show.
(iii b) In this case we may have modified an edge v →Dn+1 vj to v →Dn v≡j . But as
δn+1(vj) = δn+1(v≡j ) and δn+1(v
≡
j ) ∩ Q̃ = δn(v≡j ) ∩ Q̃, the condition (ADAG iii b)
still holds for v and p.
(iii c) In this case, too, we show that (ADAG iii c) still holds, mainly because we did not
change most of the components. We have to show this for each i ∈ γ?n(v, p), i. e.,
each i for which βn(v, p, i) is defined. Therefore, let βn(v, p, i) = βn+1(v, p, i) =
(v′, pm, i′, ψ). During the definition of δ′R we might have removed the predicate
pm from δ′R for v
′, or we might have removed the edge(s) between v′ and v, both
would be a problem. The predicates p1, . . . , pm−1 are pop symbols so we did not
modify them.
But because βn(v, p, i) is defined we know that there is a goal u /∈ GC with
(v, p, i) ;∗Dn+1 u. As we also know (v
′, pm, i′) ;Dn+1 (v, p, i), we know that




Now we might still have damaged the DAG such that v′ no longer is a parent of
v, but of another node v≡. For this to be the case, v would have to be an n-goal
in GC. Again look at the goal u with (v, p, i) ;∗Dn+1 u, and let eu be the stage
of u. In Lemma 4.10 we will later show that eu  n. Then we have v ∈ GB
by (4.36 d), so we have not altered the edge from v′ to v.
Again, the condition vj1 = vj2 for all j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , m} with xj1 = xj2 still holds,
as the modification of edges in (4.38 a) and (4.38 b) does not depend on l.
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(iii d) This case is the most technical one. Again, we will show that (ADAG iii d) still
holds. Note that for each goal u /∈ GC we have (u, p, 0) ;0Dn+1 (u, p, 0) for p ∈ Ĩ,
so the witness function for v, p and 0 is defined.
Let the witness be βn(v, p, 0) = βn+1(v, p, 0) = (v′, pm, i′, ψ) with the send clause
ψ = [p0(t), p1(t′), . . . , pm(t′, κ′) → p(t)]. Again, the definition of δ′R might have
removed the predicate pm from δ′R for v
′, or we might have modified edges in
FixDn+1(v) (or between v
′ and v).
The predicate p0 would only be removed from δn(v) if p was also removed from
δn(v), which is not the case.
The predicates p1, . . . , pm−1 are pop symbols which we did not modify. And as
v was a goal in Dn+1, we set pm ∈ δ′R, so we have pm ∈ δm(v′).
In Dn+1, the pair (σκ(t), t′) embeds to (v, v′), hence, it also embeds in Dn as long
as we did not modify any edge in FixDn+1(v), i. e., as long as we do not have any
u ∈ FixDn+1(v) with u ∈ G
C. Assume that there is such an u, we will show that
this leads to a contradiction. First, we know that u is an n-goal as it is in GC and
it is either a descendant of v or of v′, or both.
• If v′ →∗ u holds, note that u ∈ GC means u /∈ Static+Dn+1 by (4.36 c). We then
either have u ∈ StepsDn+1(≤ n) or u /∈ StepsDn+1(≤ n). In the first case, we
use Lemma 4.11, so we have u /∈ GoalsDn+1(≥n), so u /∈ GC.
In the latter case, u /∈ StepsDn+1(≤ n) implies v
′ /∈ StepsDn+1(≤ n), so v /∈
GoalsDn+1(≤ n). But then we have v ∈ GoalsDn+1(> n), which means u ∈
FixDn+1(v) ∩ G ⊆ GB by (4.36 b). This contradicts u ∈ GC.
• If v →∗ u holds, again note u ∈ GC means u /∈ Static+Dn+1 by (4.36 c). As
Dn+1 is simple, we know v /∈ GoalsDn+1(< n). But as above, we have v /∈
GoalsDn+1(> n), otherwise, we would have u /∈ G
C. Hence, we have v ∈
GoalsDn+1(n) = G. But the I-symbol p is still in δm(v), so we have v ∈ G
B.
Then by (4.36 e) we also have u ∈ GB, i. e., u /∈ GC.
Now we know there is no node in FixDn+1(v)∩GC, so the structure of FixDn+1(v)
has not changed in Dn. Then we also know (σκ(t), t′) 7→ (v, v′).
This shows that Dn is still an ADAG. Note that it is also a simple ADAG: Take some nodes
v, w ∈ V with v →∗ w, but v ∈ GoalsD(j) for a j and w /∈ Static+D. We have to show that
w /∈ GoalsD(> j).
4 Scaling Down ADAGs 97
During the definition of δn we did only remove symbols, so because of the assumption that
Dn+1 was simple this could only happen if we changed an edge on the path from v to w.
This means there is an n-goal u such that v →∗Dn u and u
≡ →∗Dn w, and we modified the
edge pointing to u to an edge pointing to u≡.
But then because of the modification and condition (4.36 c) we know that u /∈ Static+Dn . Then
we have j ≥ n, otherwise the nodes v and u would contradict the simplicity of Dn+1. But
we also know u≡ →∗Dn+1 w (remember that on each path we modified only on edge), and
the simplicity of Dn+1 tells us that w /∈ GoalsD(>n), so w /∈ GoalsD(> j) ⊆ GoalsD(>n).
Thus, we obtained a simple ADAG, and we will now have to show that condition (4.35)
holds.
Proof of Condition (4.35)
We now show that GoalsDn(≥ n) is exponentially bounded in terms of the size of the
protocol. By inductive hypothesis, GoalsDn+1(>n) is exponentially bounded, and as we did
only modify n-goals, we also know GoalsDn(> n) is exponentially bounded. Because we
removed the I-symbol from all goals in GC, we only need to find a bound for GB.
Therefore, we will take a look at the five conditions (4.36 a) to (4.36 e) defining GB:
a) The number of goals in {u≡ | u ∈ G} is bounded by the number of equivalence classes
of ≡. As ≡ is defined by different values of δn+1 with δn+1 : V 99K 2Q f , we can have at
least 2|Q f | different possible values, i. e., equivalence classes. This is exponential in terms
of the size of the protocol.
b) As stated above, we know by inductive hypothesis that there are at most exponentially
many goals in GoalsDn(> n). As the depth of each send clause is polynomial, there
can be an exponential number of goals in the fixed part of each goal. But exponentially
many goals and exponentially many nodes for each of them still gives a total number of
nodes that is exponentially bounded in terms of the size of the protocol.
c) The set Static+Dn+1 is defined by all nodes which are reachable from a node v = α(t) for
a term t ∈ sub(TP ) in less than |P|2 steps. This equals all nodes which are reachable
from a node v′ = α(t′) for a term t′ ∈ TP (note the missing »sub«) in less than |P|3 steps.
As the maximum degree of the nodes is two, this leads to exponentially many nodes in
Static+Dn+1 .
For the following steps we can use Lemma 4.11, which shows that there are no additional
goals in S = StepsDn+1(≤ n), so all goals that we will add in (4.36 d) and (4.36 e) are in
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G \ S. Also note that Lemma 4.4 states that for each node u ∈ G \ S, the nodes of variables
of u are in S.
d) By inductive hypothesis, there is only an exponentially bounded number of m-goals u for
m > n. We will show that on each β-path to such a goal, there can be only a polynomial
number of n-goals u not in S. Therefore, we will add a polynomially bounded number
of goals v for each goal u greater than n, leading to a total number of n-goals added in
this step that is exponentially bounded.
So let u be an m-goal for an m > n. Then by Lemma 4.2 there is a unique β-path v1, . . . , vl
from v1 = α(tm′) to vl = u for an m′ ≤ m. By the lemma, we also know vi →Dn+1 vi+1
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l − 2}.
If no n-goal exists on the path, we have nothing to show. Therefore, assume that
i ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1} is the minimal index of an n-goal on that path, i. e., vi is an n-goal.
Lemma 4.4 shows that vj is in S for each j > n + |P|2. Hence, for u we will only add
{vi, . . . , vi+|P|2} ∩ G to GB, which is polynomially bounded.
e) We have already shown that the set GB is exponentially bounded if we only use condi-
tions (4.36 a) to (4.36 d).
We will now show that for each u added so far, there is only an exponentially bounded
number of goals added by condition (4.36 e). This shows that the whole set GB is expo-
nentially bounded.
As we have already shown, the goals added by condition (4.36 e) cannot be in S. They
have to be descendant of an n-goal u ∈ GB, but the nodes of variables of u are in S
(Lemma 4.4). Hence, the goals added by this condition can only be in the fixed part
FixDn+1(u).
Now as the number of fixed nodes of a goal is exponentially bounded, we add only
an exponentially bounded number of goals for each goal already in GB prior to condi-
tion (4.36 e).
Thus, GB is exponentially bounded, which is the desired conclusion.
4.3.2 Lemmas concerning Goals
We will show two lemmas we referred to in the proof above. The first states that an n-goal
can only be used to send goals whose step is greater than n, i. e., that a β-path through an
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n-goal leads to a goal greater than n:
Lemma 4.10. Let v be an n-goal in a simple ADAG D with v /∈ Static+D. Assume that v ;∗
(u, Ie, 0). Then n  e holds.
Proof. For the proof let v be an n1-goal in a simple ADAG D with v /∈ Static+D, and assume
that we have Ie1 ∈ δ(v) for e1 = (n1, m1) and v ;∗ (u, Ie7 , 0). We will show that e1  e7
holds.
If we have v ;∗ (u, Ie7 , 0), we know that re6 ∈ δ(v) for a stage e6 = (n6, m6) with e6 ≤ e7.
But then we also have (α(sn5), r
(n5,0)
n5 , 0) ;
∗ (v, re6) for an n5 ≤ n6. As v /∈ Static+D, we know
by Lemma 4.5 that v is a descendant of w = α(tn4) for an n4 ≤ n5. By condition (ADAG i a)
we have Ie3 ∈ α(w) for a stage e3  n4.
Now take the first goal on the path from w to v. Either v is that goal, then by the structure
of the intruder pop clauses we know e1 ≤ e3, or v is a descendant of another goal v′ with
Ie2 ∈ δ(v′) for a stage e2 ≤ e3. In the latter case we have e1 ≤ e2 as the ADAG is simple and
v /∈ Static+D.
Hence, altogether we know e1  e7 by
e1
or e1 ≤ e2
}
≤ e3  n4 ≤ n5 ≤ n6 ≤ e7 . (4.40)
We now show another lemma used above to prove the ADAG conditions. This lemma states
that a node belonging to a step is no goal of that step or of a later step. Intuitively this
should hold for a normal ADAG, as any term processed by a principal in a step has to be
known to the intruder earlier than that step, so is makes no sense to send that information
again.
Lemma 4.11. Let v be a node in a simple ADAG D with v /∈ Static+D, but v ∈ StepsD(≤ n). Then
v /∈ GoalsD(≥n) holds.
Proof. Let v be a node in a simple ADAG D such that v /∈ Static+D, but v ∈ StepsD(≤ n) for
an n ≤ N. If v is no goal at all, we have nothing to show. Now assume that v is a goal with
Iev ∈ δ(v). Then we refer to Lemma 4.5 to show that there is an m ≤ n with w →∗ v for
w = α(tm). Let Iew ∈ δ(w), we know ew  m. We will show that ev ≤ ew holds, which will
lead to ev ≤ ew  m ≤ n, i. e., v /∈ GoalsD(≥n).
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We now use the same argumentation as in the previous lemma: Take the first goal on the
path from w to v. Either v itself is that goal, then by the structure of the intruder pop clauses
we know ev ≤ ew. Or v could be a descendant of another goal u with Ieu ∈ δ(v) for a stage
eu ≤ ew. In the latter case we have ev ≤ eu ≤ ew as the ADAG is simple and v /∈ Static+D.
4.4 Bounding the Size of an ADAG
Finally, the last theorem states that if we have such an ADAG with a bounded number
of goals, we can reduce the total number of nodes in the ADAG (and the other relevant
components) so that the whole ADAG is exponentially bounded.
Theorem 4.12 (Bounded ADAGs). Let P be a protocol. If D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) is an ADAG
for P and (π, f ) with an exponentially bounded set of goals in terms of the size of P and where each
term occurring in Ψ has at most polynomial depth in terms of the size of the protocol. Then there is
an ADAG D′ = (D′, Ψ, Γ̂′, α′, β′, γ′, δ′, λ′) for P and (π, f ) which is exponentially bounded.
As above, this is done by merging nodes with the same labeling – but now we respect the
goals and the register sequences, i. e., we merge all nodes which have the same labeling,
lead to the same goals and which have undistinguishable register sequences from a certain
point of view. After this mergence the ADAG has only an exponential number of nodes,
while the additional structures like the labeling function are also exponentially bounded in
terms of the protocol size.
For the ease of understanding we will present the main proof with the help of four lemmas
that will be proven afterwards Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.4.
Proof. Let P be a protocol. Let D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) be an ADAG for P and (π, f ) with
the restrictions mentioned in the theorem, and let D = (V, F, µ).
We will first define a set FixedD of nodes that we will protect during the rest of the proof,
and the complement FreeD:




FreeD = V \ FixedD . (4.42)
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For the next part of the proof, we need to know that each node in FreeD has exactly one
parent. By Lemma 4.13 this assumption is possible whilst still meeting the restrictions
mentioned in the theorem. Hence, we will assume that D is an ADAG where each w ∈ FreeD
has exactly one parent.
To reduce the set of nodes V, we will split FreeD into two sets of paths: push paths, which
are labeled with push symbols originating in FixedD and leading to a goal, and pop paths,




[v1, . . . , vm]
∣∣∣ (v1, r(n,0)n , 0) ; v2 ; · · · ; vm ; (v, Ie, 0)
for an n ∈ {1, . . . , N} with v1 = α(sn)
}
(4.43)
Now the set of pop paths is defined – and according to the fifth condition of Lemma 4.2,
we can assume that the nodes on these paths are not labeled with any push symbols:
Paths4D =
{
[v1, . . . , vm]
∣∣∣ w → v1 → v2 → · · · → vm
for a node w ∈ FixedD ∪Paths5D
and v1, . . . , vm /∈ FixedD ∪Paths5D




By abuse of notation we will write Paths5D or Paths
4
D for the set of all nodes occurring in a
path in Paths5D or Paths
4
D, respectively – as we already did in (4.44).





Let v ∈ V be a node. If GoalsD(v) is not empty, v is element of a β-path ~v ∈ Paths
5
D by
Lemma 4.2. Otherwise, we note that v leads to a leaf v′ (possibly v = v′). By Lemma 4.3 we
can assume that there is an ancestor w ∈ FixedD, hence, take a path from w to v′ through




Now Lemma 4.15 shows that by modifying the paths in Paths5D the number of nodes on
these paths may be bounded to a double exponential number. Afterwards we can apply
Lemma 4.18 which proves the same for pop paths. This yields that the total set of nodes V
can be double exponentially bounded because V = FixedD ∪Paths5D ∪Paths
4
D.
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Finally we can transform the ADAG such that not only the set of nodes, but the whole
structure is double exponentially bounded as shown in Lemma 4.19. This concludes the
proof of our theorem.
4.4.1 Splitting Nodes with Multiple Different Parents
Lemma 4.13 (Single Parents). Let D be an ADAG for a protocol P with the same assumptions and
restrictions as in Theorem 4.12. Then there exists an ADAG D′ still fulfilling these restrictions, but
where each node in FreeD has exactly one parent node.
Remark 4.14. Note that there can still be multiple edges between two nodes, i. e., it is
possible to have two nodes v, v′ and edges (v, v′, 1) and (v, v′, 2). This is necessary to fulfill
the ADAG conditions (ADAG iii b) and (ADAG iii c). But even if a node has multiple connections
to its parent node, we will say that it has only or exactly one parent (node).
Proof. Let D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ). We will split the nodes in FreeD which have more than
one parent – this can be done without harm to the ADAG because the nodes that must not
be split are in FixedD.
Let w ∈ FreeD be a node with multiple different parents, i. e., the nodes v1, . . . , vm are the
parents of w for an m > 1 with vj1 6= vj2 for all j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Then we will define the
ADAG D′ = (D′, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β′, γ′, δ′, λ′).
We begin with the DAG D′: Take new nodes w1, . . . , wm. Let V′ = {w1, . . . , wm} ∪V \ {w}.
Let F′ be the same as F but where each edge (vj, w, l) is replaced by (vj, wj, l). And finally
let µ′ be the same as µ but with µ′(wj) = µ(w) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Then we set D′ =
(V′, F′, µ′).
For each predicate symbol r ∈ R̃ and each i ∈N we again define (w, r, i)B = wj if β(w, r, i) =
(vj, r′, i′, ϕ). Similar to the previous constructions we define δQ = δ(w) ∩Q, δR = δ(w) ∩ R̃,





r ∈ δR | (w, r, i)B = wj for an index i ∈N
}
. (4.45)
Note that the new nodes will not be goals as there are no goals in FreeD, so we do not have
to care for the witnesses of I-symbols. Now we can define δ′, β′, γ′ and λ′ for the new
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nodes:
δ′(wj) = δQ ∪ δ
j
R ∪ δI for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m} , (4.46)
β′((w, p, i)B, p, i) = β(w, p, i) for all p ∈ δ(w), i ∈ γ?(w, p) , (4.47)
γ′((w, p, i)B, p, i) = γ(w, p, i) for all p ∈ δ(w), i ∈ γ?(w, p) , (4.48)
λ′(c) = ((w, p, i)B, p, i, j) if λ(c) = (w, p, i, j) . (4.49)
For all other nodes in V ∩ V′, for all related register sequences, indices and constants, let
δ′ = δ, β′ = β, γ′ = γ and λ′ = λ. Then D′ = (D′, Ψ, Γ̂, α′, β′, γ′, δ′, λ′) is an ADAG; and D′
has an exponential number of goals, as we did not duplicate any goals.
If there is a node w ∈ FreeD′ , we will apply this transformation on D′, until we get an ADAG
D′′ that still fulfils the restrictions mentioned in Theorem 4.12, but in which each node
w ∈ FreeD′′ has at most one parent. Now by Lemma 4.3 we can assume that each node in
w ∈ FreeD′′ has exactly one parent.
4.4.2 Shortening the Push Paths
Lemma 4.15 (Bounding Push Paths). Let D be an ADAG for a protocol P with the same assump-
tions and restrictions as in Theorem 4.12 as well as the restriction that each node in FreeD has only
one parent. Then there exists an ADAG D′ still fulfilling these restrictions, but where the number of
nodes in Paths5D is bounded double exponentially in terms of the size of the protocol.
Proof. Let D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) be an ADAG as mentioned in the lemma. To prove this
lemma, we define sections of push paths which will be special subpaths of push paths:
For each [v1, . . . , vi, . . . , vj, . . . , vm] ∈ Paths
5
D the set SectionsD shall contain each non-empty
sequence [vi, . . . , vj] of maximal length, such that GoalsD(vi) = GoalsD(vj) and that vi, . . . , vj /∈
FixedD. Maximal length means that neither [vi−1, . . . , vj] nor [vi, . . . , vj+1] could be in
SectionsD.
Lemma 4.16 restricts the number of sections, i. e., the size of the set SectionsD is exponen-
tially bounded. Then Lemma 4.17 shows that D can be modified such that each section
has a length which is double exponentially bounded, without losing the restrictions in the
lemma.
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4.4.2.1 Bounding the Number of Sections
Lemma 4.16 (Bounding the Number of Sections). Let D be an ADAG fulfilling the restrictions
mentioned in Lemma 4.15. Then the number of paths in SectionsD is exponentially bounded in
terms of the size of the protocol.
Proof. Let D be an ADAG with the necessary restrictions. Examine the size of SectionsD:
First, Lemma 4.2 states that the size of Paths5D equals the number of goals in D. We look
at each push path ~v = [v1, . . . , vm] ∈ Paths
5
D, and we show that the number of sections that
can be constructed from this path is bounded.
First, let i1, . . . , il be the set of indices with vij ∈ FixedD (and let i0 = 0 as well as il+1 =
m + 1). This leads to the following set of subsequences of ~v, where the size of the set is
equal to or less than l + 1 ≤ | FixedD |+ 1, i. e., exponential:
Paths5D(~v) =
{
[vij+1, . . . , vij+1−1]
∣∣∣ j ∈ {0, . . . , l}} . (4.50)
Now let ~w = [w1, . . . , wm] ∈ Paths
5
D(~v). Let i1, . . . , il be all indices with GoalsD(wij) 6=
GoalsD(wij+1), and so ~w /∈ SectionsD. But we know GoalsD(wij+1) ⊆ GoalsD(wij) because
of Lemma 4.2 and the fact that wij+1 ∈ FreeD has only one parent, i. e., each goal reachable
from wij+1 is also reachable from wij . Therefore, l is bounded by |GoalsD(w1)|, which is
bounded by the total number of goals. Now we can define the following set (with i0 = 0
and il+1 = m):
SectionsD(~w) =
{
[wij+1, . . . , wij+1 ]
∣∣∣ j ∈ {0, . . . , l}} . (4.51)
Then each sequence ~u ∈ SectionsD(~w) is a section, as ~u contains no nodes from FixedD and
the set of reachable goals equals for all nodes in ~u. On the other hand, for each section ~u we




∣∣∣ ~v ∈ Paths5D, ~w ∈ Paths5D(~v),~u ∈ SectionsD(~w)} . (4.52)
As for each ~v ∈ Paths5D we have a set Paths
5
D(~v) of exponential size, and because for each
~w ∈ Paths5D(~v) we have a set SectionsD(~w) of exponential size, we altogether have an expo-
nentially bounded set SectionsD.
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4.4.2.2 Shortening Sections
Lemma 4.17 (Bounding the Length of Sections). Let D be an ADAG fulfilling the restrictions
mentioned in Lemma 4.15. Then we can construct an ADAG D′ still meeting the restrictions, but
where the length of paths in SectionsD is exponentially bounded in terms of the size of the protocol.
Proof. Let D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) be an ADAG as mentioned in the lemma. We will reduce
the number of nodes in a section by a pumping method.
Comparing Register Sequences and Nodes
Let ~v = [v0, v1, . . . , vm] ∈ SectionsD. We will compare each vj with v0 by a function ∆v0
which notes the differences in the labeling δ and the register sequences γ between v0 and
vj. We will search for nodes vj1 , vj2 with ∆v0(vj1) = ∆v0(vj2) and j2 > j1, and then we will
replace each edge vj1−1 → vj1 by an edge vj1−1 → vj2 .
As each node on the path may have a register sequence with fresh anonymous constants,
we cannot simply compare the values of the register sequences – we need to abstract from
the concrete constants as explained below. Thus, we first define a function ∆? for comparing
register sequences.
We need a fixed set of Z anonymous variables y1, . . . , yZ ∈ Y and Z fresh variables y?1 , . . . , y
?
Z ∈
Y?. Then we define the following function on two ground register sequences:




1), . . . , χ(c
′
Z)) (4.53)
with a function χ(c′) =
yj if c′ = cj and j = min
{




′ /∈ {c1, . . . , cZ} .
To clarify this definition we will give some examples. The function compares each c′j with
cj: It uses yj as a variable for cj (and for all j′ > j with cj′ = cj), and the fresh anonymous
constants not occurring in c1, . . . , cZ are mapped to the fresh variables y?i .
Note that the results may be ambiguous as we did not care for the ordering of the fresh
variables y?i ; in fact, we do not need these details as we only show a rough complexity
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bound. Therefore, the following results would be possible
∆?((a, b, c, d), (b, c, c, d)) = (y2, y3, y3, y4) , (4.54)
∆?((a, b, c, c), (c, c, e, d)) = (y3, y3, y?1 , y
?
1) , (4.55)




2 , y1) , (4.56)




4 , y1) . (4.57)
This enables us to compare the nodes v′ ∈ ~v with the node v0 which is the first node of ~v,
but first, just for one push symbol and one of the register sequences of v0. Therefore, let
p ∈ δ(v0) and i ∈ γ?(v0, p). Then we set:
∆v0(v




γ(v0, p, i), γ(v′, p′, i′)
)) ∣∣∣ (v0, p, i) ;∗ (v′, p′, i′)} . (4.58)









We will count the possible values for ∆v0 : In the first component, we have a subset of
Q f , so there are 2
|Q f | possible values. In each of the next l components, we have a set of
tuples as defined in (4.58). Each of these tuples consists of a push symbol and a register
sequence containing variables from two sets of size Z, so the size of each tuple is bounded
by |Q f | · (2Z)Z.
Now analyze how many tuples can occur in ∆v0(v
′, p1, i1), . . . , ∆v0(v
′, pl, il): Each node can
contain no more register sequences than the number of goals reachable from that node,
which is a consequence of Lemma 4.2. Hence, the total number of tuples in all l sets is
bounded by the total number of goals. This leads to the following bound for the possible
values of ∆v0 :
2|Q f | ·
(
|Q f | · (2Z)Z
)|GoalsD |
(4.60)
< 2n · (n · (2n)n)|GoalsD | with n = c1 · |P|c0 for some c0, c1 ∈N (4.61)
≤ (2n·c2)|GoalsD | for some c2 ∈N (4.62)
≤ 2n·c2·(2n·c3 ) with |GoalsD | ≤ 2n·c3 for some c3 ∈N (4.63)
≤ 22n·c4 for some c4 ∈N (4.64)
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Now we can define the transformation on the ADAG that bounds the length of a section
~v = [v0, v1, . . . , vm] to 22
n·c4 . If the length of a section is already less than 22
n·c4 , we have
nothing to do. Else, there have to be two nodes vj1 , vj2 with ∆v0(vj1) = ∆v0(vj2) and j1 < j2.
We will now replace each edge vj1−1 → vj1 by vj1−1 → vj2 and further modify the ADAG.
Note that by repeating this procedure we are able to bound the length of the section ~v to be
less than 22
n·c4 . Then, by iterating over all sections, we reduce the number of nodes in each
section.
Transforming the ADAG to Shorten a Section
We will define the term DAG D′ based on D, with the modified edge as explained above
and without the nodes vj1 , . . . , vj2−1 (and without their relevant descendants):
V′ = V \
{
w ∈ V | vj1 →




F′ = (F ∩ (V′ ×V′ ×N)) ∪
{
(vj1−1, vj2 , l)
∣∣ (vj1−1, vj1 , l) ∈ F} . (4.66)
We now have to change the witness function for vj2 to point to vj1−1, and we have to modify
some register sequences as the constants in the register sequences of vj1 and vj2 may differ:
Each fresh anonymous constant c that is generated between v0 and vj1−1 will be replaced
by χ̂(c). This may mean that it is not changed at all if χ̂(c) = c, but in this way we will
construct β-paths which are valid for the register sequences of vj2 .
Note that in this step we may have removed an unbounded number of anonymous con-
stants: All the constants that had been generated along the path from vj1 to vj2 are deleted
if they do not occur in any register sequence of vj2 .
From ∆v0(vj1) = ∆v0(vj2) we know δ(vj1) = δ(vj2). We also know that for each p ∈ δ(vj1)
and each i1 ∈ γ?(vj1 , p) we have a matching index i2 ∈ γ
?(vj2 , p). For simplification we just
assume that i1 = i2; this is possible because the actual values of the indices i1, i2 do not
matter, so we could modify the values of γ?(vj2 , p) to match γ
?(vj1 , p) without damaging
the ADAG.
Now we know that for each register sequence κv0 of v0, for each p ∈ δ(vj1) and each i ∈
γ?(vj1 , p) we have a register sequence κ∆ with
κ∆ = ∆?(κv0 , γ(vj1 , p, i)) = ∆
?(κv0 , γ(vj2 , p, i)) . (4.67)
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Let χ−11 be a mapping from constants to variables which replaces each anonymous constant
with the corresponding variable in the register sequence of variables κ∆, i. e., this mapping
– extended on register sequences – would give χ−11 (γ(vj1 , p, i)) = κ∆. Let χ2 be the mapping
from variables to anonymous constants such that – extended on register sequences – the
mapping χ2 would give χ2(κ∆) = γ(vj2 , p, i). By (4.53) we know both χ
−1
1 and χ2 exist and
that when combining them to χ(p,i) = χ
−1
1 ◦ χ2 we have a function with χ(p,i)(γ(vj1 , p, i)) =
γ(vj2 , p, i).
Let χ̂ be the unification of all functions χ(p,i) for each p ∈ δ(vj1) and each i ∈ γ
?(vj1 , p). This
unification is a well-defined function as each constant in its domain is either fresh or in a
register sequence of v0, and χ̂ is the identity on the latter ones. We will define the functions
of the ADAG D′ = (D′, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β′, γ′, δ′, λ′), beginning with δ′, which is just the restriction
of δ to V′. Now define the register sequence and the witness function for all nodes v ∈ V′,
symbols p ∈ δ′(v), and indices i ∈ γ?(v, p) by
β′(v, p, i) =
β(v, p, i), if v 6= vj2 ,β(vj1 , p, i), if v = vj2 , (4.68)
γ′(v, p, i) =
χ̂(γ(v, p, i)), if v ∈ {v0, . . . , vj1−1} ,γ(v, p, i), otherwise . (4.69)
We can now define the freshness function – this looks a bit technical because we may have
removed nodes and their register sequences, and because other register sequences may have
been affected by χ̂. Note that λ is not defined for constants c ∈ dom(χ̂) \ range(χ̂), as they
are replaced and removed from the ADAG.
λ′(c) =
λ(c), if c /∈ dom(χ̂) and λ(c) = (v, p, i, z) for a node v ∈ V′ ,λ(χ̂−1(c)), if c ∈ range χ̂ . (4.70)
Now D′ is an ADAG still fulfilling all restrictions mentioned in Theorem 4.12, but with a
shortened section. As explained above, we can repeat this procedure until each section has
a bounded length.
Proving the ADAG Conditions and Restrictions
We will now prove that D′ is still an ADAG. First, me modified the DAG, but we only
connected two nodes with an edge that were connected before by a sequence of edges, so
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D′ is still acyclic. We will now check conditions (ADAG i a) to (ADAG iii d). As we did not
manipulate I-symbols, there is nothing to show for (ADAG i a) to (ADAG ii). Now let v ∈ V′
and p ∈ δ′(v, p). Then we have v ∈ V and p ∈ δ(v, p) and one of the conditions (ADAG iii a)
to (ADAG iii d) holds for v and p in D. Again, distinguish between these four cases:
(iii a) In this case we have nothing to show because v ∈ FixedD.
(iii b) For the application of pop clauses note that when manipulation edges, we did re-
place each edge vj1−1 → vj1 by an edge vj1−1 → vj2 , but we know δ(vj1) = δ(vj2),
so (ADAG iii b) still holds.
(iii c) This case is the interesting one. Distinguish three cases:
• First, let v /∈ {v0, v1, . . . , vj2}. Then nothing was changed for v, so condition (ADAG iii c)
still holds.
• Now let v = vj2 , so we connected v to a new parent node during the modifica-
tion. First, we modified all edges between v and his parent consistently. We did
not change the register sequences of v, so the freshness function is still correct,
but we have to show that the modified witness function is correct, i. e., for each
register sequence of v there is a compatible register sequence of the new parent.
Let i ∈ γ?(v, p). Then we know that not only p ∈ δ(v), but also p ∈ δ(vj1) by
equation (4.59). Hence, there was a witness β(vj1 , p, i) in D, and we can use it as
a witness β′(v, p, i).
Now for the embedding of the register sequences let β(vj1 , p, i) = (v
′, p′, i′, ϕ)
(with v′ = vj1−1), and let κ, κ
′ be the register sequences in ϕ. Then we can start
with the compatibility of the embeddings in D and show:
(κ, κ′) 7→ (γ(v′, p′, i′), γ(vj1 , p, i)) , (4.71)
it follows (κ, κ′) 7→ (χ̂(γ(v′, p′, i′)), χ̂(γ(vj1 , p, i))) (4.72)
= (χ̂(γ(v′, p′, i′)), γ(vj2 , p, i)) (4.73)
= (γ′(v′, p′, i′), γ′(vj2 , p, i)) . (4.74)
The first transformation is valid because χ̂ is a function that changes both single
embeddings in the same way. The third step is valid by definition of χ̂ and the
functions χ(p,i), whereas the final step is valid by definition of γ′ (4.69).
Now we know that condition (ADAG iii c) still holds for this case.
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• Finally, we assume that v ∈ {v0, v1, . . . , vj1−1}, so v’s register sequences may have
been changed by χ, and so may the freshness function.
As in case (ADAG iii d) we know the embeddings may have changed, but are
still compatible, as we did change the register sequence of the parent node of
v in the same way. This does even hold for v = v0 as we do not change its
register sequences (or that of its parent node) because by definition, dom(χ̂)
only contains constants that are in none of the register sequences of v0, i. e.,
fresh.
The freshness function was modified accordingly, i. e., when c was replaced by
c′, we have λ′(c′) = λ(c). Thus, condition (ADAG iii c) also holds for this case.
(iii d) In this case we know that v ∈ FixedD, and also v′ ∈ FixedD for β(v, I) = (v′, p′, i′, ϕ),
so we have nothing to show.
This proves that our construction yields an ADAG. But this ADAG also fulfills all restrictions
we mentioned before: It is still simple; we only shortened a path, so each set of nodes
contradicting the simplicity would also show that the ADAG we started with would not
have been simple. It still has only one parent for each node in FreeD; we only changed
each edge vj1−1 → vj1 to vj1−1 → vj2 and removed the node vj2−1. The set of goals was not
manipulated, this also holds for the stage theory, so both are still bounded.
4.4.3 Shortening the Pop Paths
Lemma 4.18 (Bounding Pop Paths). Let D is an ADAG for a protocol P , which fulfils the restric-
tions of Theorem 4.12 as well as the restrictions that each node in FreeD has only one parent and
that the number of nodes in the push paths is double exponentially bounded in terms of the size of
the protocol. Then there exists an ADAG D′ fulfilling these restrictions, while the number of nodes
in Paths4D is double exponentially bounded as well.
Proof. We will prove this lemma by first shortening each single path and then showing that
the sum over all nodes in all paths is double exponentially bounded.
Shortening a Pop Path
Let D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) be such an ADAG with the DAG D = (V, F, µ), and let ~v =
[v1, . . . , vm] ∈ Paths
4
D. By Lemma 4.2 we can assume that there are no push symbols in the
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labeling of the nodes of ~v and that for all nodes vj ∈ ~v we have GoalsD(vj) = ∅ (otherwise,
vj would be in Paths
5
D).
Let M = 2|Q f |. Then we know that if m > M, there are two nodes vj1 , vj2 with β(vj1) = β(vj2)
and j1 < j2. Like in Section 4.4.2.2, we will replace the edge vj1−1 → vj1 by vj1−1 → vj2 .
However, we do not have to remove vj1 , . . . , vj2−1 (and the relevant descendants) explicitly,
as shown below.
Formally we define D′ based on D just by replacing the set of edges F with the following
set F′:
F′ = (F \
{
(vj1−1, vj1 , l)
∣∣ l ∈N}) ∪ { (vj1−1, vj2 , l) ∣∣ (vj1−1, vj1 , l) ∈ F} . (4.75)
This clearly leads to an ADAG: The only condition affected may be (ADAG iii b), but it still
holds because of β(vj1) = β(vj2).
Now we can use Lemma 4.3 which shows that each node w which was on a pop path
~w = [v1, . . . , vj1 , . . . , w, . . .] ∈ Paths
4
D and that is no descendant of vj2 can be removed, as it
is no longer a descendant of any α(t) for any t ∈ TP .
Then we get an ADAG with the necessary restrictions: The only thing we have to check is
that each node in FreeD has only one parent. In FreeD′ , there was exactly one node with
more than one parent: The node vj2 was a descendant of vj2−1 and vj1−1. But by applying
Lemma 4.3 we removed vj2−1, so this restriction holds again. We can repeat this procedure
until the length of each pop paths is bounded by M.
Bounding the Number of Pop Paths
We will show that in an ADAG D with a bounded length of the pop paths as described above,
there is at most a double exponential number of pop paths, which proves our statement that
there are at most double exponentially many nodes in the set Paths4D.
Let w ∈ FixedD ∪Paths5D be a node. Let tw be the tree rooted in w consisting of all paths
[v, . . .] ∈ Paths4D with w → v; we know this is a tree because the nodes in Paths
4
D have
exactly one parent. The grade of each node in this tree is bounded by the maximal degree
of the signature, and by assumption about the length of the pop paths the depth of the tree
is at most exponential. Hence, we know that there are at most double exponentially many
nodes in tw.
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As each path in Paths4D belongs to a tree tw, we can bound the number of nodes in Paths
4
D
by the following expression which is double exponential in terms of the size of the protocol:
∑
w∈FixedD
| {v ∈ V | v ∈ tw} | . (4.76)
This concludes the proof of this lemma and shows that the total number of nodes in an
ADAG can be bounded to be double exponential.
4.4.4 Reducing the ADAG Components
Lemma 4.19 (Bounding the ADAG). LetD is an ADAG for a protocol P with a double exponentially
bounded number of nodes in terms of the size of P , and with the bounds assumed in Theorem 4.12.
Then we can assume that the whole ADAG with all of its components has a double exponentially
bounded size.
Proof. Let D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ) be an ADAG with a double exponentially bounded
number of nodes. We will now show bounds for all components or reduce them, leading
to an ADAG that can be described in a double exponentially bounded amount of space.
We will use the assumption that the indices of register sequences i ∈ γ?(v, p) for each node
v and each symbol p ∈ δ(v) do not exceed an exponential size: By Lemma 4.2 the number
of register sequences in a node v, i. e., ∑p∈δ(v) |γ?(v, p)|, is bounded by the number of goals
that v leads to. As an upper bound, each node could lead to exponentially many goals
and thus have exponentially many register sequences. As the values of the indices do not
matter, we can rename each register sequence such that these indices are smaller than a
certain bound M ∈ O(2|P|) where O is the Landau notation.
Now we will turn to the components of the ADAG. As the set of nodes is bounded, D is
bounded as well. By the assumption transferred from Theorem 4.12, the stage theory Ψ is
exponentially bounded.
Now look at the set of anonymous constants Γ̂: We know we have at most M register
sequences at one node. Each of the register sequences could contain Z fresh anonymous
constants. Thus, the total number of constants occurring in the ADAG is also double expo-
nentially bounded, and we can set Γ̂′ ⊆ Γ̂ to contain all anonymous constants in all register
sequences as well as all constants used in the labeling of the DAG. Then, Γ̂′ is double expo-
nentially bounded.
4 Scaling Down ADAGs 113
Finally, look the functions of D:
α : sub(TP ) → V , (4.77)
β : V ×Q f ×N 99K V ×N×Ψ , (4.78)
γ : V ×Q f ×N 99K Γ̂′Z , (4.79)
δ : V 99K 2Q f , (4.80)
λ : Γ̂′ 99K V ×Q f ×N× {1, . . . , Z} . (4.81)
We will analyze the size of each set occurring in the list of functions above:
• The sets TP , Q f , and Z have polynomial size in terms of the size of the protocol.
• The sets sub(TP ), 2Q f , and Ψ are of exponential size.
• The cardinality of V, Γ̂′, and Γ̂′Z is double exponential.
• Finally, each occurrence of N can be substituted by M, which is double exponential.
Now we will use the fact that for finite sets A and B, the description of a function f : A →
B can be done in space O(|A| · log |B|) (with Landau notation O) by taking functions
µA : {1, . . . , |A|} → A and µB : B → {1, . . . , |B|} and storing the |A|-tuple(
µB( f (µA(1))), . . . , µB( f (µA(|A|)))
)
. (4.82)
Thus, all functions and hence the whole ADAG can be described in space that is at most
double exponential.
4.5 Proof of the Main Result
Proof of the Main Theorem 2.17. Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol. Theorems 4.12 allow us to
develop the following algorithm:
Algorithm 4.20. Let P = (P, Φ) be a protocol. Guess an execution scheme π and a stage mapping
f for P . Construct the instance Φ̂f of Φf of exponential size as shown in Definition 4.7. Take
a double exponential set Γ̂ of anonymous constants. Then guess a DAG D = (V, F, µ) of double
exponential size which uses only constants from Γ̂. Guess functions α, β, γ, δ, λ of appropriate type.
Then verify if the ADAG conditions (ADAG i a) to (ADAG iii d) hold for D = (D, Ψ, Γ̂, α, β, γ, δ, λ),
the protocol P and (π, f ). If that is the case, return »insecure«, otherwise return »secure«.
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Our algorithm decides in nondeterministic double exponential time if there is an attack by
constructing and guessing all necessary components in nondeterministic double exponen-
tial time and then checking the properties of an ADAG. The latter can be done by check-
ing (ADAG i) – this is possible in less than O(|β|) steps – and then iterating over each node,
checking conditions (ADAG ii) and (ADAG iii) for each node – this can mostly be done locally
in that node and its direct ancestors and descendants, the most complex thing to check is
the embedding in the case (ADAG iii d), but this only affects an exponential number of nodes,
i. e., the goals.
This concludes the proof of our main theorem: We can check nondeterministically in double




The goal of this report was to extend the model of selecting theories used to analyze re-
cursive cryptographic protocols; the extension now allows us to generate fresh tokens like
nonces or keys. Our main theorem shows that security of protocols in this model is decid-
able with respect to a bounded number of sessions.
To obtain this result we extended the formalism and protocol model introduced in [Tru05a,
Tru05b]: First, the signature of the protocol model was joined with an infinite set of con-
stants like in [KW04], then we modified the notion of ADAGs to cope with the generation of
fresh tokens and unbounded finite subsets of infinite signatures.
We have shown that in this model, security is equivalent to the absence of an ADAG, and so
we were able to prove decidability by bounding the size of ADAGs. To do so, we described
a method to scaled down any ADAG until its size is at most double exponential in terms of
the size of the protocol.
Extensions and Open Problems
A major disadvantage of this model is the necessity for simple or flat push clauses and sim-
ple or flat left-hand-sides in send clauses. Another problem is to find a tighter complexity
bound for the decision problem.
In addition, it would be interesting if anonymous constants could be used as keys in this
model. This is not trivial as the definition of an ADAG relies on the bounded number of keys
occurring in a protocol. Furthermore, allowing complex keys or algebraic properties of XOR
leads to undecidability in the general case [KT07]; but for restricted classes of protocols it
is possible to model properties of XOR while still maintaining decidability [KT07]. A future
direction could be to combine the approach of [KT07] with anonymous constants.
116
List of Figures
1.1 Decidability of Secrecy with Respect to Different Restrictions . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1 The Run of a Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 The Theory of a Protocol ΦP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2 Stages of a Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Illustration for Part 1 of the Proof of Lemma 3.11 (Stage Theory) . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Graph of an Attack (ADAG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 ADAG Conditions (ADAG iii a) to (ADAG iii d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.1 Illustration 1 for the Proof of Theorem 4.8 (Simple ADAGs) . . . . . . . . . . . 84



























































































Recursive Authentication Protocol, 17
Register Sequence, 22
Compatibility, 61
Ground Register Sequence, 22
Index, 64
Register Sequence of Variables, 22
Simple Register, 22





































[AC02] Roberto M. Amadio and Witold Charatonik. On Name Generation and Set-
Based Analysis in the Dolev-Yao Model. In CONCUR, volume 2421 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 499–514. Springer, 2002.
[AR00] Martín Abadi and Phillip Rogaway. Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography
(The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption). In Proceedings of the
International Conference IFIP on Theoretical Computer Science (TCS 2000), Exploring
New Frontiers of Theoretical Informatics, pages 3–22, London, UK, 2000. Springer-
Verlag.
[Bla01] Bruno Blanchet. An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog
Rules. In 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-14), pages
82–96, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, 2001. IEEE Computer Society.
[BO97] John A. Bull and David J. Otway. The Authentication Protocol. Technical Report
DRA/CIS3/PROJ/CORBA/SC/1/CSM/436-04/03, Defence Research Agency,
1997.
[Boy90] Colin Boyd. Hidden Assumptions in Cryptographic Protocols. Proceedings of
the IEEE, 137, Part E(6):433–436, 1990.
[BPW03] Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, and Michael Waidner. A Universally Com-
posable Cryptographic Library. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/015,
2003. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[BR93] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Entity Authentication and Key Distribution.
In CRYPTO, volume 773 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 232–249.
Springer, 1993.
[BS97] Jeremy Bryans and Steve Schneider. CSP, PVS and a Recursive Authentica-
tion Protocol. In DIMACS Workshop on Design and Formal Verification of Crypto
Protocols, 1997.
Bibliography 121
[CBH05] Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Colin Boyd, and Yvonne Hitchcock. Errors in
computational complexity proofs for protocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Re-
port 2005/351, 2005. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[CDL+99] Iliano Cervesato, Nancy A. Durgin, Patrick Lincoln, John C. Mitchell, and An-
dre Scedrov. A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis. In Proceedings of the 12th
IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW 1999), pages 55–69, 1999.
[CJ97] John A. Clark and Jeremy L. Jacob. A Survey of Authentication Protocol Litera-
ture. Version 1.0. http://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/~jac/papers/drareview.
ps.gz, 1997.
[CJM98] Edmund M. Clarke, Somesh Jha, and Wilfredo R. Marrero. Using State Space
Exploration and a Natural Deduction Style Message Derivation Engine to Verify
Security Protocols. In PROCOMET, volume 125 of IFIP Conference Proceedings,
pages 87–106. Chapman & Hall, 1998.
[CKRT03a] Yannick Chevalier, Ralf Küsters, Michaël Rusinowitch, and Mathieu Turuani.
An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR. In Proceedings of
the Eighteenth Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS 2003),
pages 261–270. IEEE, Computer Society Press, 2003.
[CKRT03b] Yannick Chevalier, Ralf Küsters, Michaël Rusinowitch, and Mathieu Turuani.
Deciding the Security of Protocols with Diffie-Hellman Exponentiation and
Products in Exponents. In FSTTCS 2003: Foundations of Software Technology and
Theoretical Computer Science — 23rd Conference, Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[CLS03] Hubert Comon-Lundh and Vitaly Shmatikov. Intruder Deductions, Constraint
Solving and Insecurity Decision in Presence of Exclusive Or. In LICS, page 271.
IEEE Computer Society, 2003.
[CS02] Hubert Common and Vitaly Shmatikov. Is it Possible to Decide Whether a
Cryptographic Protocol is Secure or not? Journal of Telecommunications and
Information Technology, 4:5–14, 2002.
[CW05] Véronique Cortier and Bogdan Warinschi. Computationally Sound, Automated
Proofs for Security Protocols. In ESOP, volume 3444 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 157–171. Springer, 2005.
Bibliography 122
[DK02] Hans Delfs and Helmut Knebl. Introduction to Cryptography: Principles and Ap-
plications. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, 2002.
[DLMS99] Nancy A. Durgin, Patrick Lincoln, John C. Mitchell, and Andre Scedrov. Un-
decidability of Bounded Security Protocols. In Proceedings of the Workshop on
Formal Methods and Security Protocols – FMSP, Trento, Italy, 1999.
[DLMS04] Nancy A. Durgin, Patrick Lincoln, John C. Mitchell, and Andre Scedrov. Mul-
tiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols. Journal of
Computer Security, 12(2):247–311, 2004.
[DS81] Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco. Timestamps in Key Distribu-
tion Protocols. Communications of the ACM, 24(8):533–536, 1981.
[DY83] Danny Dolev and Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. On the Security of Public Key Proto-
cols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 29(2):198–207, 1983.
[EG83] Shimon Even and Oded Goldreich. On the Security of Multi-Party Ping-Pong
Protocols. In FOCS, pages 34–39. IEEE, 1983.
[FHG98] F. Javier Thayer Fábrega, Jonathan C. Herzog, and Joshua D. Guttman. Strand
Spaces: Why is a Security Protocol Correct? In Proceedings of the 1998 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1998.
[FS00] Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier. A Cryptographic Evaluation of IPsec. http:
//www.schneier.com/paper-ipsec.html, 2000.
[GB01] Shafi Goldwasser and Mihir Bellare. Lecture Notes on Cryptography. Summer
Course »Cryptography and Computer Security« at MIT, 1996–2001, 2001.
[HE95] Kipp E. B. Hickman and Taher Elgamal. The SSL Protocol, 1995. Internet-Draft
draft-hickman-netscape-ssl-01.txt.
[Hor51] Alfred Horn. On Sentences Which are True of Direct Unions of Algebras. The
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 16(1):14–21, 1951.
[Kau05] Charlie Kaufman. Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol. RFC 4306 (Proposed
Standard), 2005.
[KKW05] Detlef Kähler, Ralf Küsters, and Thomas Wilke. Deciding Properties of
Contract-Signing Protocols. In STACS, volume 3404 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 158–169. Springer, 2005.
Bibliography 123
[Kow79] Robert A. Kowalski. Logic for Problem Solving. Prentice Hall PTR, Upper Saddle
River, NJ, USA, 1979.
[KT07] Ralf Küsters and Tomasz Truderung. On the Automatic Analysis of Recursive
Security Protocols with XOR. In W. Thomas and P. Weil, editors, Proceedings
of the 24th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2007),
volume 4393 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2007.
[Küs03] Ralf Küsters. Tree Transducer-based Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols.
Technical Report 0301, Institut für Informatik und Praktische Mathematik,
CAU Kiel, Germany, 2003. Available from http://www.informatik.uni-
kiel.de/reports/2003/0301.html.
[KW04] Ralf Küsters and Thomas Wilke. Automata-Based Analysis of Recursive Cryp-
tographic Protocols. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Symposium on Theoretical
Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2004), volume 2996 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 382–393. Springer-Verlag, 2004.
[Llo84] John W. Lloyd. Foundations of logic programming. Springer-Verlag, New York,
NY, USA, 1984.
[Low95] Gavin Lowe. An Attack on the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Authentication
Protocol. Information Processing Letters, 56(3):131–133, 1995.
[Low96] Gavin Lowe. Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
Using FDR. In Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems,
Second International Workshop (TACAS 1996), volume 1055 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 147–166. Springer-Verlag, 1996.
[Mea95] Catherine Meadows. Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols: A Survey.
In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications
of Cryptology (ASIACRYPT 1994), pages 135–150, London, UK, 1995. Springer-
Verlag.
[Mea00] Catherine Meadows. Extending Formal Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Tech-
niques for Group Protocols and Low-Level Cryptographic Primitives. In Pro-
ceedings of the Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS 2000), pages 1–4,
2000.
Bibliography 124
[Mea01] Catherine Meadows. Open Issues in Formal Methods for Cryptographic Pro-
tocol Analysis. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Information As-
surance in Computer Networks (MMM-ACNS 2001), page 21, London, UK, 2001.
Springer-Verlag.
[Mea03] Catherine Meadows. Formal Methods for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis:
Emerging Issues and Trends. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
21(1):44–54, January 2003.
[MMS97] John C. Mitchell, Mark Mitchell, and Ulrich Stern. Automated Analysis of
Cryptographic Protocols using Murϕ. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy, pages 141–151. IEEE Computer Society, 1997.
[MVO96] Alfred J. Menezes, Scott A. Vanstone, and Paul C. Van Oorschot. Handbook of
Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, USA, 1996.
[Nie05] Robert Nieuwenhuis, editor. Automated Deduction - CADE-20, 20th International
Conference on Automated Deduction, Tallinn, Estonia, July 22-27, 2005, Proceedings,
volume 3632 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2005.
[NS78] Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder. Using Encryption for Authenti-
cation in Large Networks of Computers. Commun. ACM, 21(12):993–999, 1978.
[OR87] David J. Otway and Owen Rees. Efficient and Timely Mutual Authentication.
Operating Systems Review, 21(1):8–10, 1987.
[Pau97] Lawrence C. Paulson. Mechanized Proofs for a Recursive Authentication Pro-
tocol. In Proceedings of the 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW
1997), pages 84–95, Washington, DC, USA, 1997. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[PQ01] Olivier Pereira and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. A Security Analysis of the Cliques
Protocols Suites. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Workshop, pages 73–81. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2001.
[Rob65] John Alan Robinson. A Machine-Oriented Logic Based on the Resolution Prin-
ciple. Journal of the ACM, 12(1):23–41, 1965.
[RS98] Peter Y. A. Ryan and Steve A. Schneider. An Attack on a Recursive Authen-
tication Protocol. A Cautionary Tale. Information Processing Letters, 65(1):7–10,
1998.
Bibliography 125
[RT01] Michaël Rusinowitch and Mathieu Turuani. Protocol Insecurity with Finite
Number of Sessions is NP-Complete. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE Workshop
on Computer Security Foundations (CSFW 2001), page 174, Washington, DC, USA,
2001. IEEE Computer Society.
[RT03] Michaël Rusinowitch and Mathieu Turuani. Protocol Insecurity with a Finite
Number of Sessions and Composed Keys is NP-complete. Theoretical Computer
Science, 299(1-3):451–475, 2003.
[SB05] Graham Steel and Alan Bundy. Attacking group protocols by refuting incorrect
inductive conjectures. Journal of Automated Reasoning, Special Issue on Auto-
mated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis:1–28, December 2005.
[SNS88] Jennifer G. Steiner, B. Clifford Neuman, and Jeffrey I. Schiller. Kerberos: An
Authentication Service for Open Network Systems. In Proceedings of the USENIX
Winter 1988 Technical Conference, pages 191–202. USENIX Association, 1988.
[Sti95] Douglas R. Stinson. Cryptography: Theory and Practice (Discrete Mathematics and
its Applications). CRC Press, 1995.
[Tru05a] Tomasz Truderung. Regular Protocols and Attacks with Regular Knowledge.
In Nieuwenhuis [Nie05], pages 377–391.
[Tru05b] Tomasz Truderung. Selecting Theories and Recursive Protocols. In Concurrency
Theory, 16th International Conference (CONCUR 2005), volume 3653 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 217–232. Springer, 2005.
[VSS05] Kumar Neeraj Verma, Helmut Seidl, and Thomas Schwentick. On the Com-
plexity of Equational Horn Clauses. In Nieuwenhuis [Nie05], pages 337–352.
[Ylö96] Tatu Ylönen. SSH – Secure Login Connections over the Internet. In Proceedings
of the 6th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 37–42, San Jose, CA, USA, 1996.
USENIX Association.
[Zho99] Jianying Zhou. Fixing a Security Flaw in IKE Protocols. Electronic Letter,
35(13):1072–1073, 1999.
